

Religion and Desire for Additional Children in a Son-preference and Low Fertility Society: Evidence From Vietnam

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Research

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1 **Religion and desire for additional children in a son-preference and low fertility society:**

2 **Evidence from Vietnam**

3 **Plain English Summary**

4 **Aim of the research:** This research aims to look into the association between religion and the
5 desire to have additional children of women in Vietnam. We focus on women of reproductive age
6 (15-49 years old).

7 **Background:** Vietnam provides a unique case study. The country is known for son preference
8 and low fertility. The majority of Vietnamese people have no religion. The two main religions
9 in Vietnam are Buddhism and Christianity.

10 **Data and methods:** We use data from the 2014 Vietnam Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey. We
11 use statistical analysis to find out the relationship between religion and desire for additional
12 children among women of reproductive age. We conduct the study for overall Vietnam and for
13 each region, as there are large differences across regions.

14 **Main findings:** Religion has a strong relationship with the desire for additional children, and the
15 relationship differs across regions. In three out of six regions, Christians are more likely to want
16 another child compared to those with no religion. In Mekong River, Buddhists are less likely to
17 want another child compared to those with no religion. For Northern Midlands, however,
18 Buddhists are more likely to want another child compared to those with no religion. The study
19 also shows that son preference exists in all regions of Vietnam, with the level increasing from the
20 South towards the North.

21 **Policy implications:** Understanding the relationship between religion and desire for additional
22 children for each region can support the formulation of appropriate population policies for each
23 region in Vietnam.

24 **Abstract**

25 **Background:** The association between religion and desire for additional children has
26 remained controversial and varies depending on the social context of the study. This study
27 empirically investigates the relationship between religion and desire for additional children in
28 Vietnam, a society characterized by son preference and low fertility.

29 **Methods:** Using nationally representative data from the 2014 Vietnam Multiple Indicator
30 Cluster Survey, the study employs Probit regression analysis to investigate the relationship
31 between religion and desire for additional children among women of reproductive age (15-49).
32 The sample consists of 5,585 women across all six economic regions.

33 **Results:** Religion has a strong impact on the desire to have an additional child, and the
34 relationship differs across economic regions. In three out of six regions, Christians have higher
35 fertility desire compared to non-religious people. Fertility desire of Buddhists differs from fertility
36 desire of non-religious people in two out of six regions, namely Northern Midlands and Mekong
37 River. Fertility desire of those belonging to other religions is different from that of non-religious
38 people only in Mekong River.

39 **Conclusions:** Identifying the impact of religion on desire for additional children can help
40 promote appropriate family planning policies. The study also demonstrates that son preference
41 exists in all regions of Vietnam, with the level increasing from the South, towards the Central and
42 peaks in the North, especially in the regions bordering China.

43 **Key words:** Religion, fertility desire, desire for additional children, son preference, Vietnam.

44

45

46 **Introduction**

47 The world is facing a shift in fertility not only from high to low, as observed during the late
48 1950s to the late 1970s (1), but also unpredictable changes in fertility trends, especially prolonged
49 low fertility, new unions with lower demand for children, and voluntary childlessness (2). Besides,
50 due to the direct, indirect, and long-term effects brought about by changes in fertility trends, such
51 as population aging, economic consequences, and sex-imbalance due to son-preference, efforts to
52 intervene in fertility behavior are key policies for many countries (3).

53 The relationship between fertility desire and fertility is well documented (4). Fertility desire
54 is considered an important first step to achieve actual fertility (5). Thus, understanding fertility
55 desire will help policy makers to predict fertility and enable them to design appropriate policies
56 (6). There are many studies that have documented the determinants of fertility desire, including
57 economic conditions (7), health status (8), national population policy, socio-cultural context,
58 environmental impacts, and beliefs about values and benefits of children (9, 10). Religion is
59 reported to have a strong relationship with fertility desire as well as fertility in many countries (11,
60 12). For example, religious women tend to have higher fertility desire and higher fertility than
61 women without religion in the United States, Spain and most European countries (13).

62 Vietnam provides a unique case study, as the country has a special socio-political structure.
63 Under the Communist party's leadership, the majority of Vietnamese people follow the atheism
64 idea due to the policy set by the government (14). In addition, given the country's past experiences,
65 there are many different religions in Vietnam such as Confucianism, Cao Dai, Christianity,
66 Buddhism, etc. (15, 16). In addition, to the best of our knowledge, while there are a number of in-
67 depth studies on religions in Vietnam (17), so far there is no quantitative research to explore the
68 relationship between religion and demographic behaviors such as fertility desire. In addition,

69 previous studies have shown that fertility desire in Vietnam is shaped by traditions and norms such
70 as son preference (10). As previous research has shown that fertility desire in Vietnam is
71 determined by socio-cultural ideology, this study hypothesizes that religion, a belief factor similar
72 to social culture, also determines fertility desire in Vietnam.

73 In sum, religion in Vietnam is likely to influence behaviors in many ways, but goes
74 unnoticed in formulating population policies. Moreover, there has been no previous work on the
75 impact of religion on fertility behavior in Vietnam. Therefore, this study is expected to be one of
76 the first studies in Vietnam to investigate the relationship between religion and fertility desire. We
77 aim to explore how religion influences fertility desire in a son-preference and low fertility society
78 dominated by atheism. Research results are expected to play an important role in the formulation
79 of population policies in Vietnam.

80

81 **Country context**

82 **Religion and culture belief in Vietnam**

83 Vietnam is recognized as a country with many religions, beliefs and socio-cultural
84 traditions. For example, Buddhism was introduced to Vietnam very early and dominated the
85 cultural and spiritual life from the first century to the 7th century, until the arrival of Confucianism
86 from China (17). From the beginning of the 10th century till present, Confucianism has mainly
87 dominated the socio-cultural life and the behavior of Vietnamese people due to over a thousand
88 years of Chinese domination (16). The Confucian morality stipulates that men must be the main
89 breadwinner of the family who make decisions on important family matters and educate all family
90 members (18). On the other hand, women's main role is to take care of the family. A woman is
91 required to always obey her father when she is unmarried, her husband during marriage, and when

92 the husband dies, listen to her eldest son (19). Confucianism promotes the idea of respecting men
93 because men take on the role of continuing the lineage and worshiping ancestors (20).
94 Confucianism places importance on having at least one son, as daughters are thought to belong to
95 their husbands' families after marriage (21).

96 Christianity in present-day Vietnam has two main branches which are Roman Catholic and
97 Protestant (22). Roman Catholic is considered the first of Christianity in Vietnam and was
98 evangelized during the French colonial period, and Protestantism came to Vietnam around 1911
99 (23). By 2019, Catholics accounted for the highest percentage (6.1 percent) among the group of
100 people with religion, while the proportion of Protestants was 1.0 percent (24). Unlike Buddhism,
101 which does not clearly state the view of the value of children, both Catholic and Protestant Bibles
102 clearly state that children are gifts from God. Thus, Catholics and Protestants are expected to have
103 higher fertility desire compared to those not belonging to these two religious groups (25).

104 Since 1954, under the communist political regime, Vietnam has become an atheist state.
105 At present, the proportion of people without religion is higher than the proportion of those with
106 religion (14, 15). According to the 2019 population and housing census, the percentage of the
107 population without religion accounts for 86.3 percent (24). In addition, Vietnam is also home to
108 different religious groups such as Cao Dai, Hoa Hao Buddhism, Islam, and other religions that
109 appeared in the early 20th century (17). As of 2009, each of these groups accounted for less than
110 1 percent of the population (24).

111 As a result, religions in Vietnam today are quite diverse due to the mixture of different
112 religious forms along with the development of the nation. Conceptions of each type of religion and
113 belief are also changed to suit people's beliefs (19). However, son preference still has a heavy

114 influence on Vietnamese society, in parallel with the strong development of atheism according to
115 the communist ideals.

116

117 **Methods**

118 **Study Design**

119 This study draws on nationally representative data from the 2014 Vietnam Multiple
120 Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). In-person interviews were conducted in six economic regions of
121 Vietnam, where the information was collected from reproductive-age women (15 to 49 years). The
122 2014 MICS survey collected data from 10,018 households and 9,827 women residing in the
123 households. The information on the households and on the women were provided in two separate
124 datasets. In this study, we merged these separate datasets, using a unique identifier, to capture
125 information both at the household level and the individual level. Given that the main purpose of
126 this study is to investigate the association between religion and desire for additional children, we
127 restricted the dataset to women with at least one child. This produced a sample of 5,585 women
128 with at least one child.

129 **Measures**

130 **Fertility desire:** The dependent variable is fertility desire. This is captured by women's
131 desire to have additional child in the future at the time of interview. Women who had at least one
132 child were asked "Would you like to have (a/another) child, or would you prefer not to have any
133 more children?" (0=no more, 1=have another child). We excluded women who were not physically
134 able to get pregnant.

135 **Religion:** Religion is the main independent variable. We employ self-reported religion,
136 where the respondents reported their own religion. The question regarding religion in the

137 household questionnaire has the following choice of answers: (1) Buddhism, (2) Islam, (3) Cao
138 Dai, (4) Hoa Hao, (5) Christianity (Catholicism), (6) Christianity (Protestantism), (7) Other
139 religion, (8) No religion. We grouped the responses into the following 4 categories: (1) No
140 religion, (2) Buddhism, (3) Christianity (including Catholicism and Protestantism), (4) Other
141 religions (including all the other religions).

142 **Methodology**

143 First, the test for perfect collinearity is conducted; the results indicate that all independent
144 variables do not have a high correlation with one another. For the descriptive statistics, the Fisher
145 exact test is applied instead of the Chi-squared test because the number of observations for specific
146 religions are small and does not satisfy the condition of sample size for Chi-squared test.

147 For the main analysis, ordered probit regression is employed to examine the relationship
148 between religion and desire for additional children and marginal effects are reported. The
149 estimated probability of desire for additional children comes from:

$$150 \quad F(Y = 1|X) = \Phi(X^{RC}\beta)$$

151 Where F denotes a fertility outcome (the probability that a woman wants to have additional
152 children), and Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal
153 distribution. Here β is estimated by maximum likelihood. X^{RC} is the set of independent variables
154 that are comprised of:

- 155 (i) Main independent variables: These are the variables representing religion of the
156 respondent. The information comes from self-reported religion which has 4 categories,
157 namely, Buddhism, Christian, other religion and no religion. Here no religion is the
158 baseline category.

159 (ii) The control variables in the model include socio-demographic characteristics of the
160 women (women's education, age at last birth, whether living in female-headed
161 household, ethnicity, marital status, work status, urban/rural residence), household
162 characteristics (having older persons in household, family wealth status), children's
163 characteristics (sex composition of children and child mortality, number of children
164 alive, age of last child), social indicators and other factors (sex ratio at birth, attitudes
165 towards domestic violence, and access to mass media).

166 The analysis captures son preference culture in the regression model by including sex
167 composition of children and sex ratio at birth at the provincial level. In addition, based on the
168 large differences in TFR across economic regions, the analysis is conducted separately for each
169 economic region. This is to capture the differences in the relationship between religion and fertility
170 desire across regions, which should lead to specific recommendations for each region.

171 For further investigation, the authors also incorporate interactions between religion and the
172 sex composition of children (i.e., having no son) to investigate how religion is associated with the
173 desire for additional children, conditional on the sex composition of children.

174 **Descriptive Statistics**

175 Table 1 presents the percentage of women who wanted to have additional children
176 according to religion and sex composition of living children, classified by region. The differences
177 in desire for additional children based on religion are statistically significant at the 5% level in
178 North Central and Central Highlands, and 10% level in Northern midlands. For North Central,
179 women belonging to other religions have the highest percentage wanting additional children, while
180 Buddhists have the lowest percentage, followed by those with no religion. In the case of Central
181 Highlands, Christians have the highest percentage of women who wanted another child, while

182 Buddhists have the lowest percentage. On the other hand, for Northern midlands, Buddhists have
183 the highest proportion of women who wanted to have additional children, followed by Christians,
184 and those with no religion, respectively. For South East, Red River, and Mekong River, the
185 differences are not statistically significant.

186 The percentage of women who wanted another child based on sex composition of living
187 children provides clear evidence of son preference across all regions of Vietnam. The percentage
188 of women with no son who wanted additional children is much higher than in the case of women
189 with at least one son. The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level for all six regions
190 of Vietnam.

191

192 **Empirical Findings**

193 Tables 2 and 3 present the relationship between religion and fertility desire. Table 2 reports
194 the results with the level terms only, while Table 3 additionally includes the interaction terms
195 between dummy variables representing different religions and having at least one son.

196 The results in Table 2 suggest that son preference is prevalent across all regions of Vietnam.
197 The variable ‘having at least one son’ is negative and statistically significant for overall Vietnam
198 and all six regions. The results imply that women with at least one son are less likely to want
199 another child compared to women with no son. The magnitude of the marginal effect ranges from
200 smallest (-0.04) in South East and Mekong River, to largest (-0.15) in Northern Midlands. The
201 results suggest that the level of son preference is increasing from the South, to the Central, to the
202 North of Vietnam. The level of son preference appears strongest in the northernmost part of
203 Vietnam which borders China (namely Northern Midlands). The results also show that women
204 with more children are less likely to want another child, as expected.

205 In the case of Buddhism, the results in Table 2 suggest that, for Northern Midlands,
206 Buddhists are more likely to want another child compared to those with no religion, controlling
207 for other factors. On the other hand, for Mekong River, Buddhists are less likely to desire
208 additional children compared to those with no religion. For all other regions and overall Vietnam,
209 the difference is not statistically significant. The results in Table 3 show that, for Northern
210 Midlands, the level term 'Buddhism' is positive and statistically significant, while the interaction
211 term between 'Buddhism' and 'having at least one son' is negative and statistically significant.
212 The level term result implies that, for women with no son, Buddhists are more likely to want
213 another child compared to those with no religion. The interaction term result suggests that,
214 conditioned on having at least one son, Buddhists are less likely to want another child compared
215 to women with no religion. The results together imply stronger son preference among Buddhists
216 as compared to those with no religion in Northern Midlands. For all other regions and overall
217 Vietnam, the level term 'Buddhism' and the interaction term between 'Buddhism' and 'having at
218 least one son' are not statistically significant.

219 For Christianity, the results in Table 2 demonstrate that, controlling for other factors,
220 Christians are more likely to want another child compared to women with no religion in the case
221 of South East, North Central, Central Highlands, and overall Vietnam. Table 3 shows that the
222 level term 'Christianity' is positive and statistically significant in the case of South East and overall
223 Vietnam. The results imply that, for those with no son, Christians are more likely to want another
224 child compared to women with no religion in the case of South East and overall Vietnam. The
225 interaction term between 'Christianity' and 'having at least one son' is negative and statistically
226 significant in the case of South East, and positive and statistically significant in the case of North
227 Central. For South East, conditioned on having at least one son, Christians are less likely to want

228 another child compared to women with no religion. On the other hand, for North Central,
229 conditioned on having at least one son, Christians are more likely to want another child compared
230 to those with no religion.

231 For other religions, the results in Table 2 suggest that women belonging to other religions
232 are less likely to want another child compared to those with no religion in Mekong River. For all
233 other regions and overall Vietnam, the difference is not statistically significant. Table 3 presents
234 the results including the interaction term between ‘Other religions’ and ‘having at least one son’.
235 In the case of Central Highlands and overall Vietnam, for those with no son, women belonging to
236 other religions are less likely to want another child compared to those with no religion. On the
237 other hand, in the case of North Central, for those with no son, women belonging to other religions
238 are more likely to want another child compared to those with no religion.

239 Tables 2 and 3 show that several control variables are correlated with desire for additional
240 children. Education appears an important factor determining desire for additional children. For
241 overall Vietnam, women with lower secondary, upper secondary, and university education are
242 more likely to want another child compared to those with primary education or lower. The positive
243 relationship between education and desire for additional children is observed in South East and
244 Northern Midlands. On the other hand, women with higher education are less likely to want
245 another child compared to those with primary education or lower in the case of Red River. For
246 other regions, there is no statistically significant relationship between education and desire for
247 additional children.

248 The relationship between income and desire for additional children also varies depending
249 on the region. For overall Vietnam, those belonging to the middle group are more likely to want
250 another child compared to the rich. For Red River and Mekong River, women who are poor are

251 more likely to want another child compared to those who are rich. On the other hand, for South
252 East, women who are poor are less likely to want another child compared to those who are rich.

253 Several socio-demographic characteristics of the women, children's characteristics, and
254 social indicators are correlated with desire for additional children. For overall Vietnam as well as
255 all six regions, women whose last child is older are less likely to want additional children, as would
256 be expected. Moreover, women who were older when their last child was born are less likely to
257 desire additional children. For overall Vietnam and all six regions, compared to women who are
258 married, those who are widowed/divorced/separated are less likely to want additional children.
259 Women who are heads of households are less likely to want another child in the case of Red River.
260 For North Central, women who have experienced child mortality are more likely to want additional
261 children compared to those who do not have such an experience. Access to mass media is
262 positively correlated with desire for additional in the case of Northern Midlands. In the case of
263 overall Vietnam and Mekong River, women from provinces with higher sex ratio are more likely
264 to want another child compared to those from provinces with lower sex ratio. For region of
265 residence, compared to women in South East, those in North Central are more likely to want
266 another child, controlling for other factors.

267

268 **Discussion**

269 The results show that there is a significant relationship between religion and fertility desire
270 in Vietnam, and the relationship differs across economic regions. This can be explained by the
271 differences in the degree of son preference as well as the sectors of employment and economic
272 conditions across the regions. Christians have higher fertility desire compared to non-religious
273 people in three out of six regions, namely Southeast, North Central and Central Highland. Fertility

274 desire of Buddhists differ from fertility desire of non-religious people in two out of six regions,
275 which are Northern Midlands and Mekong River. For those belonging to other religions, their
276 fertility desire is different from that of non-religious people only in Mekong River. Compared
277 with earlier studies which investigate the relationship between socio-cultural factors (in particular
278 son preference) and fertility desire (26, 27), this study adds to previous findings that spiritual
279 factor, namely religion, is also linked to fertility desire.

280 Another contribution of the study is the demonstration that son preference exists in all
281 regions of Vietnam, with the level increasing from the South, towards the Central and peaks in the
282 North, especially in the regions bordering China. This result is consistent with the research on
283 fertility desire of Vietnamese women (10), where son preference has been confirmed to exist in all
284 regions of Vietnam, and the level is higher in the North than in the South. Therefore, the study
285 provides support for more explicit intervention policy in eliminating traditional patrilineal systems,
286 son preference, and gender bias in Vietnam for more effective fertility control.

287 Regarding Buddhism, the results show the difference in fertility desire between Buddhists
288 and those with no religion in Northern Midlands and Mekong River. In Northern Midlands,
289 Buddhists tend to want more children compared to those with no religion. On the other hand, in
290 Mekong River Buddhists are less likely to want another child compared to those with no religion.
291 The combination of the differences in the sectors of employment, the level of son preference and
292 economic status can provide reasonable explanations. The forestry land use in Northern Midlands
293 and Mountain areas was 6098.5 thousand hectares compared to 511.2 thousand hectares in Mekong
294 River (28). As a result, Northern Midland's main economic sector is based on forestry, so there is
295 more need for children to support the household economy. Also, as mentioned above, the level of
296 son preference is very high in Northern Midlands (Northern part of Vietnam) compared to Mekong

297 River (Southern part of Vietnam). Moreover, in Northern Midlands, Buddhists are the poorest
298 group in society, while in Mekong River Buddhists are among the richest. It is possible that, in
299 Northern Midlands, Buddhist are more likely to want another child compared to those with no
300 religion as they are poorer and likely to work in agriculture. As those with no religion in Northern
301 Midlands are more likely to work for the government, their fertility desire is possibly affected by
302 the one-or-two child policy. On the other hand, for the more economically developed Mekong
303 River, Buddhists are among the richest groups in society and are more likely to work in the service
304 sector such as trade. As Mekong River has low Total Fertility Rate (TFR), and Buddhists do not
305 have specific religious value of children (as in the case of Christians), they are more likely to
306 follow the social norms of lower fertility in the region. This possibly explains the lower fertility
307 desire of Buddhists compared to those with no religion in the region. Previous studies have
308 demonstrated the relationship between economic conditions and fertility both in developed and
309 developing countries (29, 30). The results here show that, while religion is associated with fertility
310 desire, economic conditions can shape the direction of the relationship.

311 Another interesting finding is that the Buddhists have stronger son preference than those
312 without religion in the Northern Midlands. In Vietnam, non-religious people are likely the group
313 that work in government agencies because non-religiousism is the direction of the communist
314 regime (31). They also tend to have higher education which is required for government positions,
315 and high educational attainment has been linked to low fertility in many studies (32, 33).
316 Additionally, government workers have pension funds, so they do not need to financially depend
317 on children during old age. High education and old age financial security can lead to low fertility
318 desire among government workers. The one-or-two child policy also applies only to those
319 employed by the government and members of the Communist Party. Therefore, non-religious

320 people working for the government are also likely to limit their desire to have children. On the
321 other hand, Buddhists in Northern Midlands are poor and more likely to work in agriculture,
322 therefore having sons can be important for them as sons can help in agricultural work.

323 Regarding Christianity, Christians are more likely to want another child compared to
324 women with no religion. The difference in fertility desire can be influenced by the value of children
325 among Christians, where children are considered a gift from God. Therefore Christians are more
326 inclined to have children compared to non-religious people (25, 34). Additionally, both Christians
327 and Protestants refrain from using contraception because it is against the fundamental principle of
328 Roman Catholic marriage and against the Protestants' bible content "be fruitful and multiply" (35).
329 Besides, for those with no son, Christians are more likely to want another child compared to
330 women with no religion. As discussed above, non-religious people tend to work as government
331 officials, therefore the one-or-two-child policy can be an explanation here. On the other hand,
332 Christians are free to have more children until they have a son.

333 In addition, there are two conflicting trends in the fertility desire between Christians and
334 non-religious people who have at least one son in South East and Northern Midlands. For South
335 East, conditioned on having at least one son, Christians are less likely to want another child
336 compared to women with no religion. On the other hand, for Northern Midlands, conditioned on
337 having at least one son, Christians are more likely to want another child compared to those with
338 no religion. TFR in the South East has always been lower than TFR the Northern Midlands over
339 the past decade (28). Christians with at least one son in South East are perhaps more likely to
340 follow the social norm of low TFR in the region. For Northern Midland, it is possible that
341 Christians are more likely to follow the social norms of high TFR while those with no religion are
342 more likely to be constrained by the one-or-two child policy. Moreover, mix-gender preference is

343 also confirmed in Northern Midland (10). Therefore, in the case of Christians (who are not
344 constrained by the one-or-two child policy), even if they already have one son, they might be more
345 likely to want another child in order to have children of both genders.

346 In the case of other religions, in Mekong River, women belonging to other religions are
347 less likely to want another child compared to those with no religion. Further analysis reveals that
348 there are differences in the level of education and economic status between those belonging to
349 other religions and those with no religion in Mekong River. People belonging to other religions
350 have lower education and economic status compared to non-religious people. It is possible that, in
351 certain context, those with low education and economic status have lower fertility desire compared
352 to those with high education and economic status. This result is in line with studies indicating that
353 higher education and income can lead to higher fertility due to the ability to bring up children (36).
354 It is also possible that the beliefs of women belonging to other religions influence their fertility
355 desire.

356 On the other hand, in Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas, for those with no son,
357 women belonging to other religions are more likely to want another child compared to those with
358 no religion. There are two plausible reasons for this. Firstly, we expect followers of other religions
359 to be from mountainous ethnic minorities, therefore, they have the opportunity and are allowed to
360 have many children according to the government's fertility incentive policy aimed at protecting
361 ethnic minorities. Secondly, as explained above, son preference and the need for a son to support
362 the family in the agricultural and forestry sector is quite high in the Northern Midlands. This is
363 possibly the case for those belonging to other religions as they are likely to work in agriculture.

364

365 **Conclusions**

366 Our research provides key findings on the relationship between religion and desire for
367 additional children in Vietnam, a society characterized by son preference and low fertility.
368 Religion has strong impact on desire to have an additional child, especially for women with low
369 economic status. Those who have a religion are more likely to want another child compared to
370 those with no religion. In Vietnam, government officials are constrained by the one-or-two child
371 policy and are also more likely to report having no religion (or are Buddhists rather than
372 Christians). This could partly explain the finding that those who reported having no religion are
373 less likely to want additional children compared to those having a religion (particularly Christians
374 and Buddhists). The findings also suggest strong son preference in Vietnam, with the highest level
375 in the Norther part bordering China. Preventing ultrasounds to detect fetal sex, sex-selective
376 abortion and improving women's empowerment have long term implication for reducing son
377 preference and improving women's health. This paper has identified the relationship between
378 religion and fertility desire, and the findings have implications for appropriate family planning
379 policies for a developing country as Vietnam.

380

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