Conflict Resolution between Multi-Level Government and Farmers in Land Expropriation Based on Institutional Credibility Theory: Empirical Evidence from Shandong Province, China

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Research Article

Keywords: Conflict Analysis Model (CAM), Credibility thesis, Land disputes, Expropriation and eviction, Endogenous property rights

Posted Date: February 9th, 2023

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2562004/v1

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Abstract

The land expropriation policy of Merging Villages & Living Together (MVLT) in rural areas has intensified conflicts due to insufficient financial compensation and “demolishing old houses before building new ones”. The current research rarely includes farmers, governments at all levels, the strength of policy tools, and policy perceptions into a unified quantitative research framework. This paper adopts the institutional credibility theory, incorporates the policy instruments of higher-level governments, administrative instruments of lower-level governments, and farmers’ credibility of policies into a unified accounting framework, constructs a conflict stress index, evaluates the role of each subject’s characteristics, policy perceptions, and policy instruments in the process of conflict generation and resolution, and analyzes the ways of conflict resolution from the perspective of different stakeholder games. The analysis framework are verified by using the case study of MVLT policy in Shandong Province, China. The results show that the credibility of the policy is influenced by individual characteristics and varies significantly. The administrative means and different combinations of the lower level government can significantly improve the success rate of policy implementation. The highest value of the conflict index was observed when the administrative instruments reached the maximum value without marginal increase in farmers’ credibility for policy implementation and improvement were made.

1. Introduction

Land expropriation in China is an important realistic path for rapidly promoting urbanization. From 2003 to 2017, the government expropriated a total of 5,555,297 thousand hectares of land at an average of 370,353 thousand hectares per year (Chuang and Julia 2015). This results in the loss of farmers' land-use and usufruct rights, and the consequential insufficient compensation is the primary reason for land expropriation conflicts (Benjamin 2007; Yep 2013; Song Wang and Lei 2016). Therefore, insufficient land expropriation compensation has been criticized as a deprivation of land-lost farmers (Hui, Bao and Zhang 2013; Brockmann et al. 2009). It is also the most important source of social unrest and the significant number of conflicts caused by land expropriation in China’s rural and surrounding urban areas (Liu, Fang, and Li 2014; Cui et al. 2015; Cai et al. 2020; Lin et al. 2018). Over the past decade, more than 65% of Chinese farmers’ petitions are due to land issues of which 73.2% are related to land expropriation (Liu and Sun 2014). These latter conflicts have become a key issue affecting rural stability in China (Huang et al. 2016).

Although it is a type of land expropriation, the policy of Merging Villages & Living Together (MVLT) is different from an ordinary one that is government-led. The specific approach of the MVLT in rural areas is to demolish the houses of peasant households in several neighboring rural areas. The homesteads will be recovered and new rural communities will be composed of buildings to resettle the demolished peasant households. This will achieve land reclamation and increase the area of cultivated land to exchange for the increase of urban construction land indicators. Implementing the MVLT can result in residents living centrally, thus effectively reducing rural construction land that will gain the urban construction indicators instead.
In addition to insufficient compensation, the most significant characteristic of the MVLT is "demolishing houses first and then building resettlement houses". The homestead rights of farmers are therefore infringed (Chen and Ma 2012). The farmer must build temporary housing on his contracted land before the resettlement housing has been completed or some of them "live in no fixed place". Even if they live in resettlement houses, the original form of open living becomes centralized apartment living which leads to "separation of production and living functions" (Chen 2018). This directly causes economic risks for migrant farmers due to the breakdown of livelihood networks (Zhai 2016). Chuang (2015) believed that many of the land expropriation farmers have become "homeless without three things", that is, no land, no job, and no basic welfare guarantee (Sargeson 2012). Therefore, the MVLT receives more resistance from farmers which has led to contradictions and conflicts that are more intense.

Although the MVLT has become a profound issue in academic circles, there is a lack of research on the quantitative analysis of the degree of conflict and the resolution mechanism. For the extent of conflict, Lin et al. (2018) used the four indicators such as direct economic losses, the number of participants, injuries, and deaths caused by these conflicts to divide China's land conflicts into four types: huge land conflicts, considerable land conflicts, serious land conflicts, and ordinary land conflicts. There is no transitional state among the four types, and it is difficult to demonstrate the degree of conflict without casualties, and it is impossible to show the interaction between farmers and government organizations through the size of a conflict. As the most controversial land policy in China, there are many conflicts with the MVLT, and their degree is far greater than that of general land expropriation. However, the latter did not incite continuous and large-scale social conflicts and turbulence. Thus, how can the MVLT conflict be resolved?

This paper will analyze the policy credibility of farmers, the policy tools used by the upper government to implement the policy objectives, and the administrative means used by the lower government to organize farmers. It proposes forward a theoretical analysis framework for the game between farmers and the government that explains how the conflicts were generated and how they can be resolved. The conflict pressure index and the conflict index as well as their calculation methods are constructed, and the changes of these indexes reflect the role of administrative means of lower government and policy tools of upper government.

There are three innovations in this paper: (1) The farmers' behavior will, the upper government's will, and the lower government's administrative means are brought into the theoretical framework of a conflict analysis which provides a broader vision to the conflict generation and solution. (2) The conflict pressure and the conflict itself are distinguished, and the conflict pressure and conflict index are quantitatively measured. (3) This paper discusses the mechanism of conflict resolution, analyzes the way to resolve land expropriation conflicts with the change of policy tools of the upper government and administrative means of the lower government.

2. Theoretical Analysis Framework And Hypotheses
2.1 The conflict of the MVLT and farmers' credibility

The Conflict Analysis Model (CAM) originated from the study of land tenure and forest conflicts (Ho 2005, 2006) and was gradually developed to include a set of different variables (Ho 2014), notably, timing, source, nature, frequency, intensity, duration, and outcome of conflict. This was later expanded with additional indicators such as the different actors involved in a conflict (Yang and Ho 2019). The model is a heuristic tool to which indicators can be added, adjusted, and operationalized according to the needs of the study. Its aim is to approach conflict in a multi-dimensional, temporally, and spatially sensitive manner by going through a reiterative process of hermeneutical data interpretation. In effect, it is a flexible, analytical instrument for assessing the relevant variables rather than a rigid model in which each indicator needs to be present.

The "credibility thesis" provides the corresponding relationship between institutional credibility and behavioral response. Grabel (1994) pointed out that, when the policy is "credible", a rational economic man will respond to market signals as described by the neoclassical theory. Peter Ho (2013, 2014, 2016a) systematically proposed the theory and measurement method (institutional credibility thesis) of institutional "credibility" and defined it as: When a certain institution exists and persists, social and economic executors have a certain degree of perception and support for the system believing that it is credible, will implement it, and it is efficient. Otherwise, the efficiency of the system is relatively low. To date, the CAM has been applied and tested through a variety of studies such as on urban commons (Arvanitidis and Papagiannitsis 2020), grassland (Fan et al. 2019), forest (Krul et al. 2020), and indigenous land rights (Nor-Hisham and Ho 2016) and has become a tool to evaluate the conflict of farmland systems (You et al. 2022; Yang and Ho 2020).

The CAM also has certain areas for further refinement: (1) it mostly describes the conflict extent and the results and focuses less on the drivers of the conflict thus there is a lack of a basis for taking effective measures to resolve conflict. (2) For a land conflict that is a result from public policy and public governance, the role of the government as a policy maker and promoting executor is important. What role the government plays in conflict generation and resolution has not been studied. Thus, solutions could be found from the credibility theory to resolve the above problems.

The credibility thesis and its underlying theory hold that credibility is endogenous. It is significantly affected by the characteristics of farmers' age, gender, education level, household income, and income sources (Ho 2016b; Sun and Ho 2018; Zheng and Ho 2020). Diniz et al. (2013) have found that the five types of livelihood capital of farmers including human, material, natural, social, and financial resources have an important impact on farmers' livelihood strategies that are an important driving force for farmers' willingness to participate in land reform. Fan et al. (2022) analyzed the implementation of grassland ecosystem service policies and believed that the livelihood capital and livelihood type of farmers are endogenous to credibility. It is sufficient to observe that the credibility of policies will be different if the characteristics of policy implementers are also different, and the policies' results will vary. There is a
causal chain between individual characteristics, credibility and policy results (Fig. 1). In this context, the following hypothesis for the MVLT is proposed:

H1: There is a significant correlation between the individual characteristics of farmers and the credibility of the MVLT. If the individual characteristics of farmers such as living place, income level, and social capital are different then the credibility of the policy is also significantly different.

2.2 Government behavioral will and generation of conflict

Public choice theory holds that the government is also an "economic man" with its own pursuit of interests (Blumm 1994; Engelen 2007). Government has a hierarchical structure (Tirole 1986), and it is simplified into two levels for the MVLT, i.e. the upper and lower government. The upper government formulates the policy of the MVLT. There are two major driving factors for upper government to do so: One is to develop the local economy and reduce fiscal deficit (Pan et al. 2015; Cai 2016; Su and Tao 2017; Zhu et al. 2019), and the second is the motivation to promote government officials (Blanchard and Shleifer 2001; Whiting 2001; Zhou 2004). In addition, with the intensification of social contradictions in recent years, the risk of social stability caused by possible major conflicts has also become an important factor to be considered in the upper government's policy formulation (Kong 2018; Lin 2019). Therefore, it will assess the social stability problems that may be caused by the MVLT before formulating it (Xue et al. 2020). When the risk can be controlled, the upper government will depute the lower government to implement the MVLT. In order to ensure its effective implementation, the upper government uses policy tools including task assignment, inspection and acceptance, incentive measures, and performance assessment to urge the lower government's policy implementation (Zhou 2012; Gilley 2012; Beeson 2010).

The lower government is also an "economic man" which is of self-interest in the structure of the principal-agent in policy implementation (Yu et al. 2012; Zhao et al. 2013). Under the restriction of the policy tools of the upper government, the lower government officials implement the MVLT and achieve the policy objectives in their pursuit of political achievements. The lower government will use all administrative resources to complete the policy of the upper government within the prescribed timeframe (Rong and Cui 1998; Yang 2012). Administrative means such as land compensation discretion, administrative penalties, and organizational mobilization are used to mobilize farmers to implement the MVLT.

There are three primary actors involved in the MVLT: upper government, lower government, and peasant households. The process of game and interaction among them promotes the implementation of the MVLT but also produces prominent contradictions (Fig. 2). In Fig. 2, the upper government entrusts the MVLT to the lower government and urges the lower government to implement it for the policy objectives through policy tools. The lower government acts and mobilizes farmers to participate through administrative instruments. Farmers decide whether to participate in according to their own assessment of the policy's credibility. The conflict pressure comes from the gap between the credibility of the upper
government and the farmers which will lead to conflict under the promotion by the policy tools of the upper government. We use the conflict index to measure the degree of conflict.

When the MVLT is promulgated by the upper government, it means that the policy is completely credible. The value of credibility of the upper government is 1 on a value range of credibility between 0 and 1. If farmers also believe that the policy is credible, they will actively cooperate with the implementation of the policy (Ho 2014), and the pressure of conflict will be minimal at this time. On the contrary, if farmers think that the policy is not credible and their willingness to implement the policy is very low, there will be a fierce game between the government and farmers in the MVLT. With a greater gap of credibility, there is greater conflict pressure; the smaller the gap, the lower the conflict pressure. The expression is shown in this formula:

\[ CFI = C_g - C_f = 1 - C_f \]  

In the formula (1), CFI is the conflict stress index; Cg is the government’s credibility; and Cf is the farmers’ credibility.

The high pressure of conflict does not mean that the conflict is strong because it also depends on the intensity of the implementation of policies by the lower government. Its driving force to implement policies comes from the policy tools of the upper government. If the upper government proposed the MVLT to the lower government without corresponding policy tools, that is, without taking any governance measures, that means the policy is "a dead letter". Consequently, the lower government may not act. In this situation, there is no possibility of conflict.

The conflict index is defined as:

\[ CF_{\text{index}} = CFI \times PTI = PTI \times (1 - C_f) \]  

In the formula (2), CFindex is the conflict index; PTI is the policy tools index.

In the value range of a conflict index between 0 and 1, 1 is absolute conflict for which there is no possibility of reconciliation and land expropriation is either enforced by the government or terminated; 0 means that there is no conflict, and the land requisition is carried out smoothly.

The Pareto’s 80/20 Rule is very important for the revelation of land expropriation conflicts. In studying these conflicts (Cai et al. 2020; Liu and Sun 2014; Huang et al. 2016), all of the focus will be on analyzing the significant role of the people who have the least willingness for land expropriation that causes conflicts and rural stability problems. In addition, Lo et al. (2021) and Hu et al. (2020) paid more attention to vulnerable groups. Therefore, we need to pay attention not only to the willingness and conflict of all of the land-expropriated farmers but especially to the conflicts caused by the 20% of farmers with the lowest willingness. We define the conflict value of the latter group as:

\[ CF_{\text{index}}(\leq 20\%) = PTI \times (1 - C_f \leq 20\%) \]  


In the formula (3), $C_f \leq 20\%$ is the arithmetic mean of the credibility of the lower 20% of farmers in the sequence of all land-expropriated farmers from low to high.

### 2.3 Administrative means of lower governments and conflict resolution

The biggest feature of the implementation of land expropriation policies is the negotiation and bargaining between government and farmers (Xue 2017, 2020). Most of these conflicts are alleviated or resolved by the bargaining between the lower government and farmers in stages, and the land expropriation policy is finally implemented for all or most of the farmers.

From formula (2), it can be seen that the resolution of the conflict depends on reducing the PTI of the upper government or improving the credibility of farmers. Generally speaking, the PTI of the upper government is not easy to change, thus changing the credibility of land expropriated farmers becomes key to resolving conflicts and completing land expropriation tasks.

How do farmers determine credibility? According to Peter Ho's credibility measurement (Ho 2014, 2016b), the credibility of land expropriation policy depends on three secondary indicators, specifically, farmers' perception of profit and loss, conflict, and institutional change. The perception of profit and loss is the estimation of whether the amount of compensation for demolition can balance the loss. The perception of conflict is the estimation of the contradiction with the local government, other farmers in the same village, and relatives. The perception of institutional change is the prediction of possible policy changes if they insist on refusing demolition. These three indicators of credibility fully reflect the overall perception of farmers with the land expropriation policy and determine their willingness to act.

How do administrative means affect the credibility of farmers? Those used by the lower government primarily include the discretion of compensation, the power of administrative punishment, and the ability of organization and mobilization. It is easily discerned when we further divided it into three levels of indicators (Table 1). The separate or combined use of these level three administrative means in Table 1 may have an effect farmers' credibility. Under the threat of administrative means, the value of this may increase and resolve the conflict. To this end, we propose the following hypothesis:

H2: There is a significant correlation between the administrative means of the lower government and the improvement of farmers' credibility, and different administrative means or combinations of them have different effects on the credibility of policies.
Table 1
Index setting of administrative means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1 index</th>
<th>Secondary indicators</th>
<th>Level 3 indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative means</td>
<td>Discretion in compensation expenses</td>
<td>Adopt the way of increasing or reducing the compensation standard for demolition and removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority of administrative penalties (hard means)</td>
<td>Use a way of limiting freedom</td>
<td>Way that threatens the employment or welfare of family members or relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Take water disconnection, power cut, and road closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Threat forced demolition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization and mobilization ability (soft means)</td>
<td>Constantly sending people to persuade them</td>
<td>Party members or village cadres to take the lead and asked to persuade other farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People whose family members work in government and business persuade their family to agree to the demolition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ask your relatives to do the persuasion work</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The administrative means of the lower government can improve farmers' credibility and reduce the pressure of conflict. When all means fail to achieve the goal of improving farmers' credibility, the lower government under the strong restriction of the time node by the upper government will use administrative power to force demolition for the remaining farmers with lower credibility without consent. This type of administrative means goes against the wishes of farmers which will inevitably lead to fierce conflicts and the rise of conflict pressure. To this end, the authors propose the following hypothesis:

H3: The improvement of the credibility of farmers by the administrative means is limited. When the lower government using the maximum administrative means also fails to increase the credibility of farmers, the degree of conflict is the highest.

Generally speaking, the upper government cannot easily change the MVLT after it is promulgated, thus the PTI is a relatively stable. According to formula (2), when the PTI is constant, the size of conflict is related to farmers' credibility index. Based on hypothesis H1, H2 and H3, we propose the following ratiocination:

Ratiocination 1: Conflict is determined by the individual characteristics of the behavioral agent, and there are different conflict values with various places of residence, income levels, social capital, etc.
Ratiocination 2: The separate and combined use of different administrative means will effectively resolve the conflict.

Ratiocination 3: The conflict index reaches its maximum when the administrative means of the lower government are completely used up, and the conflict breaks out.

When information such as the degree and scale of conflict in the MVLT is transmitted to the upper government, it will assess whether the conflict seriously endangers social stability. When the upper government assesses that the MVLT will greatly affect social stability, it will be terminated, and the PTI will become zero. According to formula (2), the conflict index is 0 at this time, and the conflict disappears. It can be seen that the upper government’s timely termination of the MVLT is an effective way to resolve conflicts. At the end of the MVLT, the remaining farmers become "nail households" (Li et al. 2021; Zhou 2019). In this changing governance system, the phenomenon of the existence of uncompromising nail households reflects the important role of the social stability mechanism that ultimately controls land expropriation conflicts within a certain range.

3. Overview Of The Study Area, Data Acquisition, And Research Methods

3.1 Overview of the study area

Tancheng County is a county under the jurisdiction of Linyi City, Shandong Province. Tancheng County is located in the low mountains and hills in central and southern Shandong Province and in the hinterland of the Tancang Plain(Fig. 4). Tancheng County is a jurisdiction with 13 towns. At the end of 2020, the total number of households was 314,700, the total population was 1,045,400, the urban population was 308,500, and the rural population was 736,900. It is an agricultural county for which the GDP was 32.094 billion CNY in 2020. The added value of the primary industry was 3.587 billion CNY accounting for 11.2% of GDP; the second was 8.408 billion CNY accounting for 26.2% of GDP; and the third was 20.099 billion CNY accounting for 62.6% of GDP.

The MVLT in Tancheng County was implemented in March 2018. Compensation for house demolition shall be implemented in accordance with the "Notice of the Office of the People’s Government of Tancheng County on Publishing the Compensation Standards for Ground Attachments and Green Crops in Land expropriation‘ issued on January 6, 2016. Prior to its initiation, the local government entrusts the relevant real estate estimation company with measuring and registering the houses and ground attachments of each household and estimates the total compensation. Various compensation amounts will be paid for different housing types and construction standards, and they are approximately equivalent to the replacement construction cost, however, there is no compensation for the homestead area. In order to promote rapid implementation, the county government has established a leading group for the work. It is headed by the executive deputy head of the Standing Committee of the County Party
Committee that is responsible for the specific activities of farmers' housing demolition and resettlement housing construction as well as inspecting and supervising the project's progress.

### 3.2 Data acquisition

In this paper, Q village in Shengli town was selected from five villages in Tancheng county as the investigation area. The first author's parents live there and investigated the entire process of the implementation of the MVLT as a local and acquired first-hand data in its process.

There are 1215 households in Q village, and 351 of them have participated in the project, accounting for 28.9% of the total number of households in the village. Beginning on April 12, 2018, 15 staff members (all civil servants) in charge of demolition in Shengli Town and 50 village cadres formed a working group. They began to distribute publicity materials, issued compensation standards of demolition to each peasant household, and persuaded them to sign demolition agreements. Since April 14, 2018, our survey team has conducted a full sample follow-up survey on the 351 relocated households primarily based on a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Chambers 1994; Cramb et al. 2004). We use PRA tools such as questionnaires, observations, and semi-structured interviews to finalize our survey. See Table 2 for the basic information of the relocated farmers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N = 351</th>
<th>Classification of Farmers</th>
<th>Number of Household</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of household, age</td>
<td>Under the age of 30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30–60 year</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>74.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over the age of 60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of income</td>
<td>Non-agricultural income ≤ 30%</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>24.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30% Non-agricultural income 90%</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>55.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-agricultural income ≥ 90%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing structure</td>
<td>Brick mix</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>65.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brick wood</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steel mix</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income per household (CHY)</td>
<td>≤ 2000</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>25.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000–4000</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>62.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>≥ 4000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11.28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Research methods

3.3.1 Measurement index of farmers' credibility

We refer to the credibility measurement of Peter Ho (Ho 2014, 2016b) and divide the credibility into three secondary indicators of profit and loss perception, contradiction perception, and institutional change perception according to the specific situation of MVLT. Each secondary indicator is subsequently broken down into three-level indicators.

Indicator settings are described as follows:

(1) The value of the profit and loss perception is obtained from the following three-level indicators:

a. Can the compensation fund for land expropriation policy balance profits and losses? Value of loss balance = amount of compensation - increased cost. If the value is > 0, it is income; if the value < 0, it is a loss. This is set as follows (single choice):

The compensation given by the government is very sufficient, sufficient, enough, not enough, insufficient.

b. Is there any delay in the gain compensation funds for the land expropriation policy? This is set up as follows (single choice):

Immediately, half a year, 1 year, 2 years, more than 2 years.

(2) The value of the conflict perception is obtained from the following three-level indicators:

a. The possible size of the conflict? This is set as follows (single choice):

No conflict, agree to land expropriation; Minor conflict; Moderate conflict; Fierce conflicts, petitions and appeals; Serious conflict, bloody, and death.

b. In which groups do conflict occur? This is set as follows (multiple choice):

Between farmers and local governments; Among farmers in the same village; Between farmers and their relatives and social relations.

(3) The value of change perception is obtained from the following three-level indicators:

a. Whether the land expropriation policy is consistent? This is set as follows (single choice):

no change; resist for a while, the government will raise the compensation standard; after a period, the land expropriation policy will come to an end.
b. If farmers refuse to change, what is the possibility of the government changing its policy? This is set as follows:

impossible, maybe possible, possible, very likely, completely possible.

The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is used to determine the weight of the evaluation index (Xu 2006; Saaty 1980). The calculation steps of indicator weight are approximately as follows:

The farmers’ credibility index is determined by questioning the farmers involved in the MVLT in the survey area. 15 farmers that are involved in it were invited to form an expert group to solicit their opinions on the role of task allocation, inspection and acceptance, incentive measures, and performance appraisal. The judgment matrix table for the four indicators of the second level in the policy tool according to the scale description (Table 3) were filled in, and 15 judgment matrices were obtained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Equal importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Weak importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Essential importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Very strong importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Absolute importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2, 4, 6, 8</td>
<td>Intermediate value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The judgment matrix table obtained in the above process was inputted into the YAAHP (analytic hierarchy process software V.6.0)\(^1\). The judgment matrix and weight value of each index were obtained. In order to eliminate the deviation of personal understanding of the index weight, the average value of the index weight in 15 judgment matrices was taken as the final weight.

Set \( m_i \) as the weight of the index \( x_i \). For \( i \), the Credibility is \( C_i \):

\[
C_i = m_i x_i \quad (4)
\]

where \( X_i \) is the standard value of the index \( i \). The credibility index intuitively reflects the degree of trust in a policy. The value of credibility is between 0 and 1 which is continuous. The higher the value is, the greater the credibility.

### 3.3.2 Indicators for the measurement of policy instrument indices
The following indicators are established for the policy instruments of the MVLT. Each indicator was assigned by the Likert level 5 scale according to the degree of the problem from minimal to significant.

1. Task assignment: The MVLT has the time node to finish.
2. Inspection and acceptance: The superior established a strict assessment system before, during, and after the event.
3. Incentive measures: According to the completion of the MVLT, there is a certain amount of incentive funds.
4. Performance assessment: The completion of the MVLT shall be included in the annual performance assessment, and those who fail to pass it shall be degraded.

We investigate the lower government's perception of the upper government's policy instruments and ask the former's personnel in the MVLT to complete the questionnaire. The weight of each sub-index of the policy instrument is obtained by a method similar as that for the credibility weight.

Let $w_i$ be the weight of the policy instrument indicator $p_i$. For $i$, the policy instrument value of the indicator is $PTI_i$:

$$PTI_i = w_i \cdot p_i \quad (5)$$

The value of the policy instrument index reflects how strong the upper government pushed the lower government to finish the project, and the value range is $[0,1]$. It is also continuous, and a higher value indicates the greater the efforts of the upper government to promote the implementation of policies.

### 3.3.3 Administrative means of lower governments and evaluation of farmers' characteristics

The evaluation methods of the division of the administrative means from Table 1 and the peasant household characteristics are shown in Table 4. The situation of each household and the administrative means that they perceived are different. According to Table 1, we requested each household to fill in the specific sheet and subsequently calculate the value of administrative means perceived by each household according to Table 4.

In order to study the impact of individual characteristics of farmers on the credibility of the policy, we evaluated these with the method in Table 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proxy index</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Proxy index's calculation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the characteristics of farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residence</td>
<td>$X_1$</td>
<td>Do you live in the village?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, 1; No, 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure</td>
<td>$X_2$</td>
<td>What is the housing structure like?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brick and wood, 1; brick concrete, 2; steel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>concrete, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>source of income</td>
<td>$X_3$</td>
<td>What is the source of income?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pure agriculture, 1; part-time industry, 2;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-agricultural, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>$X_4$</td>
<td>What is your monthly income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>less than 3000, 1; 3000–5000, 2; more than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5000, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social capital</td>
<td>$X_5$</td>
<td>How about your social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no, 0; relative, 1; family member 2; relative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ family member 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrative means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compensation means</td>
<td>$G_1$</td>
<td>Mainly for three degrees:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no, 0; light, 1; heavy, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hard means</td>
<td>$G_2$</td>
<td>Here are 4 options, one point each, for a total of 4 points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soft means</td>
<td>$G_3$</td>
<td>Here are 5 options, one point each, for a total of 5 points</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A regression model is constructed by taking the credibility of farmers as the dependent variable and the characteristics of farmers and the administrative means of lower governments as the explanatory variables as follows:

$$\text{Credibility}_i = \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3 x_{i3} + \cdots + \beta_j x_{ij} + \gamma_j g_{ij} + \beta_0 + \epsilon_i \quad (6)$$

In the formula (6), $x_{ij}$ is the standard value of the characteristic index of the farmer $j$ with the sample $i$, and $g_{ij}$ is the standard value of the administrative means perceived by the farmer $j$ with the sample $i$. $\beta_0$ is a constant term, and $\epsilon_i$ is a residual term.

### 3.3.4 Classification of conflict index
In order to better describe the degree of conflict, the conflict index is divided into five equal parts between 0 and 1 corresponding to the change of conflict from low to high. Fan and Yang (2019) classified the credibility according to the credibility scales and intervention (CSI) checklist of Peter Ho (2016b) which is the basis for the timing and mode of government intervention (Table 5). Following the credibility classification and intervention checklist setting, we obtain the Conflict Degree Intervention (CDI) checklist (Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credibility index</th>
<th>0.0000-0.2000</th>
<th>0.2001-0.4000</th>
<th>0.4001-0.6000</th>
<th>0.6001-0.8000</th>
<th>0.8001-1.0000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium low</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Medium high</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional efficiency</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Medium Poor</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Medium Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional intervention</td>
<td>Ordaining</td>
<td>Prohibiting</td>
<td>Facilitating</td>
<td>Co-opting</td>
<td>Condoning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict index</th>
<th>0.0000-0.2000</th>
<th>0.2001-0.4000</th>
<th>0.4001-0.6000</th>
<th>0.6001-0.8000</th>
<th>0.8001-1.0000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict level</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium low</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Medium high</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy efficiency</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Medium good</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Medium poor</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy intervention</td>
<td>Condoning</td>
<td>Co-opting</td>
<td>Facilitating</td>
<td>Prohibiting</td>
<td>Ordaining</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 6, we divide the degree of conflict into five levels according to the size of the conflict index and propose targeted policy intervention measures for different degrees of the MVLT conflict which provides a basis for timing and intervention measures of conflict governance.

1 YAAHP (Yet Another AHP) is an AHP software that provides convenient functions such as hierarchical model construction, entry of judgement matrix data, computation of weight, and export of computational data (http://www.yaahp.com/).

4. Result Analysis
4.1 Credibility and level of conflict in the initial implementation of the MVLT

At the initial stage of the MVLT in Q village, the working group distributed propaganda materials to each farmer; relayed the benefits of the MVLT, the policy of demolition and the compensation standard; and persuaded them to sign the demolition agreement. At this time, we investigated the credibility of 351 farmers. We also investigated the perception of the policy instruments of 12 staff members and calculated the value of policy instruments.

It can be seen from Table 7 that the credibility of all farmers is 0.4763, and the corresponding risk index is a Neutral (upper) level, which is a relatively high level. After ranking the credibility, 20% of farmers (70 households) had the lowest credibility at only 0.2117 which is a Medium low (lower) level, and the corresponding conflict index is 0.7736 which is a Medium high (upper) level of conflict. It demonstrates that the willingness of farmers is very low. Forced participation will inevitably lead to a higher level of conflict. Our survey also shows that the work group is under substantial pressure.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Credibility</th>
<th>Credibility level</th>
<th>Policy instrument</th>
<th>Conflict index</th>
<th>Conflict level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full sample(351)</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>0.4763</td>
<td>Neutral (lower)</td>
<td>0.9813</td>
<td>0.5139</td>
<td>Neutral (upper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample*20%</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>0.2117</td>
<td>Medium low (lower)</td>
<td>0.9813</td>
<td>0.7736</td>
<td>Medium high (upper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1(61)</td>
<td>17.38</td>
<td>0.8790</td>
<td>High (lower)</td>
<td>0.9813</td>
<td>0.1187</td>
<td>Low (upper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2 − 1(85)</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>0.5467</td>
<td>Neutral (upper)</td>
<td>0.9813</td>
<td>0.4448</td>
<td>Neutral (lower)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2−2(157)</td>
<td>44.73</td>
<td>0.3827</td>
<td>Medium low (upper)</td>
<td>0.9813</td>
<td>0.6058</td>
<td>Medium high (lower)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3 − 1(36)</td>
<td>10.26</td>
<td>0.2185</td>
<td>Medium low (lower)</td>
<td>0.9813</td>
<td>0.7669</td>
<td>Medium high (upper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3 − 2(12)</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>0.0512</td>
<td>Low (lower)</td>
<td>0.9813</td>
<td>0.9311</td>
<td>High (upper)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In order to reflect the change of the credibility level in Table 5 and the conflict index level in Table 6 in a more detailed manner, each level of classification is divided into upper and lower levels.
After measuring the credibility and conflict index of the full sample, it is ascertained that there is an enormous difference in credibility among farmers. It can be divided into three groups from high to low (Table 7). Among them, 61 households have an average credibility of 0.879 for the MVLT, and the corresponding level of credibility is High (lower). They directly accept the policy requirements and sign the demolition agreement which we divided into the first group. It is worth noting that the 12 households in the group 3 – 2 have a credibility of 0.0512, they are completely against the MVLT, and the conflict level is very high.

4.2 Individual characteristics and credibility of farmers

The MVLT depends on the extensive participation of farmers. Their individual characteristics are different which determines their varying degrees of willingness to participate and also establishes the credibility of the policy. Individual characteristics are distinguished into whether to live in a policy implementation area, housing structure, income source, income level, and social capital, and these variables have different effects on credibility. Column (1) of Table 8 shows the relationship between the credibility and the characteristics of the full sample of farmers. Living in policy implementation area has a significant negative correlation with the credibility, indicating this living situation will reduce the credibility of the policy. In addition, there is a significant correlation between the credibility and monthly income with the higher the income, the higher the credibility. There is a negative correlation between the credibility and their social capital with the richer the social capital, the lower the credibility. Hypothesis H1 is verified.
The full sample is divided into three groups according to the level of credibility in order to find the factors affecting the credibility in more detail. Table 8 (2) is the first group with higher credibility greater than 0.8; Table 8 (3) is the second group with middle credibility between 0.3 and 0.8; Table 8 (4) is the third group with lower credibility than 0.3.

At the initial stage of the policy implementation, the lower government did not undertake any administrative instruments, however, there were 61 households with high credibility of 0.8790 which is at a High (lower) level. Table 8(2) shows the regression results on the credibility and the individual characteristics of the 61 households. The most important individual characteristic is whether they live in a policy implementation area, and the p value for this has passed the significance test. It indicates that farmers who do not live in a policy implementation area have higher credibility. A further survey of the 61 households has supported the regression results of which 49 were unoccupied, and the owners lived in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>residence</td>
<td>-0.501***</td>
<td>-0.076***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-21.37)</td>
<td>(-12.41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure</td>
<td>0.031**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
<td>(-0.66)</td>
<td>(-0.49)</td>
<td>(4.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of income</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(-0.38)</td>
<td>(5.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>0.046***</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.050***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.85)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(-0.19)</td>
<td>(7.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>-0.039***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.056***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.11)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(-9.30)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.740***</td>
<td>0.845***</td>
<td>0.225***</td>
<td>0.140***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.09)</td>
<td>(21.29)</td>
<td>(22.55)</td>
<td>(6.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\text{Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1}$
other cities for many years. Another 12 households moved to the county town, and the cost of demolition can subsidize the cost of a house there. This is why this group has such a high credibility.

There are 48 households in the third group. Table 8 (3) illustrates that the credibility of this group is significantly negatively correlated with social capital. The richer the social capital is, the lower the credibility. The credibility of this group is only 0.1742, and the corresponding conflict index is 0.8104. The conflict is at the High (lower) level, and there is the possibility of conflict developing.

There are 242 households in the second group. At the beginning of the implementation, their credibility of the policy is not high, ranging from 0.3 to 0.8 in Table 8 (4). It can be seen that the credibility of this group is significantly related to the housing structure, income source, and monthly income. This indicates that, for this group, the index of the housing structure, income source, and monthly income will have a positive impact on the credibility.

### 4.3 Administrative instruments and credibility

At the beginning of the MVLT, the second group's credibility is at a low level. However, when the lower government imposed administrative instruments, the credibility of the 242 households was improved, and this group signed a demolition agreement. Through the follow-up survey, we find that the credibility of these farmers has indeed changed after doing this. The regression results in Table 9 (1) show that the improvement of the credibility is related to all of the three administrative instruments, and there is a significant correlation with hard and soft means. This fully demonstrates that the administrative instruments of the lower government can improve the credibility of these farmers and reduce the risk of conflict. Thus, hypothesis H2 has been verified.
There are 48 households that have not signed the demolition agreement. Table 9(2) illustrates that the credibility of 48 households has no correlation with the administrative instruments of the lower government. At this time, these cannot improve the credibility of this group, indicating that the administrative instruments to do so are limited. When the lower government cannot improve the credibility of this group or decrease the conflict index using all of administrative instruments means the degree of conflict is the highest.

The 48 households can be approximately divided into three groups of which the first group comprises 7 households whereby the houses have been demolished. The compensation requirements are higher than the government can provide, and they refuse to lower their compensation targets. At this time, the lower government cannot stipulate higher compensation funds except for continuing propaganda organizations, and the conflict index reaches its maximum. At this time, the lower government will investigate each of the remaining farmers again, ascertain the social relations of each household, and make a plan to deal with the farmers who are ready to resist with violence. Under the strong restriction of
the time node by the upper government, the lower government will choose the administrative power to
totally eliminate the houses with consent. There are 12 households in the second group. Their social
capital is relatively strong with direct relatives working in government departments or influential public
utilities departments. This group has a higher income, so the reason why they disagree with the
demolition is not the compensation for demolition but that they do not agree with the form of co-
residence in villages referred to as strong nail households. There are 29 households in the third group for
which the family income is not high enough to purchase new buildings in the resettlement after
demolition. Therefore, these farmers hope that the amount of compensation can meet their requirements
for buying new buildings with same amount of area, otherwise, they refuse to demolish and will
desperately protect their houses. At this time, the lower government has been unable to raise the
compensation standard. The authors call this group weak nail households.

The regression results of the change of the credibility and administrative instruments of the above three
groups are shown in Table 9 (3), 9 (4), and 9 (5). Table 9 (3) shows that the change of the credibility of
the 7 forced demolition households has nothing to do with administrative instruments. Further
investigation ascertained that, if the lower government adopts the method with extreme pressure, it will
inevitably lead to fierce conflicts. The authors conducted a structured interview with the first group and
subsequently assessed their perception of credibility which changed from 0.1742 to almost zero, and the
conflict value reached the highest level.

Table 9 (4) indicates that there is a significant negative correlation between the change of the credibility
and compensation means of strong nail households. Additionally, Table 9 (5) shows that there is a
significant negative correlation of weak nail households between the change of the credibility and the
compensation means, i.e. soft means. After the forced demolition, the credibility of these two groups (41
households) decreased from 0.1742 to 0.0712, and the corresponding conflict index was 0.9114 which is
the high(upper) level. That means the conflict has reached the highest level, and disharmony may break
out at any time which will endanger social stability. Thus, hypothesis H3 has been verified.

4.4 Conflict pressure after the policy stop

The MVLT has been implemented on a pilot basis in different regions of Shandong Province. The
dissatisfaction and struggles of affected farmers are made public through various channels. The
enhancement of online public opinion began on May 12, 2020, when He Xuefeng published one article
titled "Merging villages & Living together, Why should Demolish Farmers' Houses?". On May 6, 2020, the
government affairs dynamic column of the Department of Natural Resources of Shandong Province
announced that it held an expert seminar and technical regulations on projects such as the Special Plan
for the Layout of Villages in Shandong Province. According to the news, the Office of Land and Spatial
Planning will "formulate a plan in the whole province to steadily promoting the for MVLT". It has aroused
widespread concern\(^2\) and creates substantial social pressure on public opinion. Liu Jiayi, secretary of the
Shandong Provincial CPC Committee, stated: "Those policies that are being implemented but bring out
strong opinions from the masses, those that are being studied and prepared for implementation, and
those that have been studied but have not yet been implemented will all be suspended and re-screened.\footnote{3}

In this way, the MVLT in Q Village was stopped, and the household that had not been demolished was retained and became a nail household.

Since the MVLT was stopped, the conflict index decreases to 0. In order to study the change of credibility, the authors continue to track and investigate 48 households. The survey results show that, before the stop of the MVLT, the credibility of this group was 0.1750, the conflict pressure was 0.8250, and the level of conflict was high. With the disappearance of the policy tool, the credibility is adjusted to 0.6943; it does not disappear but it also does not increase close to 1. The conflict pressure is 0.3057 which is in the neutral (lower) level. This shows that, even if the MVLT is abolished, the negative impact of the policy on farmers will not disappear completely, and there is a lag effect of administrative instruments that buries hidden dangers for the government's follow-up policy formulation.


https://www.guancha.cn/HeXueFeng/2020_05_14_550296_2.shtml


https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1670882730150930750&wfr=spider&for=pc

5. Discussion

Based on the credibility thesis and underlying theory, this paper aimed to explain the key to conflict generation and resolution. The authors also examined the willingness of farmers to participate in the MVLT quantitatively by calculating the credibility that reflects the degree of the conflict index. In previous studies, it is assumed that farmers have complete freedom of choice, and their individual characteristics and preferences determine the credibility and thus establish their own behavior choices. The authors ascertained that those farmers who have moved out of the village received the compensation to improve their income, and they have the highest credibility. For those farmers who live in villages, the reasons for the different credibility are due to the different preferences and livelihood levels. It is necessary to implement refined and different policy.

In the implementation of public policy, the credibility of farmers is not only endogenous but also affected by the external environment. In the MVLT with low credibility, the lower government imposed different administrative instruments to increase the credibility of 242 households that finally signed the demolition agreement, accounting for 68.9% of the total number. Based on the study of the MVLT’s implementation process, this paper calculates the change of the credibility of the farmers involved and finds that the administrative instruments of the lower government have changed the credibility of some farmers. It also effectively depicts the change of the strength of governance means and accurately describes how the
Conflict is resolved by the administrative instruments of lower governments. This will bring new enlightening significance to the study of conflict theory. For those farmers who do not have social capital, the government's forced demolition not only fails to improve their credibility but also brings the possibility of conflict at any time, endangering social stability. Those farmers whose family income is not high and cannot afford new buildings with no social capital will fight for their lives in the face of forced demolition. In this situation, the lower government cannot use administrative instruments to achieve policy objectives indefinitely under the unchanged policy tools. The role of upper government policy tools is also very important as it is the key to promote policy implementation and resolve conflicts. The nail households after the termination of the policy are precisely the manifestations of conflict resolution.

Theoretically, the authors believe that one of the important contributions of this paper is to introduce the "credibility thesis" into the analytical framework of policy implementation and to prove that the conflict is the result of the interaction between the credibility of farmers and the upper government's policy tools. Additionally, the administrative instruments of the lower government affect the credibility of farmers and become an important measure for resolving the conflict. Under the same land expropriation policy, the difference of farmers' preferences and livelihood status leads to the difference in credibility which results in different behaviors in the MVLT.

6. Conclusion

This paper begins with the analysis of the credibility and willingness of farmers, the upper government, and the lower government to implement the policy of MVLT. It also establishes an explanatory framework for policy formulation, implementation, and conflict generation; defines the connotation of farmers' credibility, policy tools, and administrative instruments; and constructs a corresponding index system and quantitative measurement methods. A unified and accurate description of conflict generation, conflict intensity, and conflict resolution is provided. Through the case analysis, the following key conclusions can be drawn:

1. For the unified MVLT, the credibility of farmers varies greatly, and is distributed from the lowest to the highest (Table 7). The farmers who had moved out of the village had the highest credibility. For those living in the villages, the variances in their credibility were caused by the differences in farmer preferences and livelihood levels (Table 8).

2. The administrative instruments of the lower government can change the credibility of farmers and thus effectively resolve conflicts. The degree of conflict caused by the MVLT was neutral (upper), however, 20% of farmers with the lowest credibility contributed more to conflict generation, and the conflict index was at the high(upper) level (Table 7). The lower government chose different or combinations of administrative instruments (such as "hard means" or "soft means") with the comprehensive investigation of the characteristics of different farmers. This improved their credibility through their profit and loss perception, conflict perception, and institutional changes (Fig. 3, Table 9) and thus achieved the purpose of resolving conflicts.
3. The ability of lower governments to resolve conflicts with administrative instruments is limited. When it uses all of the administrative instruments but also cannot improve the credibility of farmers or decrease the conflict index, the degree of conflict reaches the highest.

4. The upper government also plays an important role in the generation and resolution of conflicts. On the one hand, the value of the policy tools of the upper government determines the intensity of the policies being promoted to the lower government which indirectly promotes the generation of conflicts. On the other hand, facing the pressure of public opinion from the feedback of the MVLT, the upper government makes a decision to change the policy objectives or terminate the policy which ultimately effectively resolves the conflict.

References


9. Chen R.Z., and Li M.L. 2018. "Integrated governance of communities that have been evacuated from villages and cohabited communities under the perspective of urban-rural relations." JiangHan Tribune (03):133-139.


**Figures**

*Figure 1*

How farmers' individual characteristics affect the credibility of policies
Figure 2
Schematic diagram of the implementation of the MVLT and conflict generation

Figure 3
Schematic diagram of the effect of administrative means of lower governments on the credibility of farmers
Figure 4

Location map of the study area