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Heterogeneous environmental regulation and industrial structure transformation and upgrading: Evidence from China

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Abstract: There are obvious differences between different types of environmental regulations, which are manifested in different environmental protection tendencies and goals, and there are also significant differences in policy implementation. Therefore, it is an urgent empirical problem to quantitatively evaluate the impact of heterogeneous environmental regulations on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure. Based on this, this paper empirically tests the impact of heterogeneous environmental regulations on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure on the basis of measuring the level of industrial structure transformation and upgrading. The results show that the transformation and upgrading level of China's industrial structure increased year by year from 2000 to 2017. The three types of environmental regulatory measures have effectively promoted the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure, and the market incentive environmental regulation (MER) has a significantly higher role in the advancement of the industrial structure than the command-controlled environmental regulation (CER) and the voluntary public participation environmental regulation (VER). The three types of environmental regulations have gradually highlighted the role of environmental regulations in promoting the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure with the improvement of the level of regional economic development. In the mechanism test, it is found that technological innovation has partial mediating effect in the process of CER affecting the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure, MER and public VER have complete mediating effect, while FDI has only partial mediating effect in the process of three types of environmental regulation affecting the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure.

Keywords: Heterogeneous environmental regulations; Industrial structure transformation and upgrading; Market incentive environmental regulation; Command-controlled environmental regulation; Voluntary public participation environmental regulation

1. Introduction

After more than 40 years of reform and opening up, China's economic growth has created a miracle in the history of world economic development. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, China's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.3% from 1979 to 2019, and its average annual contribution to world economic growth was about 18%. However, in the early stage, China's excessive reliance on extensive development with high investment, high energy consumption, and high pollution caused excessive use of resources and severe environmental damage, which became the main obstacle to economic growth (Lu, 2017; Liao, 2018), and resources increasingly depleted and deteriorating ecological environment (Dai, 2015). Therefore, coordinating the relationship between ecological health and economic growth is the key to implementing sustainable development strategies (Abu Seman et al., 2019). The "2018 Global Environmental Performance Index (EPI) Report" released by Yale University and others pointed out that among the 180 countries participating in the evaluation, China ranked 120, which shows that China's environment is in urgent need of improvement. China's economy has reached a critical moment when it has to change its economic development mode, that is, from a stage of rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development. The transformation and upgrading of industrial structure is an important way to coordinate sustainable economic development and environmental protection. The characteristic of industrial structure upgrading is that production factors enter high-value-added, high-efficiency and low-consumption industries from low-value-added, low-efficiency and high-consumption

49 industrial chain links. The process of chain links is one of the key drivers of economic growth. (Pipkin
50 and Fuentes, 2017; Zhu et al., 2019). Therefore, in order to alleviate the downward pressure on the
51 economy, the Chinese government is seeking to transform the economic development mode, optimize
52 the industrial economic structure, increase total factor productivity, and promote the national economy.
53 (Hu et al., 2020; Guo et al., 2020). The transformation of industrial structure can not only increase the
54 proportion of technology-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries, promote technological progress,
55 and support emerging industries, but also reduce the proportion of high-polluting and high-energy-
56 consuming industries, encouraging environmental technology research and development and investment
57 in cleaner production equipment, and improve the level of cleaner production from the root cause.

58 However, the current problem of irrational and unbalanced industrial structure in China has
59 gradually emerged (Heinrich and Dai, 2016), which has attracted the attention of the government. In the
60 "13th Five-Year" development plan outline, it is clearly proposed to promote the transformation and
61 upgrading of the industrial structure. The report of the 19th national Congress of the Communist Party
62 of China is relayed to the goal of promoting the development of industrial structure to the high end of
63 global value chain. The current transformation and upgrading of China's industrial structure mainly relies
64 on the guidance and intervention of industrial policies, which has a relatively serious color of planned
65 economy, resulting in a lack of internal incentives for policy effects. To transform the mode of economic
66 development and lead the economy to high-quality development. The Chinese government has chosen a
67 path that can both improve the environment and promote sustainable economic development. For this
68 reason, it has issued a number of environmental policies to deal with environmental problems in the
69 process of industrial development. Among them, environmental regulation is an important measure for
70 environmental protection at this stage. The implementation of environmental regulation policies
71 increases the internal cost of enterprises, prompts enterprises to transform production methods, produces
72 an effect of survival of the fittest, and ultimately drives the transformation and upgrading of industrial
73 structure (Ramanathan et al., 2010; Ahmed et al., 2016). With the advancement of environmental
74 regulatory policies, China's industrial structure has undergone major changes. In 2015, the tertiary
75 industry's contribution to China's GDP exceeded 50% for the first time (Yu ang Wang, 2020). In 2019,
76 the three major industries accounted for 7.1%, 39% and 53.9% of GDP.

77 There are obvious differences between different types of environmental regulations, which are
78 reflected in different environmental protection tendencies and goals, and there are also significant
79 differences in policy implementation, so the impact on industrial structure transformation and upgrading
80 will also be different. The Chinese government has gradually established a command and control type,
81 market incentive type, and voluntary public participation type "three-dimensional one" environmental
82 policy tool system. The heterogeneity between the three will directly affect the cost constraints of
83 industrial structure transformation and upgrading, and thus affect "Porter effect" and "Compliance cost
84 effect" in environmental regulation. Ignoring the heterogeneity of environmental regulations or
85 conducting a total-level analysis of environmental regulations can easily lead to deviations in the
86 assessment of the effects of environmental regulations and policies (Li, 2020). Therefore, the research
87 on environmental regulations should not only involve the strength of environmental regulations, but also
88 include the reasonable mix and use of heterogeneous environmental regulatory policy tools. Based on
89 this, this paper studies the impact of heterogeneous environmental regulations on the transformation and
90 upgrading of industrial structure based on different types of environmental regulation perspectives. To
91 explore whether China's environmental regulations promote the transformation and upgrading of the
92 industrial structure while tackling environmental pollution? That is, can we achieve a win-win situation
93 between environmental protection and industrial structure transformation and upgrading?

94 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second part is a literature review. The third part
95 is research design. The fourth part is the discussion of the empirical results, and the final part is the
96 summary of the research conclusions and policy implications.

97 **2. Literature review**

98 Scholars focus on "Porter Hypothesis" and "Pollution Haven Hypothesis", and research shows that
99 environmental regulation policies can affect regional industrial structure in various ways (Gouldson et
100 al., 2014; Wang et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). According to the existing relevant industrial economic

101 theories, strict environmental regulations increase the production costs of enterprises, thus having a
102 certain impact on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure. However, due to different
103 research perspectives, measurement methods or indicators, the research conclusions have not yet formed
104 a consistent view, which are mainly divided into three situations: promotion, inhibition and uncertainty.
105 First, regarding the "benefits" theory, it is believed that appropriate environmental regulations can induce
106 enterprise innovation. Although enterprises may increase costs and reduce competitiveness in the short
107 term, they are beneficial to the development of enterprises in the long run, thus promoting the
108 transformation and upgrading of industrial structure, namely "Porter Hypothesis" (Porter, 1991; Porter,
109 1995; Keller and Levnson, 2002; Gurtoo and Antony, 2007). Some scholars have demonstrated the
110 "Porter Hypothesis" from different premises (Cole et al., 2005; Ramanathan et al., 2010; Hou et al., 2018;
111 Yu ang Wang, 2020), For example, Burton et al. (2011) studied the pulp and paper industry through
112 environmental regulation factors, and concluded that environmental regulation has a significant role in
113 promoting the growth of such enterprises and significantly improving the level of structural optimization
114 of the industry. Liu et al. (2016) constructed a theoretical model of the impact of environmental regulation
115 on the upgrading of industrial structure. They pointed out that if the technical effect of environmental
116 regulation is higher than the distortion effect of resource allocation, environmental regulation will
117 promote the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure. Shehabi (2020) studied the impact of
118 energy subsidy reform on Kuwait's economic diversification. The results show that the implementation
119 of environmental supervision policies can reduce the excessive dependence of economic development
120 on resources and the environment, promote the diversified development of the industrial structure of
121 resource-based countries, and reverse the disease problem in the Netherlands.

122 The second is that the "unfavorable theory" means that increasing the intensity of environmental
123 regulations will increase the company's "compliance cost", weaken its market price advantage, and then
124 put the company at a disadvantage in market competition, and ultimately inhibit the transformation and
125 upgrading of the industrial structure (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). Specifically, in order to circumvent
126 environmental regulations or reduce environmental costs, regional differences in environmental
127 standards or environmental regulations will encourage polluting companies to transfer, thereby inhibiting
128 the adjustment of the industrial structure of the region or the country, that is, the "Pollution Refuge" effect.
129 (Millimet et al., 2016; Solarin et al., 2017). Kheder and Zugravu (2012) studied the impact of
130 environmental regulations on the site selection of French manufacturing and found that there was a
131 "pollution paradise effect" in the process of corporate site selection. Millimet et al. (2009) believes that
132 environmental regulations have increased the production costs of enterprises, reduced production
133 efficiency and profits, and affected the industry structure through enterprise entry or exit, production
134 scale adjustment and resource reallocation. Alpay et al. (2002) found that environmental regulation is a
135 negative hindrance on the food processing industry in the United States.

136 Third, the impact of environmental regulations on the transformation and upgrading of industrial
137 structure is uncertain, that is, the relationship between environmental regulations and industrial structure
138 transformation and upgrading is nonlinear (Zhou et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2018; Chen and Qian, 2020;).
139 Yuan et al. (2014) used panel data from 30 provinces in China from 1999 to 2011, and the study showed
140 that the impact of environmental regulations on industrial structure adjustment was first restrained,
141 followed by promotion, and then restrained. Tong et al. (2016) constructed a theoretical model of
142 environmental regulation, factor input structure, and industrial industry transformation and upgrading.
143 The study found that the impact of environmental regulation on industrial industry transformation and
144 upgrading presents a J-shaped characteristic. Chen and Qian (2020) compared and analyzed the dual
145 impact of different types of marine environmental regulations on the upgrading of manufacturing
146 industry structure and the transfer of polluting industries based on the panel data of China's coastal areas
147 from 2004 to 2017. Research shows that various types of marine environmental remediation have a
148 positive U-shaped relationship with the transfer of polluting industries and the upgrading of industrial
149 structure.

150 With the increasingly serious environmental pollution corresponding to economic development, the
151 cost of pollution control continues to increase. Over the past few decades, the environmental regulation
152 thinking has developed from the end-point management level to the level of pollution prevention,
153 ecological efficiency and product life cycle analysis (El-Zayat et al., 2006). Because of ignoring the

154 heterogeneity of environmental regulations or conducting a total level analysis of environmental
155 regulations, it is easy to bias the evaluation of the effects of environmental regulations and policies (Li,
156 2020). Therefore, in the same period, most national environmental management systems have shifted
157 from a single government-led environmental management to a multi-coordinated environmental
158 governance (Taylor et al., 2013). Shen et al. (2019) used a threshold model to study the nonlinear dynamic
159 effects of different types of environmental regulations on the environmental total factor productivity of
160 the industrial sector from the perspective of heterogeneity, trying to determine the optimal intensity and
161 tool combination of environmental regulations. The research results show that due to the existence of
162 heterogeneous industries, different types of environmental regulations have a heterogeneous impact on
163 the environmental total factor productivity of different industries. Due to the large differences in the level
164 of economic development between regions in China, there may be differences in the "innovation
165 compensation effect" and the "compliance cost effect" produced by environmental regulations, leading
166 to differences in the impact of environmental regulations on the transformation and upgrading of regional
167 industrial structures. Moreover, the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure is mainly
168 manifested in two aspects: the rationalization and advanced of the industrial structure. Only when
169 environmental regulations simultaneously promote the rationalization and advancement of the industrial
170 structure can the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure be realized in a real sense.
171 Based on this, first of all, this research measures the development level of China's industrial structure
172 transformation and upgrading from two aspects, rationalization and advancement of the industrial
173 structure. Secondly, based on the perspective of different types of environmental regulation, this paper
174 uses panel data model and threshold model to study the impact of heterogeneous environmental
175 regulation on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure, and discusses the impact
176 mechanism, so as to provide new empirical evidence for the relationship between environmental
177 regulation and the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure.

178 3. Research design

179 3.1 Model setting

180 This paper mainly explores the relationship between heterogeneous environmental regulations and
181 industrial structure transformation and upgrading. As the Chinese government has gradually established
182 a command-and-control, market-incentive and voluntary public participation "three-dimensional one"
183 environmental policy tool system. At the same time, considering that the three types of environmental
184 regulations may directly have complementary possibilities, the three types of environmental regulation
185 interaction items are introduced into the model to construct the following panel data model.

$$187 \quad TL_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 CER_{it} + \alpha_2 MER_{it} + \alpha_3 PER_{it} + \alpha_4 CER_{it} \times MER_{it} \times PER_{it} + \alpha_5 X_{it} + \xi_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$188 \quad ES_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CER_{it} + \beta_2 MER_{it} + \beta_3 PER_{it} + \beta_4 CER_{it} \times MER_{it} \times PER_{it} + \beta_5 X_{it} + \zeta_{it} \quad (2)$$

189 Where, TL and ES are industrial structure rationalization and advanced industrial structure,
190 respectively, CER , MER , and PER represent command-control, market incentive, and voluntary
191 public participation environmental regulations, X is a controlled variable, and subscripts i and t
192 represent province and time, ξ_{it} and ζ_{it} represent residual items.

193 Taking into account the large differences in the level of economic development between regions in
194 China, there may be differences in the "innovation compensation effect" and "compliance cost effect"
195 produced by environmental regulations, leading to differences in the impact of environmental regulations
196 on the transformation and upgrading of regional industrial structures. Furthermore, taking the level of
197 regional economic development as the threshold, this paper uses the threshold model to study the impact
198 of heterogeneous environmental regulation on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure.
199 In the past, most studies on the "threshold effect" used methods such as grouping experience and adding
200 cross-terms. Grouping experience was restricted by the grouping criteria and could not accurately

201 estimate the threshold value. Although the cross-term was added to the model to estimate the threshold
 202 value, it could not verify the correctness of the threshold. It was not until Hansen (1999) proposed the
 203 non-dynamic panel threshold regression modeling idea that it solved the accurate measurement of the
 204 "threshold effect". The choice of threshold variables can be determined exogenously by the theoretical
 205 model. The threshold regression model originally proposed by Hansen (1999) is as follows.

$$206 \quad y_i = x_i^* \beta_1 + e_i, \quad q_i \leq \gamma \quad (3)$$

$$207 \quad y_i = x_i^* \beta_2 + e_i, \quad q_i > \gamma \quad (4)$$

208 Where, y_i is the explained variable, x_i is the $p \times 1$ order explanatory variable vector, and q_i
 209 is the threshold variable. The threshold variable q_i serves to divide the sample into different groups,
 210 and the regression coefficients in the model are determined based on whether the threshold variable
 211 is greater than or less than a certain threshold value.

212 Define the dummy variable $d_i(\gamma) = (q_i \leq \gamma)$, where $I(\bullet)$ is the indicator function, that is, for
 213 $q_i \leq \gamma, I(\bullet) = 1$, otherwise $I(\bullet) = 0$. Therefore, the above model can be transformed into the following
 214 model.

$$215 \quad y_i = x_i^* \beta + x_i^* d_i(\gamma) \theta + e_i \quad (5)$$

216 Where, $\beta = \beta_2$; $\theta = \beta_1 - \beta_2$.

217 This paper draws on the threshold regression model of Hansen (1999) and establishes a single
 218 threshold regression model as follows.

$$219 \quad TL_{it} = a_{11}CER_{it}I(ED \leq \gamma_1) + a_{12}CER_{it}I(ED > \gamma_1) + a_{21}MER_{it}I(ED \leq \gamma_2) \\ 220 \quad + a_{22}MER_{it}I(ED > \gamma_2) + a_{31}PER_{it}I(ED \leq \gamma_3) + a_{32}PER_{it}I(ED > \gamma_3) \\ 221 \quad + a_4CER_{it} \times MER_{it} \times PER_{it} + a_5X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \\ 222 \quad (6)$$

$$223 \quad ES_{it} = \beta_{11}CER_{it}I(ED \leq \gamma_1) + \beta_{12}CER_{it}I(ED > \gamma_1) + \beta_{21}MER_{it}I(ED \leq \gamma_2) \\ 224 \quad + \beta_{22}MER_{it}I(ED > \gamma_2) + \beta_{31}PER_{it}I(ED \leq \gamma_3) + \beta_{32}PER_{it}I(ED > \gamma_3) \\ 225 \quad + \beta_4CER_{it} \times MER_{it} \times PER_{it} + \beta_5X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \\ 226 \quad (7)$$

227 (6) and (7) where ED is the threshold variable, which represents the level of regional economic
 228 development, γ_1, γ_2 , and γ_3 are the threshold values, and the meaning of other variables is consistent
 229 with the benchmark model.

230 3.2 Variable description

231 3.2.1 Dependent variable

232 Industrial structure refers to the composition of various industrial sectors and within each industrial
 233 part in the national economy. The transformation and upgrading of industrial structure is the process of
 234 industrial structure changing from a low-level form to a high-level form (Ernst, 1998). The dependent
 235 variable of this paper is the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure, which is mainly
 236 measured from two dimensions of industrial structure rationalization and industrial structure
 237 advancement. The rationalization of industrial structure not only reflects the ability of inter-industry
 238 structural transformation, but also reflects the effective use of resources. It is a measure of the degree of
 239 coordination between factor input and industry. Existing studies generally use the degree of structural
 240 deviation to measure the level of rationalization of industrial structure, but because this method ignores
 241 the different roles of different industries in economic development, the measurement results may be
 242 biased. Therefore, this paper selects the *Theil Index*, which takes into account the deviation of the output
 243 value and employment structure of each industry, and the difference in the economic status of each
 244 industry, as a measure of the rationalization of the regional industrial structure. The specific calculation
 245 formula is as follows.

246
$$TL = \sum_{m=1}^3 \left(\frac{Y_m}{Y} \right) \ln \left(\frac{Y_m}{L_m} / \frac{Y}{L} \right), \quad m = 1, 2, 3 \quad (8)$$

247 Where, TL stands for *Theil Index*, Y stands for output value, L stands for employment, and m stands
 248 for three major industries. When TL=0, the economy is in an equilibrium state. The larger the TL value,
 249 the more easily the economic development deviates from the equilibrium state and the more unreasonable
 250 the industrial structure.

251 The advancement of industrial structure is an important part of the transformation and
 252 upgrading of industrial structure. In general literature, the advancement of industrial structure is
 253 defined as the increase in the proportion of non-agricultural output value, but this method cannot
 254 accurately reflect the nature of industrial structure evolution. The advancement of industrial
 255 structure involves the evolution of industrial proportional relations and the improvement of labor
 256 productivity (Liu et al., 2008). Therefore, referring to the method of Liu et al. (2008), the product
 257 of the inter-industry proportional relationship and labor productivity is used as a measure of
 258 advanced industrial structure. Calculated as follows.

259
$$ES = \sum_{m=1}^3 \frac{Y_m}{Y} \times LP_m, \quad m = 1, 2, 3 \quad (9)$$

260 Where, ES stands for advanced industrial structure, and LP stands for labor productivity, which is
 261 calculated by using the ratio of regional industrial added value to the number of employees at the end of
 262 the same period. The larger the ES value, the higher the degree of advanced industrial structure.

263 3.2.2 Key independent variables

264 Command controlled environmental regulation (CER) mainly refers to the government's adoption
 265 of compulsory environmental regulations to intervene in corporate pollution discharge activities to
 266 achieve the external goal of reducing environmental pollution. Refer to the practice of Wu et al. (2020)
 267 to select the employment index of regional environmental agencies instead. Market incentive
 268 environmental regulation (MER) is stimulated by economic interests and influences the environmental
 269 behavior of the parties through market forces, mainly including sewage charges, subsidies, taxes, etc.
 270 Among them, sewage charges are the earliest market-incentive environmental regulation tool. And the
 271 scope of implementation is wide, the time span is long, and it is more representative than policies such
 272 as emissions trading and subsidies. Therefore, this paper draws on the practices of Levinson (1996) and
 273 Xie et al (2017) and uses pollution fees to characterize market incentive environmental regulations.
 274 Voluntary Public Participation Environmental Regulation (PER) is a non-statutory agreement established
 275 between enterprises, governments, or non-profit organizations, and the purpose of this agreement is to
 276 improve environmental quality or enable effective use of natural resources. Environmental proposals are
 277 an important form of public participation in environmental protection supervision, which reflect the
 278 people's attention to environmental issues. This paper uses environmental proposals to reflect public
 279 voluntary participation in environmental regulations.

280 3.2.3 Threshold variable

281 The regional development level (ED) situation determines the environment in which the industrial
 282 structure transformation and upgrading is located. Therefore, the regional economic development level
 283 is very important to the industrial structure transformation and upgrading. This paper uses per capita
 284 GDP as a measure of the regional economic development level, and takes it as a threshold variable.

285 3.2.4 Control variables

286 According to the existing research, some provincial characteristics are added as control variables in
 287 the regression analysis of the model to alleviate the bias of omitted variables as much as possible. Natural
 288 resource endowment (NR). Natural resource endowment not only reflects the resource constraints of
 289 various regions in the choice of industrial structure, but also reflects the principle of comparative
 290 advantage of economic development. For the measurement of natural resource endowment, this paper
 291 selects the sum of fixed asset investment of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and extractive
 292 industries as the proportion of the total fixed asset investment of the whole society to reflect the
 293 comprehensive endowment of natural resources in various regions to the greatest extent. Resident

294 consumption (RC). It is generally believed that with the improvement of living standards, people will
 295 pay more attention to the quality of life, environment and other factors, which will have a compelling
 296 effect on the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure. This paper uses the ratio of the
 297 consumption level of each region to the region's GDP to measure. Informatization (IT). Due to data
 298 limitations, this paper uses per capita post and telecommunications business to measure the level of
 299 informatization. Financial development level (FL). Levine (1997) believes that financial development is
 300 accompanied by economic development. With the continuous development of financial markets, the
 301 provision of financial services for economic entities has promoted the optimal allocation of resources,
 302 and has a certain role in promoting the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure. This paper
 303 draws on the common practice of existing literature and takes the proportion of the loan balance of each
 304 region in the total output value of the region at the end of the year as a measure of the level of financial
 305 development.

306 3.3 Descriptive statistics of data sources and variables


307 Due to the availability of data, this paper takes 30 provinces in China as the research object, and
 308 selects panel data from 2000 to 2017. The data used in the empirical research are mainly derived from
 309 the *China Statistical Yearbook*, *China Environmental Statistical Yearbook*, *China Environmental*
 310 *Yearbook*, and the provincial-level statistical yearbooks. All nominal data are based on the year 2000 and
 311 are deflated by using the general production index and the consumer price index respectively. For a small
 312 part of missing data, it is estimated by trend fitting. Table 1 summarizes the data characteristics of each
 313 variable. At the same time, in order to solve the heteroscedasticity problem, the data processing mostly
 314 adopts the method of ratio or natural logarithm. See Table 1 for details.

315 **Table 1** Descriptive statistics of variables

Variable	N	Mean	Max	Min	Std. Dev.
<i>TL</i>	540	0.250	0.934	0.007	0.157
<i>ES</i>	540	7.937	29.969	0.284	5.759
<i>CER</i>	540	7.859	10.000	4.000	1.004
<i>MER</i>	540	10.399	14.761	6.685	1.086
<i>PER</i>	540	4.879	7.000	0.000	1.080
<i>ED</i>	540	2.886	12.906	0.124	2.429
<i>NR</i>	540	0.068	0.326	0.000	0.057
<i>RC</i>	540	0.363	0.750	0.107	0.079
<i>IT</i>	540	0.139	0.699	0.012	0.107
<i>FL</i>	540	0.998	5.332	0.182	0.463

316 3.4 The average change trend of industrial structure rationalization and advancedization


317 Based on the above methods, the degree of rationalization and advancement of the industrial
 318 structure of 30 regions in China from 2000 to 2017 was measured, and the average change trend was
 319 calculated. The details are shown in the figure. It can be seen from Figure 1 that, first of all, the *Theil*
 320 *Index* is in a downward trend as a whole, indicating that China's industrial structure configuration level
 321 is gradually increasing, and the industrial structure tends to be rationalized, but there is still a certain
 322 distance from the optimal level. Secondly, judging from the magnitude of the change in *Theil Index*, most
 323 years showed negative growth, especially after 2012, the decline was large, and only a small increase in
 324 2017.



325
326 **Fig. 1.** The average Theil index and its change range from 2000 to 2017

327 Note: tl is the range of changes in the rationalization of the industrial structure. TL is the *Theil Index*.

328
329 It can be seen from Figure 2 that the upgrading degree of the industrial structure from 2000 to 2017
330 is constantly improving, which indicates that China's industrial structure is changing from the low-level
331 form of "primary industry, secondary industry and tertiary industry" to the high-level form of "tertiary
332 industry, secondary industry and primary industry". From the perspective of the growth rate of the
333 advanced industrial structure, most years realized positive growth, only 2004 was negative growth, and
334 the growth rate was relatively large in the eight years from 2005 to 2012. This shows that China's
335 industrial structure has improved significantly during this period. In 2013 and the following years, the
336 development speed of China's industrial advancement has slowed down, and the growth rate is about 4%.
337



338
339 **Fig. 2.** Average industrial structure advancement and its change range from 2000 to 2017

340 Note: es is the range of changes in the advanced industrial structure; ES is the advanced industrial
341 structure.

342 4. Empirical results

343 4.1 Benchmark regression

344 Firstly, before panel data regression, the model needs to be tested with Hausman statistics to
345 determine whether to use a random effects model or a fixed effects model. Secondly, in order to avoid
346 the bias of the estimation results caused by the multicollinearity of the model, this paper adopts the
347 stepwise regression method to perform regression estimation on the model. The results of Hausman test
348 show that the fixed effects model is better than the random effects model, so the fixed effects model is
349 selected. The regression results of the model are shown in Table 2 and Table 3. It can be seen from the
350 regression results of the model that the overall model has passed the significance test of the F statistic,
351 indicating that the measurement model is set reasonably. The following is a detailed analysis of the
352 regression structure of the model with the rationalization of industrial structure and advanced industrial
353 structure as dependent variables.

354 The model (1) in Table 2 does not include any control variables in the panel data model regression
355 estimation. CER, MER and PER are all negative at the 1% significance level, which indicates that the
356 three types of environmental regulation measures have effectively reduced the deviation degree of
357 industrial structure, that is, improved the rationalization level of industrial structure. From the regression
358 results of the three interaction terms, it does not have a positive effect on the rationalization of the
359 industrial structure. The possible reason is that there are problems in the convergence of the three types
360 of environmental regulations in China, and the three types of environmental regulations have not exerted
361 the greatest effect. Models (3)-(6) gradually added control variables, and the key independent variables
362 did not change significantly, indicating that the model estimation results have a certain degree of
363 robustness. From the perspective of the regression coefficients of the control variables, the level of
364 residential consumption, informatization and financial development has improved the rationalization
365 level of the industrial structure at a significant level of 1%. The transformation of residents' consumption
366 structure has a certain negative effect on the rationalization of industries. In recent years, the income
367 level of residents has been increasing year by year, and the consumption structure has been upgraded. In
368 order to meet consumption needs, the industrial structure will inevitably change. The process of
369 informatization contains the mechanism of rapid industrial development, which directly promotes the
370 rationalization of industrial structure. With the improvement of the level of financial development, the
371 provision of financial services for industrial development has promoted the optimal allocation of
372 resources and reduced its financing costs, thereby conducive to the development of a rationalized
373 industrial structure. The natural resource endowment is positively correlated with the *Theil Index*, but it
374 has not passed the significance test, indicating that natural resource endowment has not played an
375 effective role in the rationalization of industrial structure.

376 Table 3 reports the regression results of CER, MER and VER on the advanced measurement of
377 industrial structure. Model (1) Panel data model regression estimation without any control variables,
378 CER, MER, and PER are all positive at a significant level of 1%, which indicates that the three types of
379 environmental regulatory measures have effectively improved the advanced industrial structure Level.
380 Moreover, the role of MER in the advancement of the industrial structure is significantly higher than the
381 role of CER and VER. This shows that with the continuous improvement of China's market structure,
382 environmental regulation policies based on market development will play a leading role in the
383 transformation and upgrading of industrial structure. Similarly, the interaction terms of the three types of
384 environmental regulations have a negative effect on the advancement of the industrial structure, which
385 once again proves that the coordination of the three types of environmental regulations in China needs
386 to be further optimized. From the perspective of the regression coefficients of the control variables,
387 household consumption, informatization and financial development levels have increased the level of
388 advanced industrial structure at a significant level of 1%, while natural resource endowments are
389 negatively correlated with the advanced industrial structure. There are related explanations in the
390 previous paper, so I won't repeat them here.

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Table 2 Benchmark regression results (TL)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>CER</i>	-0.027*** (0.0087)	-0.036*** (0.0127)	-0.037*** (0.0127)	-0.042*** (0.0126)	-0.034*** (0.0125)	-0.024** (0.0121)
<i>MER</i>	-0.016*** (0.0049)	-0.022*** (0.0073)	-0.023*** (0.0075)	-0.028*** (0.0075)	-0.019** (0.0077)	-0.013* (0.0074)
<i>PER</i>	-0.015*** (0.0039)	-0.031** (0.1548)	-0.026** (0.0155)	-0.035** (0.0153)	-0.029* (0.0151)	-0.020 (0.0146)
<i>Inter</i>		0.059 (0.0582)	0.058 (0.0582)	0.072 (0.0575)	0.055 (0.0568)	0.039 (0.0545)
<i>NR</i>			0.073 (0.1023)	0.037 (0.1012)	0.087 (0.1003)	0.023 (0.0977)
<i>RC</i>				-0.090*** (0.0228)	-0.106*** (0.0227)	-0.103*** (0.0382)
<i>IT</i>					-0.176*** (0.0423)	-0.126*** (0.0412)
<i>FL</i>						-0.102*** (0.0154)
<i>_cons</i>	0.708*** (0.0723)	0.561*** (0.1616)	0.574*** (0.1627)	0.648*** (0.1615)	0.594*** (0.1595)	0.521*** (0.1534)
<i>Hausman</i>				20.26 (0.0164)		
<i>F</i>	77.16 (0.0000)	75.97 (0.0000)	65.19 (0.0000)	66.27 (0.0000)	55.44 (0.0000)	58.31 (0.0000)
<i>N</i>	540	540	540	540	540	540

393 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
394 indicate standard errors. The lower bracket of the Hausman test indicate the P value, the bracket below
395 F test is the adjoint probability of statistics.

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Table 3 Benchmark regression results (ES)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>CER</i>	2.607*** (0.4494)	4.156*** (0.6508)	4.214*** (0.6492)	3.683*** (0.6141)	2.893*** (0.5776)	2.431*** (0.5594)
<i>MER</i>	3.728*** (0.2563)	4.621*** (0.3731)	4.816*** (0.3832)	4.268*** (0.3667)	3.384*** (0.3548)	3.091*** (0.3438)
<i>PER</i>	0.882*** (0.2028)	3.379*** (0.7912)	3.278*** (0.7899)	2.804*** (0.7453)	2.254*** (0.6956)	1.849*** (0.6711)
<i>Inter</i>		-9.706*** (2.9740)	-9.591*** (2.9644)	-8.193*** (2.7938)	-6.493** (2.6040)	-5.789** (2.5039)
<i>NR</i>			-10.988** (5.2071)	-14.595*** (4.9180)	-19.523*** (4.6048)	-14.516*** (4.4892)
<i>RC</i>				9.045*** (1.1073)	7.539*** (1.0430)	16.999*** (1.7563)
<i>IT</i>					17.386*** (1.9413)	15.148*** (1.8961)
<i>FL</i>						4.635*** (0.7069)
<i>_cons</i>	-55.959*** (3.7326)	-31.861*** (8.2582)	-33.791*** (8.2808)	-26.317*** (7.8430)	-20.9917*** (7.3152)	-17.664** (7.0459)
<i>Hausman</i>	62.00 (0.0000)					
<i>F</i>	23.63 (0.0000)	24.01 (0.0000)	24.33 (0.0000)	21.46 (0.0000)	17.95 (0.0000)	18.56 (0.0000)
<i>N</i>	540	540	540	540	540	540

414 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
 415 indicate standard errors. The lower bracket of the Hausman test indicate the P value, the bracket below
 416 F test is the adjoint probability of statistics.

417 4.2 Robustness test

418 (1) Key independent variables lag by one period

419 Considering that the main body of research often has a time lag in response to environmental
 420 regulations, that is, the effectiveness of environmental regulations will take a period of time to come into
 421 play. Therefore, this paper will examine the impact of the lagging first-phase variables of three types of
 422 environmental regulations on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure to test the
 423 robustness of the benchmark model estimation results. It can be seen from Table 4 that the sign and size
 424 of the regression coefficients of the key independent variables and control variables have not changed
 425 significantly, and it can be concluded that the benchmark regression results of this paper are robust.

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Table 4 Robustness test (Key independent variables lag by one period)

Variable	TL	ES
<i>CER</i>	-0.017** (0.0075)	2.821*** (0.6354)
<i>MER</i>	-0.016** (0.0079)	3.449*** (0.3694)
<i>PER</i>	-0.038** (0.0164)	3.264*** (0.7582)
<i>Inter</i>	0.092 (0.0595)	-9.041*** (2.7499)
<i>NR</i>	0.051 (0.1001)	-12.421*** (4.6310)
<i>RC</i>	-0.112*** (0.0397)	17.005*** (1.8382)
<i>IT</i>	-0.162*** (0.4776)	13.659*** (2.2086)
<i>FL</i>	-0.106*** (0.0165)	4.572*** (0.7624)
<i>_cons</i>	0.275* (0.1653)	-12.209 (7.6417)
<i>Hausman</i>	20.25 (0.0164)	65.39 (0.0000)
<i>F</i>	56.76 (0.0000)	17.16 (0.0000)
<i>N</i>	510	510

437 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
 438 indicate standard errors. The lower bracket of the Hausman test indicate the P value, the bracket below
 439 F test is the adjoint probability of statistics.

440 (2) Replace the key independent variables

441 Since there are many indicators for environmental regulation, this paper will select an alternative
 442 indicator for the three types of environmental regulations to test the robustness of the model. Among
 443 them, the CER chooses "the number of environmental administrative punishment cases" as a substitute
 444 indicator. MER select the "three-simultaneous deposit" as an alternative indicator, but based on the
 445 availability of data, use the "implementation of the three-simultaneous project environmental investment
 446 amount" for specific measurement in each region. VER select "the total number of environmental letters
 447 and visits in the region" as a substitute indicator. It can be seen from Table 5 that after replacing the
 448 independent variables, the signs and sizes of the regression coefficients of the key independent variables
 449 and the control variables also did not change significantly. It can be concluded that the benchmark
 450 regression results of this paper are robust.

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Table 5 Robustness test (replace the key independent variables)

Variable	TL	ES
<i>CER</i>	-0.009** (0.0043)	2.122*** (0.1806)
<i>MER</i>	-0.005** (0.0023)	3.010*** (0.3412)
<i>PER</i>	-0.033** (0.0151)	3.104*** (0.1134)
<i>Inter</i>	0.012 (0.0035)	-7.153*** (1.4507)
<i>NR</i>	0.089 (0.0516)	-7.965** (3.9231)
<i>RC</i>	-0.053*** (0.0139)	9.002*** (1.6883)
<i>IT</i>	-0.070** (0.0304)	9.765*** (1.7767)
<i>FL</i>	-0.084*** (0.0163)	1.476** (0.6729)
<i>_cons</i>	0.444*** (0.0439)	5.605 (1.8147)
<i>Hausman</i>	26.57 (0.0164)	15.26 (0.0841)
<i>F</i>	56.50 (0.0000)	23.42 (0.0000)
<i>N</i>	540	540

460 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
 461 indicate standard errors. The lower bracket of the Hausman test indicate the P value, the bracket below
 462 F test is the adjoint probability of statistics.

463 (3) Change the model estimation method

464 Considering that fixed effects regression may have endogenous problems, the generalized distance
 465 estimation method is used to estimate the robustness of the benchmark model. System Generalized
 466 Distance Estimation (System GMM) combines differential GMM and horizontal GMM into one, and
 467 performs GMM estimation as a simultaneous equation system. In the system GMM, the endogenous
 468 explanatory variable lag is used as its own instrumental variable, which not only improves the efficiency
 469 and robustness of the estimation, but also estimates the regression coefficient that does not change with
 470 time. Based on this, this paper adopts a two-step system GMM estimation method to test the robustness
 471 of the above-mentioned benchmark model. It can be seen from Table 6 that the model has passed the
 472 AR(1), AR(2) and Sargan tests. The model does not have the problem of second-order autocorrelation,
 473 and there is no problem of over-identification of instrumental variables. Therefore, the regression result
 474 is reliable. It is known from the regression coefficient and significance that the sign and significance of
 475 the coefficient have not changed significantly, again verifying the robustness of the benchmark regression
 476 results in this paper.

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Table 6 Robustness test (change model estimation method)

Variable	TL	ES
<i>CER</i>	-0.049** (0.0129)	1.578*** (0.3434)
<i>MER</i>	-0.012** (0.0051)	3.426*** (0.2722)
<i>PER</i>	-0.028* (0.0170)	1.864*** (0.5257)
<i>Inter</i>	0.061 (0.0548)	-2.966 (1.9279)
<i>NR</i>	0.269 (0.2147)	-17.497** (3.5939)
<i>RC</i>	-0.054*** (0.0128)	10.459*** (3.4417)
<i>IT</i>	-0.178*** (0.0589)	9.210*** (3.0179)
<i>FL</i>	-0.088** (0.0404)	1.282** (0.6051)
<i>_cons</i>	0.581*** (0.2058)	-18.894 (5.5321)
<i>Province</i>	Yes	Yes
<i>Year</i>	Yes	Yes
<i>AR(1)</i>	-3.45 (0.0006)	-2.66 (0.0077)
<i>AR(2)</i>	0.19 (0.8652)	1.10 (0.2694)
<i>Sargan</i>	0.26	0.17
<i>N</i>	540	540

482 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
 483 indicate standard errors. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests in parentheses below are the adjoint probabilities of
 484 the statistics.

485 4.3 Non-linearity test

486 This paper selects the level of regional economic development as the threshold variable, and uses
 487 the Bootstrap method to repeatedly sample 300 times for threshold self-sampling inspection. Table 7 and
 488 9 show the results of the 300 self-sampling tests, and Table 8 and 10 show the estimated thresholds and
 489 95% confidence intervals. According to the test results, under the condition of the advanced industrial
 490 structure as the dependent variable, the single threshold and double threshold effects of the three types
 491 of environmental regulations have passed the 1% significance test, but the triple threshold effect is not
 492 significant. Under the condition of rationalization of the industrial structure as the dependent variable,
 493 the single threshold and double threshold effects of the CER and the VER have passed the significance
 494 test of 10% and above, while the single threshold effect of market incentive environmental regulation
 495 only passes the significance test of 5%.

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Table 7 Self-sampling inspection of threshold effect (ES)

Threshold variable	Threshold nature	F	P	BS	Critical value		
					1%	5%	10%
<i>CER</i>	Single	348.56***	0.0000	300	112.411	84.713	68.402
	Double	204.31***	0.0000	300	63.496	41.810	34.068
	Triple	94.65	0.6867	300	282.092	216.954	197.281
<i>MER</i>	Single	310.56***	0.0000	300	117.289	87.046	76.631
	Double	234.84***	0.0000	300	72.049	45.515	36.313
	Triple	89.15	0.6600	300	269.008	214.654	187.674
<i>PER</i>	Single	332.60***	0.0000	300	126.019	92.497	77.277
	Double	188.08***	0.0000	300	57.019	41.215	33.458
	Triple	76.43	0.6800	300	224.945	169.373	151.792

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Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.

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Table 8 Threshold estimation results (ES)

Threshold variable	Threshold estimate	95% confidence interval
<i>CER</i>	Threshold 1	[2.164 2.206]
	Threshold 2	[4.487 4.685]
<i>MER</i>	Threshold 1	[2.374 2.431]
	Threshold 2	[4.492 4.702]
<i>PER</i>	Threshold 1	[2.374 2.469]
	Threshold 2	[4.487 4.686]

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Table 9 Self-sampling inspection of threshold effect (TL)

Threshold variable	Threshold nature	F	P	BS	Critical value		
					1%	5%	10%
<i>CER</i>	Single	55.51**	0.0267	300	59.474	47.365	40.761
	Double	34.71*	0.0733	300	56.825	39.819	30.287
	Triple	13.65	0.4933	300	46.992	35.493	28.386
<i>MER</i>	Single	56.06**	0.0167	300	70.817	46.830	38.257
	Double	30.25	0.1233	300	69.601	40.105	32.001
	Single	50.30**	0.0467	300	72.371	49.954	39.268
<i>PER</i>	Double	37.55*	0.0733	300	61.697	46.963	31.845
	Triple	11.96	0.6267	300	63.906	41.200	32.086

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Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%.

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Table 10 Threshold estimation results (TL)

Threshold variable	Threshold estimate	95% confidence interval
<i>CER</i>	Threshold 1	[0.274 0.371]
	Threshold 2	[1.432 1.464]
<i>MER</i>	Threshold 1	[0.274 0.371]
<i>PER</i>	Threshold 1	[0.274 0.371]
	Threshold 2	[1.432 1.464]

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511 Based on the above threshold effect test analysis, it can be seen that the three types of environmental
512 regulations have a threshold effect on the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure with
513 the regional economic development level as the threshold variable. Therefore, the threshold model is
514 regressed. Table 11 and Table 12 are the regression results of the threshold model for the advanced and
515 rationalized industrial structure of the dependent variable. It can be seen from Table 11 that the three
516 types of environmental regulations have gradually highlighted the role of environmental regulations in
517 promoting the advancement of the industrial structure with the improvement of the level of regional
518 economic development. In particular, when the level of regional economic development is lower than
519 2.397, the VER does not play a significant positive role in the advancement of the industrial structure.
520 This shows that the level of regional economic development, as the material basis for the transformation
521 and upgrading of the industrial structure, is crucial to the realization of environmental regulation policies
522 to promote industrial transformation and upgrading. If the regional economic development level is high,
523 when the environmental regulation policy is implemented, it can use its own economic advantages to
524 achieve industrial transformation and upgrading smoothly. However, if the regional economic
525 development level is low, the local government may cause the effect of environmental regulation policies
526 to be greatly reduced in order to develop the economy.

527 It can be seen from Table 12 that MER only has a single threshold value of 0.347 when the regional
528 economic development level is used as the threshold variable. Similarly, the three types of environmental
529 regulations have gradually highlighted the role of environmental regulations in promoting the
530 rationalization of industrial structure with the improvement of the level of regional economic
531 development. And when the level of economic development is low, CER and VER have not effectively
532 promoted the improvement of the level of industrial structure rationalization.

533 **Table 11** Regression results of panel threshold model

Variable	ES		
<i>CER*I(ED<2.172)</i>	0.678*** (0.2626)		
<i>CER*I(2.172<ED<4.661)</i>	1.254*** (0.2647)		
<i>CER*I(ED>4.661)</i>	1.928*** (0.2580)		
<i>MER*I(ED<2.397)</i>		1.493*** (0.1670)	
<i>MER*I(2.397<ED<4.661)</i>		1.889*** (0.1693)	
<i>MER*I(ED>4.661)</i>		2.320*** (0.1689)	
<i>MER*I(ED<2.397)</i>			0.143 (0.3044)
<i>MER*I(2.397<ED<4.661)</i>			0.809*** (0.2697)
<i>MER*I(ED>4.661)</i>			1.607*** (0.2738)
<i>Control variable</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>_cons</i>	-4.492 (2.8186)	-9.210*** (2.4506)	-35.032*** (4.2959)
<i>N</i>	540	540	540

534 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
535 indicate standard errors.

Table 12 Regression results of panel threshold model

Variable	TL		
$CER*I(ED<0.347)$	-0.010 (0.0077)		
$CER*I(0.347<ED<1.462)$	-0.026** (0.0124)		
$CER*I(ED>1.462)$	-0.066*** (0.0189)		
$MER*I(ED<0.347)$		-0.009* (0.0059)	
$MER*I(ED>0.347)$		-0.064** (0.0265)	
$PER*I(ED<0.347)$			0.004 (0.0078)
$PER*I(0.347<ED<1.462)$			-0.025** (0.0124)
$PER*I(ED>1.462)$			-0.076*** (0.0157)
<i>Control variable</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>_cons</i>	0.593*** (0.0854)	0.520*** (0.0816)	0.624*** (0.1277)
<i>N</i>	540	540	540

537 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
538 indicate standard errors.

539 5.4 Mechanism test

540 Since environmental resources are non-exclusive and competitive, the negative externalities caused
541 by environmental pollution need to be resolved through government forces. The theory of government
542 intervention believes that the externality of environmental pollution cannot be solved by the market
543 mechanism itself, while the government has complete information and can rely on environmental
544 regulations to internalize external effects. Porter et al (1995) expanded and deepened this theory and
545 proposed that strict environmental regulations will induce technological innovation in enterprises,
546 thereby achieving the goal of a win-win situation for environmental protection and economic
547 development, namely the "Porter Hypothesis". Specifically, on the one hand, enterprises affected by
548 environmental regulations may choose to improve production processes and pollution control
549 technologies in order to avoid being punished by environmental regulations. On the other hand, the green
550 subsidy policy may receive investment in technological innovation, thereby increasing the level of green
551 technological innovation, and ultimately promoting the transformation and upgrading of the industrial
552 structure. Those who hold the opposite view to Porter's hypothesis believe that because the cost of
553 complying with environmental regulations always exists, it will have a crowding-out effect on innovation
554 funds, thereby hindering the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure to a certain extent, that
555 is, "following the cost theory." Therefore, this paper further examines whether environmental regulation
556 can achieve the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure through the intermediary effect of
557 technological innovation.

558 Before foreign capital enters the host country, the strength of environmental regulations in a country
559 or region will inevitably affect the location of foreign investment. The "Pollution Paradise Hypothesis"
560 points out that in order to maximize profits, pollution-intensive companies will transfer their industries
561 to countries with lower levels of environmental regulation. On the one hand, strict environmental
562 regulations have become an obstacle to the capital entry of some polluting companies, increasing the cost

563 of foreign companies purchasing raw materials from the local area, and then squeezing out the investment
564 in production and operation links, which is not conducive to the spillover effect of foreign capital, so it
565 may have a negative impact on the transformation and upgrading of local industrial structure. On the
566 other hand, the establishment of environmental regulations as a screening threshold for foreign
567 investment can reduce the entry of pollution-intensive companies and leave room for other companies
568 with relatively clean production. Adom and Amuakwa-Mensah (2016) believe that the technology
569 spillover of foreign enterprises in the host country can improve the production efficiency of domestic
570 enterprises, thus promoting the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure to a certain extent.
571 Similarly, this paper examines whether environmental regulations can achieve industrial structural
572 transformation and upgrading through the intermediary role of foreign direct investment.

573 On the basis of existing literature, it is considered that environmental regulation may have an impact
574 on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure through two paths: technological innovation
575 and foreign direct investment. Therefore, in order to test whether these two paths exist or not, this paper
576 uses the method of Baron and Kenny (1986) to build a mediation effect model with technological
577 innovation and foreign direct investment as mediation variables to test the mechanism of environmental
578 regulation on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure. The mediation effect model is set
579 as follows.

$$580 \quad ES_{it} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 ER_{jit} + \theta_2 X_{it} + \xi_{it} \quad (10)$$

$$581 \quad PA_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 ER_{jit} + \xi_{it} \quad (11)$$

$$582 \quad ES_{it} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 ER_{jit} + \delta_2 PA_{it} + \delta_3 X_{it} + \xi_{it} \quad (12)$$

$$583 \quad FDI_{it} = \eta_0 + \eta_1 ER_{jit} + \xi_{it} \quad (13)$$

$$584 \quad ES_{it} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 ER_{jit} + \rho_2 FDI_{it} + \rho_3 X_{it} + \xi_{it} \quad (14)$$

$$585 \quad TL_{it} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 ER_{jit} + \theta_2 X_{it} + \xi_{it} \quad (15)$$

$$586 \quad PA_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 ER_{jit} + \xi_{it} \quad (16)$$

$$587 \quad TL_{it} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 ER_{jit} + \delta_2 PA_{it} + \delta_3 X_{it} + \xi_{it} \quad (17)$$

$$588 \quad FDI_{it} = \eta_0 + \eta_1 ER_{jit} + \xi_{it} \quad (18)$$

$$589 \quad TL_{it} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 ER_{jit} + \rho_2 FDI_{it} + \rho_3 X_{it} + \xi_{it} \quad (19)$$

590 Where, ER stands for environmental regulations, $j=1,2,3$, which respectively represent CER, MER,
591 and VER. PA is technological innovation. The current indicators for measuring technological innovation
592 include R&D investment, the number of scientific researchers, and the number of patents. We uses the
593 number of patent applications to measure. FDI is foreign direct investment, which is measured by the
594 ratio of the amount of regional foreign direct investment to local GDP. The meaning of other variables is
595 consistent with the benchmark model.

596 Table 13 reports the estimated results of technological innovation as an intermediary variable. It can
597 be seen that the three types of environmental regulations all have a significant positive role in promoting
598 technological innovation, which can be the next step of the mediation effect test. After the intermediary
599 variable PA is introduced into the model, the regression coefficients of CER are still significant, while
600 the regression coefficients of MER and VER have become insignificant. Part of the mediating effect
601 exists in the process of industrial structure transformation and upgrading, and there is a complete
602 mediating effect in the process of MER and VER on the process of industrial structure transformation
603 and upgrading. This also shows that China's MER and VER have the "Porter Hypothesis" in their

604 influence on the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure, while the CER is not.

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Table 13 Estimation results of mechanism test (PA)

Variable	PA	ES	ES	TL	TL
<i>CER</i>	1.100*** (0.1695)	1.489*** (0.3849)	0.869** (0.3671)	-0.017** (0.0083)	-0.008 (0.0083)
<i>MER</i>	1.416*** (0.0967)	2.538*** (0.2485)	1.687 (1.2529)	-0.009* (0.0053)	0.003 (0.0057)
<i>PER</i>	0.388*** (0.0765)	0.351** (0.1756)	0.142 (0.1659)	-0.010*** (0.0038)	-0.007* (0.0037)
<i>PA</i>			0.882*** (0.1030)		-0.0127*** (0.0023)
<i>Control variable</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>_cons</i>	-17.776*** (1.4081)	-31.646*** (3.6299)	-22.880*** (3.5451)	0.617*** (0.0787)	0.491*** (0.0798)
<i>N</i>	540	540	540	540	540

606 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
607 indicate standard errors.

608 Table 14 reports the estimated results of foreign direct investment as an intermediary variable. The
609 results show that CER and MER have a certain hindering effect on foreign direct investment, while VER
610 has no obvious impact on foreign direct investment, indicating that with the improvement of China's
611 environmental regulations, restrictions some foreign investment activities with high pollution levels.
612 After adding the intermediary variable FDI to the model, the regression coefficients of the three types of
613 environmental regulations are still significant, and the coefficient of the intermediary variable FDI is not
614 significant, indicating that foreign direct investment has only a partial mediating effect in the process of
615 the three types of environmental regulations affecting the industrial structure transformation and
616 upgrading.

617

Table 14 Estimation results of mechanism test (FDI)

Variable	FDI	ES	ES	TL	TL
<i>CER</i>	-0.109* (0.0612)	1.489*** (0.3849)	1.427*** (0.3813)	-0.017** (0.0083)	-0.017** (0.0083)
<i>MER</i>	-0.064* (0.0349)	2.538*** (0.2485)	2.562*** (0.2460)	-0.009* (0.0053)	-0.009* (0.0053)
<i>PER</i>	0.014 (0.0276)	0.351** (0.1756)	0.386** (0.1741)	-0.010*** (0.0038)	-0.010*** (0.0038)
<i>FDI</i>			-1.120*** (0.3286)		0.008 (0.0072)
<i>Control variable</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>_cons</i>	1.943*** (0.5084)	-31.646*** (3.6299)		0.617*** (0.0787)	0.620*** (0.0787)
<i>N</i>	540	540	540	540	540

618 Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Values in parentheses
619 indicate standard errors.

620 5. Research conclusions and policy implications

621 Since the reform and opening up, China's economic development speed and overall scale have made
622 remarkable achievements, but at the same time, it is also facing problems such as overcapacity and
623 overall de-realization to virtuality, and the problem of irrational and unbalanced industrial structure has
624 gradually become prominent (Heinrich and Dai, 2016). To transform the mode of economic development
625 and lead the economy to high-quality development. The Chinese government has chosen a path that can
626 both improve the environment and promote sustainable economic development. For this reason, it has
627 issued a number of environmental policies to deal with environmental problems in the process of
628 industrial development. However, there are obvious differences between different types of environmental
629 regulations, which are reflected in different environmental protection tendencies and purposes, and there
630 are also significant differences in policy implementation. Therefore, quantitative assessment of
631 heterogeneous environmental regulations has become an empirical problem that needs to be solved
632 urgently for the transformation and upgrading of China's industrial structure. Therefore, this paper
633 describes the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure from two levels of industrial structure
634 rationalization and advancement. On this basis, it uses panel data models and threshold models to
635 empirically test the different effects of heterogeneous environmental regulations on industrial structure
636 transformation and upgrading, and further analyzes which influence mechanism. The main conclusions
637 are as follows: (1) The level of rationalization of China's industrial structure increased year by year from
638 2000 to 2017, but there is still a certain distance from the optimization level. The industrial structure is
639 changing from a low-level form of "primary, secondary, and tertiary industries", transformed into a high-
640 level structure of "tertiary industry, secondary industry, and primary industry". (2) The three types of
641 environmental regulation measures can effectively reduce the deviation degree of industrial structure and
642 improve the advanced level of industrial structure, and the effect of MER on the advanced level of
643 industrial structure is significantly higher than that of CER and PER. However, from the regression
644 results of the three interaction terms, it has no effect on the transformation of industrial structure
645 upgrading has a positive promoting effect. (3) According to the results of non-linear testing, the three
646 types of environmental regulations have gradually highlighted the role of environmental regulations in
647 promoting the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure as the level of regional economic
648 development increases. (4) In the examination of the mechanism of action, it is found that technological
649 innovation has a partial mediating effect in the process of the impact of CER on the transformation and
650 upgrading of industrial structure. MER and VER have a complete intermediary effect in the process of
651 industrial structure transformation and upgrading, while foreign direct investment has only a partial
652 intermediary effect in the process of the three types of environmental regulations affecting industrial
653 structure transformation and upgrading.

654 Based on the above research conclusions and combined with theoretical analysis, the following
655 policy implications are drawn. First, improve the environmental law enforcement system, continuously
656 innovate law enforcement methods, fundamentally solve the problems of extensive, random law
657 enforcement and unfair law enforcement, and effectively improve the reasonable level of command-and-
658 control environmental regulations. The second is to build a market incentive-based environmental
659 regulation and guidance mechanism. MER has become the main regulatory force to promote industrial
660 transformation and upgrading. China should continue to carry out in-depth emissions trading and carbon
661 emissions trading pilot work, summarize and improve its regulatory methods, and finally promote it to
662 all provinces across the country to obtain environmental dividends. The third is to establish and improve
663 laws and regulations on public participation, improve the government information disclosure system,
664 strengthen corporate information disclosure systems, give full play to the role of media supervision and
665 reputation mechanisms, increase education and publicity, encourage people to participate in
666 environmental protection, and actively play VER promotes the transformation and upgrading of
667 industrial structure. Fourth, attach importance to the mediating effect of various types of environmental
668 regulations. First, increase investment in technological innovation in the manufacturing industry,
669 accelerate the transformation, utilization, promotion and application of research and development results,
670 and improve the intellectual property protection and other invention and creation incentive systems.

671 Secondly, make environmental regulations as the threshold for the introduction of foreign investment, by
672 screening some pollution-intensive and resource-intensive enterprises, ensuring the quality of foreign
673 investment, and actively digesting the green technology and management experience of foreign-funded
674 enterprises. Finally, the interaction and coordination mechanism among CER, MER and VER should be
675 brought into play. By coordinating the three types of environmental regulations, to make up for the
676 shortcomings of a single environmental regulation, and finally form a joint force of environmental
677 regulations to achieve the goal of industrial transformation and upgrading.

678

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682 Wang constructed the models and analyzed the optimal solutions. Lianghu Wang wrote the paper. Yatian Ma
683 reviewed and edited the manuscript. All authors read and approved the manuscript.

684 **Data availability** The datasets generated and/or analyzed during the current study are property of National
685 Bureau of Statistics, they are available from the corresponding author who will inform National Bureau of
686 Statistics that the data will be released on reasonable request.

687 **Compliance with ethical standards**

688 **Conflict of interests** The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

689 **Ethics approval and consent to participate** Not applicable

690 **Consent to participate** Not applicable

691 **Consent to publish** Not applicable

692

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Figures




Figure 1

The average Theil index and its change range from 2000 to 2017 Note: tl is the range of changes in the rationalization of the industrial structure. TL is the Theil Index.




Figure 2

Average industrial structure advancement and its change range from 2000 to 2017 Note: es is the range of changes in the advanced industrial structure; ES is the advanced industrial structure.