

Policy assessments for the carbon emission flows and sustainability of Bitcoin blockchain operation in China

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Abstract

The large energy consumption and the associated carbon emission of the Bitcoin blockchain operations are growing to a non-negligible problem that could potentially undermine the sustainable efforts of many countries around the world. In this paper, we make the first and original attempt to investigate the carbon emission flows of the Bitcoin blockchain operations in China under different carbon policies with a Bitcoin blockchain carbon emission (BBCE) model. We find that without any policy interventions, the annual energy consumption of the Bitcoin blockchain in China is expected to maximize in 2024 at 296.59 Twh and generate 130.50 million metric tons of carbon emission flows correspondingly, which would exceed the annualized greenhouse gas emission level of the Czech Republic and Portugal in 2016. Moreover, the maximum carbon emission per GDP of the Bitcoin industry is estimated to reach 10.77 kg/USD in June 2026 based on benchmark assessments. In addition, policies that induce changes in the energy consumption structure of the mining activities may be more effective than intuitive punitive measures in limiting the total amount of carbon emission in the Bitcoin blockchain operation. In particular, we find that market access policy has an incentive effect on the emission reduction of the Bitcoin industry. After evaluating the policy effectiveness, we provide some novel insights for the sustainable operations of the disruptive blockchain technology by analyzing the carbon emissions pattern of the Bitcoin blockchain.

Keywords: Blockchain; Bitcoin; Sustainability; Carbon emission; Policy design

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34 As Bitcoin attracted a considerable amount of attention in recent years, its underlying core
35 mechanism, namely blockchain technology, has also quickly gained popularity. Due to its key
36 characteristics such as decentralization, auditability and anonymity, blockchain is widely regarded
37 as one of the most promising and attractive technologies for a variety of industries, such as supply
38 chain finance, production operations management, logistics management and the Internet of Things
39 (IoT) ^{1,2,3}. Although blockchain is widely regarded as one of the most promising and attractive
40 technologies for a variety of industries, its first application in the actual operation of the Bitcoin
41 network indicates that there exist a non-negligible energy and carbon emission drawback with the
42 current consensus algorithm. Therefore, there is an urgent need to address this issue. This paper take
43 the first and original attempt to take the initial steps by quantifying the current and future carbon
44 emission patterns of Bitcoin blockchain operations in China under different carbon policies. In
45 recent years, the system dynamics (SD) based model is widely introduced for carbon emission
46 flows estimation for a specific area or industry^{4,5}. In comparison to its counterparts, SD modelling
47 has the two main advantages in carbon emission flows assessment: firstly, with the help of the
48 feedback loops of stock and flow parameters combined, system dynamics technique is able to
49 capture the interactions of variables in a complex system, which enables the simulation and
50 estimation of specific industry operations^{6,7,8}. In addition, intended policies can be adjusted for
51 scenario policy effectiveness evaluation, since the SD based model is focused on disequilibrium
52 dynamics of the complex system^{9,10}. Based on system dynamics modeling, we develop the Bitcoin
53 blockchain carbon emission model (BBCE) to assess the carbon emission flows of the Bitcoin
54 network operations in China under different scenarios.

55
56 This paper serves as the original attempt to use the theory of carbon footprint to create the
57 theoretical model for Bitcoin blockchain carbon emission assessment and policy evaluation ^{11,12}.
58 First, we establish the system boundary and feedback loops for the Bitcoin blockchain carbon
59 emission system, which serve as the theoretical framework to investigate the carbon emission
60 mechanism of the Bitcoin blockchain. The BBCE model consists of three interacting subsystems:
61 Bitcoin blockchain mining and transaction subsystem, Bitcoin blockchain energy consumption

62 subsystem and Bitcoin blockchain carbon emission subsystem. Specifically speaking, transactions
63 packaged in the block are confirmed when the block is formally broadcasted to the Bitcoin
64 blockchain. To increase the probability of mining a new block and getting rewarded, the mining
65 hardware will be updated continuously and invested by network participants for a higher hash rate,
66 which would cause the hash rate of the whole network to rise. The network mining power in is
67 determined by two factors: first, the network hash rate (hashes computed per second) positively
68 accounts for the mining power increase in the Bitcoin blockchain when high hash rate miners are
69 invested; second, the power usage effectiveness (PUE) is introduced to illustrate the energy
70 consumption efficiency of Bitcoin blockchain as suggested by Stoll¹³. Finally, the network energy
71 cost of the Bitcoin mining process is determined by the network energy consumption and average
72 electricity price, which further influences the dynamics behaviors of Bitcoin miner's investment.
73 Then, the BBCE model collects the carbon footprint of Bitcoin miners both in heavy and clean
74 energy regions and formulates the overall carbon emission flows of the whole Bitcoin blockchain in
75 China. The level variable GDP consists of Bitcoin miner's income and total cost, which reflects the
76 productivity of the Bitcoin blockchain. It also serves as an auxiliary factor to generate the carbon
77 emission per GDP in our model, which provides guidance for policy makers in implementing the
78 punitive carbon taxation on the Bitcoin industry. Bitcoin blockchain reward halving occurs every
79 four years, which means that the reward of broadcasting a new block in Bitcoin blockchain will be
80 zero in 2140. As a result, the Bitcoin market price increases periodically due to the halving
81 mechanism of Bitcoin blockchain. Finally, by combining both carbon cost and energy cost, the total
82 cost of the Bitcoin mining process provides negative feedback for miner's income and their
83 investment strategies. Miners will gradually stop investing and updating mining hardware in China
84 when the total cost exceeds the income in our BBCE simulation. The whole theoretical relationships
85 of BBCE parameters are demonstrated in Figure 5.

86

87 We find that the annualized energy consumption of the Bitcoin blockchain in China will reach its
88 maximum in 2024 at 296.59 Twh based on the benchmark simulation, which exceeds the electricity
89 consumption level of Italy and Netherland and ranks 13th among all countries in 2016.

90 Correspondingly, the carbon emission flows of the Bitcoin operations are expected to maximize at
91 130.50 million metric tons per year in 2024, which surpasses the total greenhouse gas emission
92 level of the Czech Republic and Portugal in 2016 reported by cia.gov under the benchmark
93 scenario without any policy intervention. In addition, the maximized carbon emission per GDP of
94 the Bitcoin industry is estimated to reach 10.77 kg/USD based on system dynamics assessments.
95 The BBCE simulation results suggest that some commonly implemented carbon emission policies,
96 such as carbon taxation, are relatively ineffective for the Bitcoin industry. On the contrary, site
97 regulation policies for Bitcoin miners are able to provide effective negative feedbacks for the
98 carbon emission of Bitcoin blockchain operations.

99 Compared with the previous studies, the main contributions of this paper are as follows: First, to the
100 best of our knowledge, none of the existing literature establishes a systematic theoretical framework
101 to assess the carbon emission flows and productivity of the Bitcoin industry in China, which are
102 unaccounted for in the current GDP and carbon emissions calculations. Second, this paper firstly
103 evaluates and assess multiple feasible policies for Bitcoin carbon emissions regulation through a
104 system dynamics model, which indicates that some common policies used for common emissions
105 control are not effective due to the unique characteristics of the PoW algorithms in the Bitcoin
106 blockchain. Third, some novel insights are provided for the sustainable operations of the disruptive
107 blockchain technology by analyzing the carbon emissions pattern of the Bitcoin blockchain.


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109 **The energy and carbon emission problem of PoW algorithm in China**

110 Although the PoW has enabled Bitcoin blockchain to operate in a relatively stable manner, several
111 unexpected behaviors of the Bitcoin blockchain have been detected: first, the attractive financial
112 incentive of Bitcoin mining has caused an arms race in dedicated mining hardware¹⁴. The mining
113 hardware has evolved through several generations. Initially, miners used the basic Central
114 Processing Unit (CPU) on general-purpose computers. Then, a shift was made to the Graphic
115 Processing Unit (GPU) that offered more power and higher hash rates than the CPU. Finally, the
116 Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) that were optimized to perform hashing

117 calculations were introduced. Nevertheless, the rapid hardware development and fierce competition
 118 have significantly increased the capital expenditure for Bitcoin mining¹⁵; second, the Bitcoin
 119 mining activity and the constant-running mining hardware has led to large energy consumption
 120 volume. Previous literature has estimated that the Bitcoin blockchain could consume as much
 121 energy per year as small to medium-sized countries such as Denmark, Ireland, or Bangladesh¹⁶;
 122 finally, the large energy consumption of the Bitcoin blockchain has created considerable carbon
 123 emissions. It is estimated that between the period of January 1st, 2016 and June 30th, 2018, up to 13
 124 million metric tons of CO₂ emissions can be attributed to the Bitcoin blockchain¹⁷. Although the
 125 estimate ranges vary considerably, they have indicated that energy consumption of network and its
 126 corresponding environmental impacts have become a non-negligible issue.

127



128
 129 **Fig. 1 | Mining pool distributions of Bitcoin blockchain.** As of April 2020, China accounts for more than
 130 75% of Bitcoin blockchain operation around the world. Some rural areas in China are considered as the ideal
 131 destination for Bitcoin mining, which is mainly due to the cheaper electricity price and large undeveloped
 132 land for pool construction. The mining pool statistics is obtained from <https://btc.com/stats>.

133

134 The growing energy consumption and the environmental impacts of the Bitcoin blockchain have
 135 posed problems for many countries, especially for China. Due to the closeness to manufacturers of

136 specialized hardware and access to cheap electricity, a majority of the mining process has been
 137 conducted in China as miners in the country account for more than 75% of the Bitcoin network’s
 138 hashing power, as shown in Figure 1. As one of the largest energy consuming countries on the
 139 planet, China is a key member of greenhouse gas reduction ratifications in the Paris
 140 Agreement^{18,19,20}. However, without appropriate interventions and feasible policies, the intensive
 141 Bitcoin blockchain operations in China can quickly grow as a threat that could potentially
 142 undermine the emission reduction effort taken place in the country ¹⁰.

143

Table 1 Scenario parameter settings				
Scenarios	Measures	Market access	Miner site selection	Carbon tax
Benchmark (BM)	Baseline policy intervention	100%	40%	2
Market access (MA)	Raise the market access standards for Bitcoin miners	50%	40%	2
Site regulation (SR)	Strict regulation on Bitcoin industry in the coal-heavy area	100%	20%	2
Carbon tax (CT)	Extra Punitive carbon tax on Bitcoin mining	100%	40%	5

Note: Exogenous auxiliary parameters are introduced to assess the carbon emission flows under different Bitcoin policy measures. In terms of variable settings, three main parameters are chosen as the scenario factors in the proposed BBCE model, including market access (MA), miner site regulation (SR) and carbon tax (CT).

144

145 Suggested by the previous work²¹ and the subsystems of our proposed BBCE model, we consider
 146 three main Bitcoin policies conducted at a different stage of the Bitcoin mining industry, which then
 147 formulates the four scenario assessments for Bitcoin blockchain carbon emission flows (in Table 1).
 148 In detail, Benchmark (BM) scenario is a baseline and current scenario of each policy factor, which


149 suggests that the Bitcoin industry continues to operate under the least policy intervention. In the
150 benchmark scenario, market access is assumed to be 100%, which indicates that profitable Bitcoin
151 miners of all efficiencies are allowed to operate in China. Suggested by the actual regional statistics
152 of Bitcoin miners, we assume 40% of miners are located in coal-heavy areas in the benchmark
153 scenario. Moreover, the punitive carbon tax will be doubled if the carbon emission per GDP of the
154 Bitcoin industry is greater than 2. In the other three scenarios, policies on different Bitcoin mining
155 procedures are adjusted due to energy saving and emission reduction concerns. Specifically, in the
156 Bitcoin mining and transaction subsystem, market access standard is doubled, i.e., profitable miners
157 with low efficiency are forbidden to enter the Chinese Bitcoin market in the market access (MA)
158 scenario, and policy makers are forced to maintain the network stability of Bitcoin blockchain in a
159 efficient manner. In the site regulation (SR) scenario, Bitcoin miners in coal-heavy areas are
160 persuaded and suggested to relocate to the hydro-rich area, which results in only 20% of miners
161 remaining in coal-heavy areas in the scenario. In the carbon tax (CT) scenario, a more strict carbon
162 tax is increased to five-times the initial value to enforce more strict punishment for high carbon
163 emission behaviors of Bitcoin blockchain. Utilizing the above scenarios, carbon emission flows and
164 energy consumptions of Bitcoin blockchain are assessed, and the carbon and energy reduction
165 effectiveness of different policies is evaluated in BBCE simulations from the period of 2014 to
166 2030.

167

168 **Carbon emission flows of Bitcoin blockchain operation**

169 The maximized annual energy consumption and carbon emission of the Bitcoin blockchain in China
170 are expected to exceed those of some developed countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, Czech
171 Republic and Portugal. Without any policy interventions, the carbon emission pattern of the Bitcoin
172 blockchain will become a non-negligible barrier against the sustainability efforts of China. Figure 2
173 reports the annualized energy consumption and carbon emission flows of Bitcoin blockchain in
174 China. As the baseline assessment under the least policy intervention, the benchmark scenario
175 simulates the natural operation results of the Bitcoin blockchain. In the BM scenario, the annual
176 energy consumption of Bitcoin blockchain in China will gradually grow and eventually maximize

177 in 2024, at 296.59 Twh per year. In fact, electricity consumed by Bitcoin blockchain in 2024 will
 178 exceed the electricity consumption level of Italy and the Netherlands in 2016 and ranks 13 among
 179 all the countries, which indicates the energy intensive pattern of Bitcoin industry operations.
 180 Regarding the carbon tax scenario, the highest energy demand of the Bitcoin industry slightly
 181 decreases due to carbon emission penalties, at 217.37 Twh. However, the results of the market
 182 assess and site regulation scenarios indicate that the total energy consumption of the Bitcoin
 183 industry will reach 350.11 Twh and 319.80 Twh respectively in 2024 and 2025.
 184



185
 186 **Fig. 2 | Annualized scenario simulation results.** In comparison to the country-level consumption and
 187 emission statistics, annualized energy consumption (a) and carbon emission flows (b) of Bitcoin operation in
 188 China are generated through monthly simulation results of each scenario. Annual energy consumption and
 189 ranking of countries are obtained from cia.gov (www.cia.gov), carbon emission and ranking of countries are
 190 collected from global carbonatlas (www.globalcarbonatlas.org).

191

192 It is clear that the carbon emission behavior of the Bitcoin industry is consistent with the Bitcoin
193 blockchain energy consumption intensity. As a result, in the BM scenario, annual carbon emission
194 of the Bitcoin industry is expected to reach its maximum in 2024, at 130.50 million metric tons. In
195 essence, the carbon emission pattern of the Bitcoin industry would become an increasing threat to
196 China's greenhouse emission reduction target, since the estimated Bitcoin carbon emission in China
197 exceeds the total greenhouse emission of the Czech Republic and Portugal in 2016 and ranks 36
198 worldwide. In comparison, the carbon emissions generated by Bitcoin blockchain significantly
199 experienced a significant reduction in SR and CT scenarios, which illustrates the positive impact of
200 these carbon-related policies. On the contrary, the MA scenario witnesses an extraordinary increase
201 of Bitcoin carbon emission to 140.71 million metric tons in 2025.

202

203 Based on the scenario results of the BBCE model, the Benchmark scenario indicates that the energy
204 consumed, and the carbon emissions generated by Bitcoin industry operations are simulated to grow
205 continuously as long as mining Bitcoin maintains its profitability in China. This is mainly due to the
206 positive feedback loop of the competitive mechanism of PoW, which requires advanced and high
207 energy-consuming mining hardware for Bitcoin miners in order to increase the probability of
208 earning block rewards. In addition, the flows and long-term trend of carbon emission simulated by
209 the proposed system dynamics model are consistent with several previous estimations^{10,13}, which
210 are devoted to precisely estimate the carbon footprint of Bitcoin blockchain.

211

212 The Paris Agreement is a worldwide agreement committed to limit the increase of global average
213 temperature^{22,23}. Under the Paris Agreement, China is devoted to cut down 60% of the carbon
214 emission per GDP by 2030 based on that of 2005. However, according to the simulation results of
215 the BBCE model, we find that the carbon emission pattern of Bitcoin blockchain will become a
216 potential barrier against the emission reduction target of China, since the maximized carbon
217 emission per GDP of Bitcoin industry is expected to sit at 10.77 kg per USD in the benchmark
218 scenario. In addition, in the current national economy and carbon emission accounting of China, the

219 operations of the Bitcoin blockchain have not been listed as an independent department for carbon
220 emissions and productivity calculation. This adds difficulty for policy makers to monitor the actual
221 behaviors of the Bitcoin industry and design well-directed policies. In fact, the energy consumption
222 per transaction of Bitcoin network is larger than lots of mainstream financial transactions channels¹⁷.
223 To address this issue, we suggest policy makers to set up separated accounts for the Bitcoin industry
224 in order to better manage and control its carbon emission behaviors in China.

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
226 **Carbon policy effectiveness evaluation**

227 Policies that induce changes in the energy consumption structure of the mining activities may be
228 more effective than intuitive punitive measures in limiting the total amount of energy consumption
229 and carbon emission in the Bitcoin blockchain operation. Figure 3 presents the values of key
230 parameters simulated by BBCE model. The carbon emission per GDP of the BM scenario in China
231 is larger than that of all other scenarios throughout the whole simulation period, reaching a
232 maximum of 10.77kg per USD in June 2026. However, we find that the policy effectiveness under
233 the MA and CT scenario is rather limited on carbon emission intensity reduction, i.e., the policy
234 effect of market access is examined to reduce in August 2027 and the carbon tax is expected to be
235 effective until July 2024. Among all the intended policies, the SR scenario is simulated to
236 significantly cut the carbon emission per GDP of the Bitcoin industry to 6 kg per USD in its
237 maximum. Overall, the carbon emissions per GDP of the Bitcoin industry far exceed the average
238 industrial carbon intensity of China, which indicates that Bitcoin blockchain operation is a highly
239 carbon intense industry.

240

241 In the BM scenario, Bitcoin miner profits are expected to drop to zero in April 2024, which suggests
242 that the Bitcoin miners will gradually stop mining in China and relocate their operations elsewhere.
243 Correspondingly, the network hash rate is computed to reach 1775 EH per second in the BM
244 scenario and the miner total cost will maximize to 1268 million dollars. Comparing the scenario
245 results for the three policies, the profitability of mining Bitcoin in China is expected to deteriorate

246 more quickly in the CT scenario. On the other hand, Bitcoin blockchain can maintain profitability
 247 for a longer period in MA and SR scenarios.
 248



249 **Fig. 3 | BBCE scenario assessment comparisons.** a-f, monthly energy consumption (a), carbon emission
 250 flow (b), carbon emission per GDP (c), miner profits (d), network hash rate (e) and miner total cost (f) under
 251 each intended policy are simulated and calculated by BBCE framework. Based on the regressed parameters
 252 of the BBCE model, the whole sample timesteps of network carbon emission assessment cover the period
 253 from January 2014 to January 2030.
 254

255
 256 Some attracting conclusions can be drawn based on the results of BBCE simulation: Although the
 257 MA scenario enhances the market access standard to increase Bitcoin miners' efficiencies, it is
 258 regarded as an emission-prompted policy rather than an emission-reduced policy based on the
 259 simulation results. In the MA scenario, we observe the phenomenon of "Incentive Effects" proposed
 260 by previous works, which is identified in other fields of industrial policies, such as monetary
 261 policies, transportation regulations and firm investment strategies^{24,25,26}. In essence, the purpose of

262 the market access policy is to limit the mining operations of low-efficiency Bitcoin miners in China.
263 However, the survived miners are all devoted to squeezing more proportion of the network hash rate,
264 which enables them to stay profitable for a longer period. In addition, the Bitcoin industry in China
265 is simulated to generate more CO₂ emissions under the MA scenario, which is mainly due to the
266 Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm and profit-pursuit behaviors of Bitcoin miners. The results of the
267 MA scenario indicate that market-related policy is likely to be less effective in dealing with high
268 carbon emission behaviors of the Bitcoin blockchain operations.

269

270 The carbon taxation policy is widely acknowledged as the most effective and most commonly
271 implemented policy on carbon emission reduction²⁷. However, the simulation results of the CT
272 scenario indicate that carbon tax only provides limited effectiveness for the Bitcoin industry. The
273 carbon emission patterns of the CT scenario are consistent with the BM scenario until Bitcoin
274 miners are aware that their mining profitabilities are affected by the punitive carbon tax on Bitcoin
275 mining. On the contrary, the evidence from the SR scenario shows that the carbon-related policies
276 are able to provide negative feedbacks for the carbon emissions of Bitcoin blockchain operations. In
277 our simulation, the maximized carbon emission per GDP of the Bitcoin industry is halved in the SR
278 scenario in comparison to that in the BM scenario.

279

280 In general, the carbon emission intensity of the Bitcoin blockchain still far exceeds the average
281 industrial emission intensity of China under different policy interventions on the operation process
282 of Bitcoin blockchain in China, including limiting Bitcoin mining access, altering the miner energy
283 consumption structure and implementing carbon emissions tax. This result indicates the stable high
284 carbon emission property of Bitcoin blockchain operations. Nevertheless, it is rather surprising to
285 arrive at the conclusion that the newly introduced cryptocurrency based on disruptive blockchain
286 technology is expected to become an energy and carbon-intensive industry in the near future.

287

288 **Future consensus algorithm design for blockchain technology**

289 The current Proof-of-Work consensus algorithm used in the Bitcoin blockchain can potentially
290 undermine the wide implementation and the operational sustainability of the disruptive blockchain
291 technology. Overall, Bitcoin is a typical and pioneering implementation of blockchain technology.
292 Its decentralized transaction characteristics and consensus algorithm provide a novel solution for
293 trust mechanism construction, which can be beneficial and innovative for a variety of industrial
294 development and remote transactions. In recent years, blockchain technology has been introduced
295 and adopted by abundant traditional industries that seek to optimize their operation process in the
296 real world²⁸, such as supply chain finance²⁹, smart contract³⁰, international business and trade³¹, as
297 well as manufacturing operations³². In addition, a national digital currency based on blockchain
298 technology, namely Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP), is scheduled and designed by
299 The People's Bank of China, which is expected to replace the current paper-currency based M0
300 supply in China.

301

302 However, the current consensus algorithm of Bitcoin, namely Proof-of-Work, gives rise to the hash
303 rate competitions among Bitcoin miners for its potential block reward, which attracts an increasing
304 number of miners to engage in and raise the energy consumption volumes of the whole Bitcoin
305 blockchain. As a result, although PoW is designed to decentralized Bitcoin transactions and prevent
306 inflation, we find that it would become an energy and carbon-intensive protocol, which eventually
307 leads to the high carbon emission patterns of Bitcoin blockchain operation in China. The evidence
308 of Bitcoin blockchain operations suggests that with the broaden usages and applications of
309 blockchain technology, new protocols should be designed and scheduled in an
310 environmentally-friendly manner. This change is necessary to ensure the sustainability of the
311 network - after all, no one wants to witness a disruptive and promising technique to become a
312 carbon-intensive technology that hinders the carbon emission reduction efforts around the world.
313 The auditable and decentralized transaction properties of blockchain provide a novel solution for
314 trust mechanism construction, which can be beneficial and innovative for a variety of industrial
315 development and remote transactions. However, the high GHG emission behavior of Bitcoin

316 blockchain may pose a barrier to the worldwide effort on GHG emission management in the near
317 future. As a result, the above tradeoff is worthy of future exploration and investigation

318

319 Different from traditional industries, the carbon emission flows of “emerging” industries such as
320 Bitcoin blockchain operation are unaccounted for in the current GDP and carbon emissions
321 calculations. Without proper accounting and regulation, it is rather challenging to assess the carbon
322 emission flows of these “new” industries using traditional tools such as input-output analysis.
323 Through system dynamics modeling, our analysis effectively tackled this issue by constructing the
324 emission feedback loops as well as capturing the carbon emission patterns. Furthermore, we are
325 able to conduct emission assessment and evaluate the effectiveness of various potential
326 implementable policies. Overall, our results have demonstrated that system dynamics modeling is a
327 promising approach to investigate the carbon flow mechanisms in emerging industries.

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
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404 **Methods**

405

406 This paper constructs a BBCE model to investigate the feedback loops of Bitcoin blockchain and
407 simulate the carbon emission flows of its operations in China. In view of the complexity of Bitcoin
408 blockchain operations and carbon emission process, the system dynamics model for Bitcoin carbon
409 emission assessment is mainly based on the following assumptions: (1) The electricity consumption
410 of the Bitcoin mining process mainly consists of two types of energy: coal-based heavy energy and
411 hydro-based clean energy. (2) Bitcoin price is extremely volatile in real market operations, which is
412 inappropriate for long-term assessment in the BBCE model. Referring to the historical Bitcoin price
413 data, we assume that the long-term Bitcoin price is mainly affected by the halving mechanism of
414 Bitcoin mining rewards. (3) Miners stop or choose other destinations for mining if the Bitcoin
415 mining process is no longer profitable in China. (4) Bitcoin policies are consistent with the overall
416 carbon emission flows in China. In other words, policies such as market access of Bitcoin miners
417 and carbon tax of the Bitcoin blockchain operations can be rejiggered for different emission
418 intensity levels.

419



420

421 **Fig. 4 | Flow diagram of BBCE modelling.** Parameters of the Bitcoin blockchain carbon emission
422 system in Figure 4 are quantified in BBCE simulations, which are suggested by the feedback loops
423 of Bitcoin blockchain. The whole quantitative relationships of BBCE parameters are demonstrated
424 in Appendix B.

425

426 Utilizing the flow diagram of BBCE systems illustrated in Figure 4, detailed feedback loops and
427 flows of Bitcoin blockchain subsystems are discussed and clarified. The types, definitions, units and
428 related references of each variable in Figure 4 are reported in Appendix A.

429

430 1) Bitcoin mining and transaction subsystem

431

432 The Bitcoin blockchain utilizes Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus algorithm for generating new
433 blocks and validating transactions. Bitcoin miners earn a reward if the hash value of target blocks
434 computed by their hardware is validated by the whole network participants. On the other hand,
435 transactions packaged in the block are confirmed when the block is formally broadcasted to the
436 Bitcoin blockchain. To increase the probability of mining a new block and getting rewarded, the
437 mining hardware will be updated continuously and invested by network participants for higher hash
438 rate, which would cause the hash rate of the whole network to rise. In order to maintain the constant
439 10-minute per new block generation process, the difficulty of generating a new block is adjusted by
440 the current hash rate of the whole Bitcoin network.

441

442 The halving mechanism of block reward is designed to control the total Bitcoin circulation
443 (maximum of 21 million Bitcoins) and prevent inflation. Reward halving occurs every four years,
444 which means that the reward of broadcasting a new block in Bitcoin blockchain will be zero in 2140.
445 As a result, the Bitcoin market price increases periodically due to the halving mechanism of Bitcoin
446 blockchain. With the growing popularity and broadened transaction scope of Bitcoin, the total
447 transactions and transaction fee per block may steadily grow, which drive the other source of
448 Bitcoin miner's income. Overall, the profit of Bitcoin mining can be calculated by subtracting the

449 total cost of energy consumption and carbon emissions from block reward and transaction fees.
450 Miners will stop investing and updating mining hardware in China when the total cost exceeds the
451 income. Consequently, the whole network hash rate receives the negative feedback due to the
452 investment intensity reductions.

453

454 2) Bitcoin energy consumption subsystem

455

456 The network mining power is determined by two factors: first, the network hash rate (hashes
457 computed per second) positively accounts for the mining power increase in Bitcoin network when
458 high hash rate miners are invested. However, the updated Bitcoin miners also attempt to reduce the
459 energy consumption per hash, i.e., improve the efficiency of Bitcoin mining process, which is
460 helpful for network mining power reduction. In addition, policy makers may raise the market access
461 standard and create barriers for the low-efficient miners to participate in Bitcoin mining activities in
462 China. In term of the energy consumption of the whole network, the power usage effectiveness is
463 introduced to illustrate the energy consumption efficiency of Bitcoin blockchain as suggested by
464 Stoll¹³. Finally, the network energy cost of Bitcoin mining process is determined by the network
465 energy consumption and average electricity price, which further influences the dynamics behaviors
466 of Bitcoin miner's investment.

467

468 3) Bitcoin carbon emission subsystem

469

470 The site selection strategies directly determine the energy types consumed by miners. Although the
471 electricity cost of distinctive energies are more or less the same, their carbon emission patterns may
472 vary significantly accordingly to their respective carbon intensity index. In comparison to miners
473 located in hydro-rich (clean energy) regions, miners located in coal-heavy (heavy energy) regions
474 generate more carbon emission flows under the similar mining techniques and energy usage
475 efficiency due to the higher carbon intensity of heavy energy¹⁷. The proposed SD model collects the

476 carbon footprint of Bitcoin miners both in heavy and clean energy regions, and formulates the
477 overall carbon emission flows of the whole Bitcoin blockchain in China.

478

479 The level variable GDP consists of Bitcoin miner's income and total cost, which suggests the
480 productivity of the Bitcoin blockchain. It also serves as an auxiliary factor to generate the carbon
481 emission per GDP in our model, which provides guidance for policy makers in implementing the
482 the punitive carbon taxation on Bitcoin industry. Finally, by combining both carbon cost and energy
483 cost, the total cost of Bitcoin mining process provides a negative feedback for miner's income and
484 their investment strategies.

485

486 The time-related Bitcoin blockchain time-series data are obtained from www.btc.com, including
487 network hash rate, block size, transaction fee and difficulty. In addition, the auxiliary parameters
488 and macroenvironment variables for network carbon emission flows assessment are set and
489 considered through various guidelines. For example, the carbon intensities of different energy are
490 suggested by Cheng et al.³². The average electricity cost and carbon taxation in China are collected
491 from the World Bank. The site proportion of Bitcoin miners in China are set based on the regional
492 statistics of Bitcoin mining pools in www.btc.com. Moreover, the monthly historical data of Bitcoin
493 blockchain are utilized for time-related parameter regression and simulation from the period of
494 January 2014 to January 2020. Based on the regressed parameters, the whole sample timesteps of
495 network carbon emission assessment cover the period from January 2014 to January 2030 in this
496 study, which is available for scenario investigations under different Bitcoin policies. The initial
497 value of static parameters in BBCE model are shown in Table 2, and the key quantitative settings of
498 each subsystem are respectively run as follows:

499

500 According to the guidance of the Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index
501 (<https://www.cbeci.org>) and Küfeoğlu and Özkuran⁹, Bitcoin mining equipment is required to
502 update and invest for remaining profitability. It is clear that mining hardware in the Bitcoin network
503 consists of various equipment and their specifications. As a result, the investment intensity in

504 Bitcoin blockchain is computed by the average price of a profitable mining hardware portfolio. the
505 quantitative relationship between investment intensity and time can be expressed as the following
506 form:

507

$$508 \quad \textit{Investment intensity} = \alpha_1 \times \textit{Time} \times \textit{Proportion} \quad (1)$$

509

510 Then the Bitcoin miner profits are accumulated by income and investment intensity flows, which
511 can be obtained as follows:

512

$$513 \quad \textit{Miner profits}_t = \int_0^t (\textit{Income} - \textit{Investment intensity}) dt \quad (2)$$

514

515 As discussed above, the aim of Bitcoin mining hardware investment is to improve the miner's hash
516 rate and the probability of broadcasting a new block. Utilizing the statistics of Bitcoin blockchain,
517 the hash rate of the Bitcoin network is regressed, and the equation is:

518

$$519 \quad \textit{Hash rate} = e^{\beta_1 + \alpha_2 \textit{Investment intensity}} \quad (3)$$

520

521 Similarly, the average block size of Bitcoin is consistent with time due to the growing popularity of
522 Bitcoin transactions and investment. The block size is estimated by time and is illustrated as below:

523

$$524 \quad \textit{Block size} = e^{\beta_2 + \alpha_3 \textit{Time}} \quad (4)$$

525

526 The proportion of Chinese miners in the Bitcoin mining process will gradually decrease if mining
527 Bitcoin in China is not profitable. So, the proportion parameter in the BBCE model is set as
528 follows:

529

$$530 \quad \textit{Proportion} = \textit{IF THEN ELSE} (\textit{Miner Profits} < 0, 0.7 - 0.01 \times \textit{Time}, 0.7) \quad (5)$$

531

532 The energy consumed per hash will reduce, i.e., the mining efficiency of the Bitcoin blockchain will
533 improve when updated Bitcoin hardware is invested and introduced. Moreover, the market access
534 proposed by policy makers also affects network efficiency. Consequently, the network efficiency
535 can be calculated as follows:

536

$$537 \quad \text{Efficiency} = e^{\beta_3 + \alpha_4 \times \text{Investment intensity} \times \text{Market access}} \quad (6)$$

538

539 Then the mining power of the Bitcoin blockchain can be obtained by hash rate and efficiency. The
540 equation of mining power is shown as follows:

541

$$542 \quad \text{Mining power} = \text{Hash rate} \times \text{Efficiency} \quad (7)$$

543

544 Finally, the energy consumed by the whole Bitcoin blockchain can be expressed by mining power
545 and power usage effectiveness:

546

$$547 \quad \text{Network energy consumption} = \text{Mining power} \times \text{Power usage effectiveness} \quad (8)$$

548

549 Employed the regional data of Bitcoin mining pools, heavy and clean energy is proportionally
550 consumed by distinctive Bitcoin pools. The total carbon flows in Bitcoin blockchain are measured
551 by the sum of both monthly heavy and clean energy carbon emissions. The integration of total
552 carbon emission is:

553

$$554 \quad \text{Carbon emission}_t = \int_0^t \text{Add Carbon emission} dt \quad (9)$$

555

556 In addition, carbon emissions per GDP are introduced to investigate the overall carbon intensity of
557 the Bitcoin mining process in China, which is formulated in the following equation:

558

$$559 \quad \text{Carbon emission per GDP} = \text{Carbon emission}/\text{GDP} \quad (10)$$

560

561 In BBCE model, punitive carbon taxation on the Bitcoin blockchain will be conducted by policy
562 makers if the carbon emission per GDP of the Bitcoin blockchain is larger than 2. As a result, the
563 carbon tax of Bitcoin blockchain is set as:

564

$$565 \quad \text{Carbontax} = 0.01 \times \text{IF THEN ELSE} (\text{carbon emission perGDP} > 2, 2, 1) \quad (11)$$

566

Table 2 Initial value of auxiliary parameters in the SD model					
Parameter	Value	Unit	Parameter	Value	Unit
Carbon tax	0.01	USD/kg	Market access	100	%
Carbon intensity of heavy energy	0.9	Kg/kwh	Power usage effectiveness	1.1	-
Carbon intensity of clean energy	0.2	Kg/kwh	Miner site selection	40	%
Electricity price	0.05	USD/kwh	Proportion	70	%

567

568 In order to test the appropriateness of system structures and behaviors, two types model validation
569 approaches are introduced in our study. The structural tests results indicate that the system boundary
570 and all the system parameters are suitable for simulation, and the causal relationship between
571 variables is appropriate. In other words, the proposed BBCE model is able to effectively reflect the
572 causal relationship and feedback loops in Bitcoin carbon emission system. To assess the difference
573 between real historical behaviors and system dynamics simulations, behavior validation is
574 suggested to conduct on the key parameters in BBCE model. The behavior validation is tested by
575 comparing the estimated parameters with their historical time-series data. In our study, key
576 time-related variables, including hash rate and efficiency, are utilized for behavior validation. The
577 results of behavior validation show that the of hash rate and efficiency is all greater than 0.9, at
578 0.977 and 0.913 respectively, which illustrate the superior behavioral suitability of the BBCE
579 parameters. Overall, the model validation results report that the proposed BBCE model effectively

580 simulates the nonlinear relationship of carbon emission produces in Bitcoin industry, and the
581 parameters in BBCE model have significant consistencies with actual time-series data.

Appendix A

Table A Variable descriptions				
Type	Parameter	Definition	Unit	Source
Level	Miner Profits	Total profits of Bitcoin miner in China	USD	-
	GDP	Gross productivity of Bitcoin blockchain	USD	-
	Carbon Emission	Accumulated carbon emission of Bitcoin blockchain	kg	-
Rate	Income	Bitcoin miner's income per month	USD/month	-
	Investment intensity	Investment intensity of Bitcoin miners	-	Küfeoğlu & Özkuran ⁹ ; CBECI
	Added GDP	Gross domestic product added per month	USD/month	-
	Added carbon emission	Carbon emission of Bitcoin blockchain per month	Kg/month	-
Auxiliary	Hash rate	Hashes per second of Bitcoin network	Trillion hashes/second	BTC.com
	Efficiency	Average mining efficiency of Bitcoin network	Joule/ Trillion hashes	Küfeoğlu & Özkuran ⁹ ; CBECI
	Mining power	Average mining power of Bitcoin network	Watt	-
	Network energy consumption	Monthly energy consumption of Bitcoin operations	Kilowatt hour	-
	Market access	Market access standards for miners	100%	-
	Power usage effectiveness	Energy usage effectiveness of Bitcoin mining centers	-	Stoll et al. ²³
	Heavy energy consumption	Energy consumed by Bitcoin blockchain in coal-heavy region	Kilowatt hour	-
	Clean energy consumption	Energy consumed by Bitcoin blockchain in hydro-rich region	Kilowatt hour	-

Heavy energy carbon emission	Carbon dioxide generated by heavy energy miners in Bitcoin blockchain	Kg	-
Clean energy carbon emission	Carbon dioxide generated by clean energy miners in Bitcoin blockchain	Kg	-
Carbon intensity of heavy energy	Emission factor of heavy energy in China	Kg/Kilowatt hour	Cheng et al. ³⁶
Carbon intensity of clean energy	Emission factor of clean energy in China	Kg/Kilowatt hour	Cheng et al. ³⁶
Miner site selection	locations proportions of Bitcoin server in coal-heavy region	%	BTC.com
Carbon cost	Monthly carbon emission cost in Bitcoin blockchain	USD	-
Electricity price	Average electricity price in China	USD/kwh	World Bank
Energy cost	Monthly electricity cost in Bitcoin blockchain	USD	-
Total cost	Sum of carbon cost and energy cost	USD	-
Carbon tax	Average taxation for industrial carbon emission	USD/Kg	World Bank
Difficulty	Global block hash difficulty in Bitcoin blockchain	-	-
New block	New block generated by miners per month	-	-
Proportion	The proportion of Chinese miners in global Bitcoin mining system	%	BTC.com; Küfeoğlu & Özkuran ⁹
Block size	Bitcoin blockchain size per month	Megabyte	BTC.com
Transaction fee	Transaction fee per month	Bitcoin	BTC.com
Bitcoin Price	Periodical Bitcoin price	USD	-
Reward	Monthly Bitcoin mined	Bitcoin	-
Halving	The Halving mechanism of Bitcoin	-	-

Appendix B

BBCE modeling equations

$$\text{Investment intensity} = 40.51 \times \text{Time} \times \text{Proportion} \quad (12)$$

$$\text{Proportion} = \text{IF THEN ELSE} (\text{Miner Profits} < 0, 0.7 - 0.01 \times \text{Time}, 0.7) \quad (13)$$

$$\text{Transaction fee} = 0.115 \times \text{Block size} \times \text{Proportion} \quad (14)$$

$$\text{Block size} = e^{7.22 + 0.0215 \times \text{Time}} \quad (15)$$

$$\text{Reward} = \text{New block} \times \text{Halving} \quad (16)$$

$$\text{Price} = 1000 + \text{STEP} (5000, 24) + \text{STEP} (6000, 72) + \text{STEP} (12000, 120) \quad (17)$$

$$\text{Income} = \text{Price} \times (\text{Reward} + \text{Transaction fee}) - \text{Total cost} \quad (18)$$

$$\text{Miner profits} (t) = \int_0^t (\text{Income} - \text{Investment intensity}) dt \quad (19)$$

$$\text{Added GDP} = \text{Income} + \text{Total cost} \quad (20)$$

$$\text{GDP}(t) = \int_0^t \text{Added GDP} dt \quad (21)$$

$$\text{Hash rate} = 0.7 \times e^{0.0039 \times \text{Investment intensity} + 8.16} \quad (22)$$

$$\text{Efficiency} = e^{9.3 - 0.0018 \times \text{Investment intensity} \times \text{Market access}} \quad (23)$$

$$\text{Mining power} = \text{Hash rate} \times \text{Efficiency} \quad (24)$$

$$\text{Network energy consumption} = 0.7315 \times \text{Mining power} \times \text{Power usage effectiveness} \quad (25)$$

$$\text{Energy cost} = 0.05 \times \text{Network energy consumption} \quad (26)$$

$$\text{Total cost} = \text{Energy cost} + \text{Carbon cost} \quad (27)$$

$$\text{Heavy energy consumption} = \text{Miner site selection} \times \text{Network energy consumption} \quad (28)$$

$$\text{Clean energy consumption} = (1 - \text{Miner site selection}) \times \text{Network energy consumption} \quad (29)$$

$$\text{Heavy energy carbon emission} = \text{Heavy energy consumption} \times$$

$$\text{Carbon intensity of heavy energy} \quad (30)$$

$$\text{Clean energy carbon emission} = \text{Clean energy consumption} \times$$

$$\text{Carbon intensity of clean energy} \quad (31)$$

$$\text{Carbon emission} (t) = \int_0^t \text{Add Carbon emission} dt \quad (32)$$

$$\text{Carbon emission per GDP} = \text{Carbon emission} / \text{GDP} \quad (33)$$

$$\text{Carbon tax} = 0.01 \times \text{IF THEN ELSE} (\text{carbon emission per GDP} > 2, 2, 1) \quad (34)$$

$$\text{Added carbon emission} = \text{Heavy energy carbon emission} + \text{Clean energy carbon emission}$$

(35)

$$\text{Carbon cost} = \text{Carbon tax} \times \text{Added carbon emission} \quad (36)$$

Appendix C

Proof-of-Work algorithm of Bitcoin blockchain

To ensure the correctness of transactions and the stability of the system, the Bitcoin blockchain technology uses the concept of Proof-of-Work (PoW) as the current consensus algorithm. In this consensus algorithm, any new transaction that takes place in the system must be first verified and informed by a majority of miners³⁴. Given that they are valid, the transactions are collected to form a block. Once a miner successfully calculates the correct hash value, the block and its corresponding hash value will be added to the blockchain, and all the local copies of the blockchain will be updated accordingly. In order to provide incentives for solving the puzzle, the consensus algorithm rewards the first miner who solved the PoW in the form of mining reward and transaction fees: on one hand, the miner receives the mining reward, which halves every 210,000 blocks, for the block it solved; on the other hand, the miner also receives the transaction fee for every successful addition of a transaction in the blockchain³⁵. As a result, all the miners race to perform the PoW and calculate the correct hash value in order to collect the corresponding reward³⁶. Finally, as shown in Figure 5, the large energy consumption of the Bitcoin blockchain has created considerable carbon emissions. It is estimated that between the period of January 1st, 2016 and June 30th, 2018, up to 13 million metric tons of CO₂ emissions can be attributed to the Bitcoin blockchain




Fig. 5 | Carbon footprint for Proof-of-Work algorithm of Bitcoin blockchain. The PoW validation process of Bitcoin blockchain involves miners solving a cryptographic puzzle to adjust the nonce and generate a hash value lower than or equal to a certain target value, where miners earn 6.25 Bitcoin currently as new block reward. The mining and calculation process of Bitcoin blockchain requires steadily growing amount of energy due to the fierce competition between miners. Both heavy and clean energy consumed by Bitcoin miners are collected to formulate the carbon emission flows of the whole Bitcoin blockchain. The mining area distribution of Bitcoin blockchain is obtained from <https://btc.com/stats>.