

Effectiveness of transverse speed reducers and exploring factors contributing to road traffic crashes on a rural two-lane highway: A mixed methods study

Nigus Asefa (✉ n.g.asefa@umcg.nl)

Rijksuniversiteit Groningen <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5680-5527>

Hannah S Yang

Mekelle University

Znabu H Kahsay

Mekelle University

Abraham Hassen

Tigray Regional Health Bureau

Tesfay G Gebrehiwot

Mekelle University

Research article

Keywords: Effectiveness of transverse speed reducers and exploring factors contributing, road traffic crashes on a rural two-lane highway, A mixed methods study

Posted Date: February 29th, 2020

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-15424/v1>

License:  This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

[Read Full License](#)

1 **Effectiveness of transverse speed reducers and exploring factors contributing to road**
2 **traffic crashes on a rural two-lane highway: A mixed methods study**

3

4 **Nigus G Asefa^{1,¥,*}, Hannah S Yang^{2,*}, Znabu H Kahsay², Abraham Hassen³, Tesfay G**
5 **Gebrehiwot²**

6 ¹Department of Epidemiology, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen,
7 The Netherlands

8 Hanzeplein 1 (9713 GZ), The Netherlands

9 Email: n.g.asefa@umcg.nl or niguurayu2003@gmail.com

10 Phone: +31 50 36 10738

11

12 ²School of Public Health, College of Health Sciences, Mekelle University, Mekelle, Tigray,
13 Ethiopia

14 Tell 251-034-4416692

15 Fax 251-034-441-66-81/40-93-04

16 P.O. B. 1871 Mekelle, Ethiopia

17

18 ³Tigray Regional Health Bureau, Mekelle, Tigray Ethiopia

19 Tell +25134 441 6127

20 Fax +25134 440 8830

21 P.O.Box 07 Mekelle, Ethiopia

22

23 [¥]Corresponding author , Email: n.g.asefa@umcg.nl

24 *Contributed equality

25

26 **Abstract**

27 **Background:** In Ethiopia, there are an estimated 25.3 road traffic related deaths per 100,000
28 population, which is much higher than the global average road traffic fatality rate. Speed is the
29 most well-known risk factor influencing both the risk as well as the severity of the resulting
30 injuries. Although there is paucity of data from low-income countries, speed reducers have been
31 widely approved as an effective traffic calming countermeasure in high-income countries. We
32 aimed to (i) explore the effectiveness of transverse vertical speed reducers and, (ii) qualitatively
33 explore stakeholders' perceptions of the factors that affect the risk of road traffic crashes.

34 **Methods:** Data on all crashes occurring from September 2010 to August 2015 were obtained.
35 Interrupted time series analysis using Poisson regression was used to estimate the effect of speed
36 reducers on the number of crashes per month before and after their installation in January 2012.
37 Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were conducted with traffic police, drivers,
38 drivers' training center owners, and community members to describe their perceptions about the
39 effects of the speed reducers. Quantitative and qualitative results were triangulated.

40 **Results:** There were 130 crashes during the study period. Of these, 45.4% were property damage
41 only, and 16.9% were fatal. After the speed reducers were installed, there was no statistically
42 significant difference (incidence rate ratio, IRR =1.17, 95% CI[0.60-2.30], p-value =0.644) in the
43 number of crashes per month, but there were changes in the distribution of crash severity (p-
44 value <0.001). Four core themes, with subsequent sub-themes, emerged as perceived
45 contributors to road traffic crashes. Of these core-themes, speedy and reckless driving, were
46 perceived as the strongest force perpetuating road collisions. Qualitative respondents disagreed
47 on whether the speed reducers were effective and expressed concerns such as the lack of signage
48 to warn drivers.

49 **Conclusions:** Although speed reducers are proven to reduce collisions in high-income settings,
50 this study in Ethiopia was inconclusive. Inappropriate design for the roadway type, sporadic
51 placement, lack of signage and maintenance, and poor stakeholder coordination may have
52 hampered effectiveness. An evidence-based planning process prior to implementing road design
53 interventions is recommended to achieve the desired results.

54 **Background**

55 According to the WHO 2018 Global Status Report and the Global Burden of Injury study,
56 road traffic crashes (RTCs) continue to be the leading causes of mortality and morbidity
57 worldwide for people aged 5-29 years.¹ A meta-analysis from 15 African countries reported a
58 pooled crash injury rate of 65.2 per 100,000 population and pooled crash death rate of 16.6
59 deaths per 100,000 population.² In Ethiopia, a low-income country in Sub-Saharan Africa, there
60 are an estimated 25.3 road traffic related deaths per 100,000 population, translating to over
61 23,000 deaths annually³. This is much higher than the global average road traffic fatality rate of
62 17.5 deaths per 100,000 population.³ Policies relating to drink-driving, speed limit, phone call,
63 and seat-belts use are included in the national legislation; however, because of resource
64 limitations and existence of competing national priorities, the enforcement of these laws is
65 poor.^{3,4}

66 Vehicle speed has been identified as a key risk factor for all kinds of RTCs, influencing both
67 the risk of a crash as well as the severity of the resulting injuries. It follows that controlling
68 vehicle speed can have a double effect of preventing crashes and reducing the severity of
69 resulting injuries.^{3,5} “Traffic calming” refers to various road design modifications used for speed
70 management in areas where driver speeds are either excessive or inappropriate for the type and
71 road user mix of a given road.⁵ Vertical traffic calming measures use forces of vertical
72 acceleration to discourage speeding. Horizontal measures use forces of lateral acceleration, while
73 audio-tactile measures use vibration, and narrowing measures use a psycho-perceptive sense of
74 enclosure to discourage speeding.⁶ Some examples of vertical measures include speed bumps,
75 speed humps, speed tables, and speed slots/cushions.⁶⁻⁹

76 There exists a considerable evidence base supporting the effectiveness and sustainability of
77 vertical speed control measures, mostly generated from high-income countries.^{3,5} Logically, the
78 self-enforcing and cost-effective nature of these interventions make them an attractive option for
79 low-income settings, yet there is little reason to believe that findings from high-income settings
80 are direct to low-income contexts which tend to have a higher proportion of non-motorized
81 traffic, more lax vehicle maintenance and safety standards application, lower driver education
82 levels, insufficient police enforcement capacity, poorer quality roads, and weaker political
83 commitment to road safety.^{3,10,11} All of these factors could affect the implementation of speed

84 reduction technologies in low-resource settings, highlighting the importance of building a
85 contextually relevant evidence base.^{11,12}

86 Some studies in low- and middle-income countries have reported positive outcomes resulting
87 from the installation of vertical speed reduction measures.^{11,12} But far more common is a theme
88 of inadequate planning that leads to ambiguous outcomes. A recent study conducted in Egypt
89 demonstrated how random installation of vertical speed control measures that deviate from
90 standard height, travel length, and spacing recommendations can damage pavement conditions as
91 well as cause excessive speed fluctuation.¹³ Experiences in Nigeria,^{14,15} Ghana,⁵ and Tanzania¹⁶
92 have also shown that mounting of speed bumps or other road modifications without following
93 established design standards, without consideration of the functional class of the road, and
94 without proper community involvement can have enormous adverse effects on vehicles, drivers,
95 and residents of the area. It has even been suggested that such well-intentioned attempts can
96 increase the incidence of collisions, in addition to causing dissatisfaction among road users and
97 community members.⁹

98 This study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of transverse vertical speed reducers installed
99 in January 2012 on a two-lane highway Hintalo Wejerat District, Tigray Region, Ethiopia using
100 interrupted time series analysis, as well as qualitative analysis of community member, driver,
101 owner of the driving center, and police perceptions.

102 **Methods**

103 **Study setting**

104 Tigray Region is the northernmost of Ethiopia's nine regional states with a population of
105 over 5.1 million. Of these, 81.5% and 19.5% population live in rural and urban settings
106 respectively. The regional urban center is the capital, Mekelle. The total area of the region is
107 approximately 54,570 square kilometers, covering a diverse landscape from the Tekeze Gorge at
108 550 meters above sea level to mountain peaks reaching 3,935 meters.¹⁷ In Tigray, rural road
109 expansion and maintenance is managed under the Universal Rural Road Access Program/Rural
110 Roads Authority while the Ethiopian Roads Authority manages the federal road network.¹⁸ The
111 region's road network includes 4,949 kilometers of dry-weather roads, 2,522 kilometers of all-
112 weather roads, and at least 497 kilometers of paved road.¹⁷

113 The specific study site, shown in Figure 1, is a 45 km stretch of asphalt two-lane highway in
114 Hintalo Wejerat District that connects Hiwane town (13°06'12.8"N 39°29'41.1"E) and Mehoni
115 town (12°47'57.4"N 39°38'36.2"E). The study site is part of a highway segment that was
116 constructed in August 2010 to bypass the previously existing Alaje mountain pass road,
117 branching off at Hiwane and eventually rejoining it at Alamata town (12°25'12.2"N
118 39°33'15.1"E). The study highway traverses remote, mountainous terrain and is known to have
119 heavy traffic, since it is part of the main North-South corridor connecting the regional capital,
120 Mekelle, to the national capital, Addis Ababa, as well as to the port of Djibouti. According to
121 oral communication with the head of Hintalo Wejerat District Traffic Police Office, the average
122 traffic volume of the road is approximately 700-1000 vehicles per day. The posted speed limit is
123 70 km/hr.³

124 Soon after the new highway was constructed, the local police reported a high crash frequency
125 and requested Ethiopian Roads Authority and its contractors to install speed reducers.
126 Consequently, in January 2012, a total of 17 transverse speed reducers were installed along the
127 study highway starting approximately 8 kilometers south of Hiwane (Table 1). The speed
128 reducers are not evenly distributed, rather they are concentrated at sites where the road is curved
129 and inclined. There is a series of four speed reducers (#1-4), followed by one isolated application
130 (#5), followed by another series of four (#6-9), and another series of eight (#10-17). There is a
131 large gap of 32 kilometers between the third and fourth series where the road is straight and flat.
132 The spacing between the speed reducers within each series varies, ranging from 50 to 600 meters
133 apart. Most of the applications span the entire road transversely, but there are two that span only
134 half the roadway (Table 1).

135

136

137

138

139

140

141 **Table 1 Description of speed reducers installed in Hintalo Wejerat District**

Serial Number	Distance from preceding speed reducer (Meters)	Width
1	N/A (8 Km south of <i>Hiwane</i>)	Full width of road (7 meters)
2	50	Full width
3	185	Full width
4	53	Full width
5	3,000	Full width
6	1,000	Full width
7	48	Full width
8	120	Full width
9	150	Full width
10	32,000	Full width
11	47	Full width
12	600	Half width (on downhill side only)
13	300	Full width
14	73	Full width
15	170	Half width (on downhill side only)
16	130	Full width
17	50	Full width

142

143 The speed reducers in the study area are made of asphaltic concrete, and consist of 2.5
 144 sinusoidal undulations, in contrast with other common vertical speed reducer designs which
 145 typically have a single raised feature (Figure 2). As shown in Figure 2, the Hintalo Wejerat speed
 146 reducers have three 25-centimeter long depressions (approximately 1 centimeter deeper than the
 147 original road surface) alternating with two 25-centimeter long raised bumps (of variable height)
 148 for a total travel length of 1.25 meters on average, although the measurements are not standard
 149 across all of the applications.

150

151

152 **Study Design**

153 This mixed-methods study used interrupted time series analysis to quantitatively evaluate the
154 impact of the transverse speed reducers on the number of crashes occurring per month on a 45
155 km long section of asphalt two-lane highway in Hintalo Wejerat District. Qualitative methods
156 including focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews (IDIs) were used to explore
157 community, traffic police, drivers' training center owner, and driver perceptions regarding the
158 speed reducers. The qualitative and quantitative results were triangulated to shed additional light
159 on the speed reducers' effectiveness or lack thereof.

160 **Data collection and statistical methods**

161 **Quantitative**

162 Local traffic police report all road collisions involving property damage or injuries using a
163 standardized form. Data was abstracted from the police reports for all collisions occurring in the
164 45 km study area from September 2010 to August 2015. The pre-intervention period spanned
165 from September 2010 to December 2011. The speed reducers were installed in January 2012.
166 Thus, the post-intervention period was defined from January 2012 to August 2015.

167 Descriptive statistics were calculated to summarize the characteristics of collisions occurring
168 during the pre- and post-intervention periods. Chi-squared test of homogeneity and Fisher's
169 exact test were used to test for changes in the distributions of categorical variables before and
170 after speed reducer installation.¹⁹ The data was collapsed by month to analyze the outcome
171 (number of collisions per month) using interrupted time series analysis with Poisson
172 regression.²⁰⁻²⁴ The proposed impact model is shown below:

173
$$\ln(\mathbf{E}[Y_t]) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * t + \beta_2 * X_t + \beta_3 * PX_t + \sum_k \left[\beta_{4k} \left(\sin \frac{2k\pi t}{T} \right) + \beta_{5k} \left(\cos \frac{2k\pi t}{T} \right) \right] + \epsilon_t$$

174 where $\mathbf{E}[Y_t]$ is the expected number of collisions during a given month, t is a continuous
175 variable indicating time from start to end of the study period that controls for the underlying non-
176 stationarity or time trend (September 2010 = 1, August 2015 = 60), $X_t=1$ represents the post-
177 intervention period and models the level change ($X_t=0$ for the pre-intervention period), and PX_t
178 is a scaled interaction term between time and intervention that models the slope change post-
179 intervention (coded 0 up to the last point before the intervention phase and coded sequentially

180 from 1 thereafter).^{20,21} Fourier terms were included to adjust for seasonal patterns: k is the
181 number of pairs of Fourier terms included in the model (k=1 for annual seasonality, k=2 for 6
182 monthly seasonality, etc.), T is the number of time periods described by each sinusoidal function
183 (T= 12 for 12 months in a year).^{22,25} Lastly, ϵ_t is the error term at time t. A lag term was not
184 included in the a priori model since the evidence shows that speed reducers tend to have an
185 immediate, rather than gradually occurring, effect on reducing vehicle speeds.^{6,7}

186 Incidence rate ratios (IRR) were derived with their 95% Confidence Intervals (CIs) from the
187 adjusted Poisson model to quantify the effect of speed reducer installation on the number of
188 crashes occurring per month. Effects indicating both the level change (one-time impact of the
189 speed reducers between the time points immediately before and after their installation) and slope
190 change (the difference between the pre- and post-installation slope or trend) were estimated, after
191 adjustments for time trend and seasonality.²⁰⁻²⁹ Stata 12 statistical analysis package was used to
192 conduct the quantitative analysis.

193 *Qualitative*

194 Data were collected in two phases, from Jul– Dec 2016 and Sep-Oct 2017. In the first phase, two
195 90-minute FGDs were conducted among traffic police officers and community residents
196 respectively, each consisting of 8 participants. Following preliminary analysis of the FGDs, four
197 45-minute IDIs were conducted with two traffic police officers, one official from the
198 Construction, Road, and Transport Bureau of Hintalo Wejerat District and one public transport
199 driver working in the study area. During the second phase, nine additional 45-minute IDIs were
200 conducted with six public transport drivers, two drivers' training center owners, and one
201 community member. Participants for both the FGDs and IDIs were purposively selected based on
202 their potential wealth of information and because of their routine exposure to road traffic related
203 conditions in the study area.

204 A semi-structured interview-guide (which includes both open-ended and closed-ended questions)
205 was used to facilitate the FGDs. In the IDIs, we used probing questions and participants were
206 given the freedom to respond to open-ended questions in as much depth as they desired. The
207 tools were developed in English and then translated into the local language, Tigrigna. The tools
208 focused primarily on the following issues: (i) The major perceived causes of RTC, (ii) The role

209 of environmental factors and road design in RTC, and (iii) Traffic policy and administrative
210 issues.

211 The principal investigators (Nigus Asefa and Hannah Yang) went to the study site and conducted
212 both the FGDs and the IDIs in the local language, Tigrigna. Informed written consent was
213 obtained from all participants. All responses were audiotaped and verbatim transcripts were
214 generated from the audio recordings. The results were then coded in Atlas.ti software using an
215 inductive approach. Similar codes were grouped and re-grouped to identify all non-repetitive
216 core themes that emerged from the data.

217 **Results**

218 **Quantitative**

219 The study investigators visited the site several times to abstract data from the traffic police
220 reports, conduct FGDs and in-depth interviews, and observe the design and placement of the
221 speed reducers. The photograph in Figure 3 was taken by the study investigators during one of
222 the site visits.

223 Figure 4 shows the crash characteristics during pre- and post-intervention periods. During the
224 five-year study period, there were a total of 29 and 101 RTCs before and after the intervention
225 time (Jan 2012), respectively, that occurred along the 45 km of highway in the study area. There
226 were 22 fatal crashes (16.9%), defined as a crash resulting in one or more fatalities, while 49
227 crashes (37.7%) resulted in one or more non-fatal injuries. The remaining 59 crashes (45.4%)
228 were property damage only, indicating that there were no injuries or fatalities. The crash severity
229 level is determined by the worst severity sustained by any individual in the crash. In total, there
230 were 73 minor injuries, 50 serious injuries, 31 deaths, and 3,418,350.00 Ethiopian Birr (EtB) or
231 \$185,884.96 USD³⁰ in estimated damages, according to the local traffic police reports.

232 We assessed the distribution of crash in terms of cause, vehicles involved, time and severity
233 between the two groups (Figure 4). Chi-squared test of homogeneity revealed that the
234 distribution of crash severity differed before and after speed reducer installation (Pearson
235 $\chi^2=34.0$, $p<0.001$), with a property only damage crashes increasing sharply in the post-
236 intervention period (Figure 4). Fisher's exact test was used to test for homogeneity in the
237 remaining categorical variables due to low expected counts. There was a statistically significant

238 difference in the distribution of crash time ($p=0.017$), marginally significant difference in the
239 responsible vehicle type ($p=0.059$), and no difference in the reported cause ($p=0.248$) before and
240 after January 2012. Overall, heavy trucks including 1 or 2 trailer trucks, tanker trucks, and Isuzu
241 trucks were responsible for 74.6% of the crashes (Figure 4). (It is worth noting that the traffic
242 police reporting format does not allow for the description of multiple vehicles involved in a
243 collision, rather it focuses solely on the vehicle at fault for legal purposes.¹⁸) Speeding was the
244 most common cause (83/130, 63.8%) of collisions followed by failure to respect the right hand
245 rule (32/130, 24.6%), according to local police documentation (Figure 4).

246 Figure 5 shows the observed number of monthly RTCs during the study period as a smoothed
247 3-month moving average (solid line), the seasonally adjusted modeled trend (dashed line), and
248 the counterfactual prediction (dotted line). The counterfactual scenario represents the expected
249 number of collisions had the speed reducers not been installed, projected using only the data
250 observed before January 2012. The mean monthly number of crashes during the pre-intervention
251 period was 1.81 ± 0.98 and during the post-intervention period it was 2.30 ± 1.29 .

252 The speed reducers did not appear to have a statistically significant effect on the number of
253 crashes occurring per month, as per the model estimates shown in Figure 6. After adjusting for
254 the slightly decreasing time trend ($\beta_1=0.98$, 95% CI 0.92-1.03) and seasonality using two sets
255 of Fourier terms (β_{4-7}), installation of the speed reducers resulted in a non-significant 17% level
256 increase (the immediate impact) in the expected number of crashes from December 2011 to
257 January 2012 ($\beta_2=1.17$, 95% CI 0.60-2.30), and a non-significant slope increase (the gradual
258 impact) of 3.6% over time ($\beta_3=1.04$, 95% CI 0.98-1.10). According to the model estimate, there
259 were 2.10 crashes per month at the beginning of the period (β_0).

260 *Qualitative*

261 The mean age of the FGD participants was 35.7 ± 8.4 years, with a minimum of 25 and a
262 maximum of 50 years. Table 2 shows the themes that emerged from discussions and interviews
263 with police officers, community members, and transport drivers regarding their perceptions
264 about the causes of RTC and the speed reducers' effects in mitigating collisions, their effects on
265 drivers and vehicles, and the suitability of their design and application.

266 Four core themes with associated sub-themes emerged from the inductive analysis of the data
267 (Table 2). According to the current study, the main facilitators contributing to RTCs can be

268 categorized as factors related to drivers, pedestrians and community matters, aspects of road
 269 design, and administrative and policy issues.

270 **Table 2 Factors contributing to RTCs in Hintalo Wejerat District, Ethiopia**

Themes	Sub-themes
Theme I: Driver-related factors	Speedy and reckless driving Failure to yield to pedestrians Lack of adequate training and skill Age and experience of drivers
Theme II: Community and pedestrian-related factors	Perceptions of the community Rural dwellers are at higher risk Inadequate awareness creation
Theme III: Road design aspects	Difficult road topography Cues and signage Unplanned road blockages Environmental and weather conditions Effectiveness of speed bumps
Theme IV: Administrative and policy issues	Lack of necessary personnel, materials, and training for law enforcement Insurance-related problems Driver licensing system

271 *Theme 1 Driver-related factors*

272 The participants repeatedly stressed that driver-related factors, such as speeding, failing to yield
 273 for pedestrians, and passing into oncoming traffic were the most common causes of RTCs (Table
 274 1). Among these factors, participants stated that speedy and reckless driving is the major factors
 275 contributing to RTCs (Figure 7) and also explained that it is a common phenomenon to see
 276 drivers speeding dangerously in residential and business districts where there is increased
 277 pedestrian traffic. One participant explained the situation as:

278 *“First of all, accidents are really the drivers’ fault. There are also some bad places*
 279 *[roads], but, most of the accidents are caused by speeding, breaking the speed limit,*
 280 *passing when there is opposing traffic, and not knowing the vehicle’s maximum load. So,*
 281 *generally, I say it’s the drivers’ problem.” Driver, in his 30’s*

282 Some of the respondents mentioned that a higher frequency of collisions is observed among the
 283 younger drivers and those with less driving experience (Figure 6).

284 *“The younger drivers and most of the drivers with new licenses tend to drive recklessly*
285 *with high speed whereas those who are experienced tend to drive slowly”.* **Local**
286 ***resident, in his 40’s***

287 On the contrary, some participants explained that age and experience do not matter according to
288 their observations, citing that many of the crashes occurring on rural, mountainous roads involve
289 trailer trucks which are typically driven by drivers holding level 5 licenses (presumably older and
290 more experienced).

291 A substantial share of RTCs can also be attributed to driver’s impatience and failure to let
292 pedestrians cross the road first. The participants reflected that negligence towards pedestrians in
293 combination with excessive speed are the main problems that lead to RTCs, especially in
294 town/urban areas.

295 *Theme 2 Community and pedestrian-related factors*

296 The current study also found that the community’s low awareness about road safety is an
297 important contributor for RTCs, putting rural pedestrians at, particularly increased risk. Some
298 rural individuals associate the left-hand side with bad luck, and they resist walking on the left
299 side of the road as is recommended to increase pedestrian visibility. Some rural people also leave
300 their animals to walk or lie in the middle of the road. Similarly, when people build houses,
301 construction materials are usually left on the streets for extended periods. Such unexpected road
302 blockages can take drivers by surprise. Public transport passengers also contribute to RTCs by
303 implicitly supporting the poor behavior of the drivers, for example by encouraging the over-
304 loading of public vehicles.

305 A traffic police officer sheds light on the collectively uncooperative cultural attitude towards law
306 enforcement:

307 *“Punishing a driver who made a mistake is thought to be inconsiderate. The Muslim*
308 *passenger says “Spare him in the name of Allah” and the Christian passenger says*
309 *“Spare him in the name of God”. They ask you: “Don’t you have a son?” No one says*
310 *“He should be punished... he would have killed us all... you rescued us”. Everyone says,*
311 *“Pardon him, and leave him alone.” Good awareness has not been created in the*
312 *community.* **Traffic police, in his 40’s**

313 Participants expressed that most road safety education activities conducted in the area are
314 misguided. Safety messages are primarily delivered in public meetings, during church holidays,
315 and on market days, thus reaching adult audiences. However, study participants believed that
316 safety education would be more effective if targeted towards youths. Respondents also
317 forwarded that resource constraints hinder road safety awareness, especially in rural
318 communities. Due to the lack of funding and transportation, traffic police are only able to deliver
319 safety messages to rural dwellers when they come to town for a market day or other events.
320 According to the participants, on-the-spot verbal instruction alone is not enough to bring
321 consistent behavior change concerning road safety. Traffic police officers agreed that community
322 awareness of road safety is still in its infancy stage

323 *Theme 3 Road-related problems*

324 Although study participants believed that drivers are the main cause of RTCs, they also revealed
325 how the difficult terrain in the study area, natural factors such as weather, and poor road
326 maintenance could increase the risk of RTC. A public transport driver explained:

327 *“There are unmaintained roads where the road markings are not even visible. Let alone*
328 *the traffic signs, the highways themselves are not maintained. This is not seen as a*
329 *contributing factor for RTC, although it is, in fact, causing crashes. Most people*
330 *understand the known factors, which are overloading and speeding. But, there are times*
331 *when road’s poor condition is at fault for the crash.” **Driver, in his 20’s***

332 There were conflicting views on how the speed reducers affected crash incidence in the study
333 area. Some participants strongly believed the speed reducers decreased the incidence of
334 collisions. As stated by one traffic police officer:

335 *“When we look carefully at the places that have speed bumps before and after their*
336 *construction, there are some where collisions have decreased. For example, in Adi*
337 *Jebjeb many vehicles were rolling over before the bumps were built, but now it has*
338 *improved a lot –similarly in Kayih Hamed and Gereb Dedek. Despite the lack of safety*
339 *warning signs before the speed reducers, most collisions have decreased. In comparison*
340 *with places that don’t have speed reducers, collisions decreased in the areas with speed*
341 *reducers.” **Traffic police, in his 40’s***

342 Despite the benefits, the participants also reported drawbacks regarding the design and
343 placement of the speed reducers. Participants reported that the bumps were too tall when they
344 were first constructed and hindered the movement of small vehicles, though they have eroded
345 considerably since then due to poor maintenance. The absence of signage before reaching the
346 speed bumps was also believed to expose unfamiliar drivers to increased risk of RTCs.

347 *“Because there is no signal to cue drivers about the speed bumps, they cause accidents*
348 *among drivers who are unfamiliar with the area, but not really for those of us who know*
349 *about them. They should have added a reflective signal that is visible at daytime and*
350 *nighttime. But, one way or another, the speed bumps are useful.”* **Local resident, in his**
351 **30’s**

352 Discussants also noted that drivers swerve off the road or out of their lane to avoid driving over
353 the bumps, which could also increase collisions.

354 Discussants also noted that drivers swerve off the road or out of their lane to avoid driving over
355 the bumps, which could also increase collisions.

356 *Theme 4 Administrative and policy-related issues*

357 Administrative and policy-related problems were reported as additional underlying causes for
358 RTCs. Traffic police struggle to enforce traffic laws is limited due to personnel shortages, budget
359 constraints, and lack of important equipment like patrol vehicles, speed control radars, and
360 breathalyzers. A traffic police officer explained how lack of equipment weakens the capacity of
361 law enforcement to do their job:

362 *“Since we don’t have speed control radars and other modern equipment we can’t apply*
363 *all the laws. To say: “You are speeding”, you should have something to measure the*
364 *speed. To confidently punish them you need a speed control device. To say: “Stop. You*
365 *are high, you are drunk”, you need to have the necessary equipment.”* **Traffic police, in**
366 **her 30’s**

367 Flaws in the driver licensing system were cited as one of the most serious problems faced by
368 road safety advocates and are believed to be one of the factors underlying the rampant speeding
369 in the area. All drivers are supposed to undergo training before obtaining their driving license,
370 but according to the study participants that is not always the case. Bribery, forgery, dishonesty,

371 or personal favors allow certain drivers to gain their license without undergoing any training at
372 all. Even drivers who legitimately graduate from a training center tend to lack meaningful
373 experience on realistic road layouts due to the generally weak and non-standardized curriculum
374 (Figure 6).

375 The participants repeatedly mentioned that the training centers do not provide training in real life
376 driving situations and hence drivers graduating from training centers in the region lack adequate
377 skills to mitigate the possible challenges of a real situation. One of the FGD participants stressed
378 how the government sanctioned training curriculum is ineffective in preparing drivers for work:

379 *“When the training centers give training, it’s only being given in the town. How can*
380 *drivers trained only in the town navigate all of the curves, and cliffs of mountainous*
381 *roads? They should give training in the field. Some organizations won’t hire drivers*
382 *based on the license issued by the Road Transport Authority. Organizations give their*
383 *own six-month training, again: the trainee assists an able driver, they train in the field,*
384 *on uphill, on a downhill, at night, during the day, in the rain...They train in all situations.*
385 *When the licensing process is thorough like this, drivers can really learn the profession.*
386 *They shouldn’t train only in the town and during the day because they will not only be*
387 *driving in towns and daytime.”* **Traffic police, in his 40’s**

388 Next, there is no efficient way for the traffic police to verify the validity of someone’s license.
389 Every Regional State in Ethiopia has the power to issue driving licenses that are valid in all parts
390 of the country. But when a traffic police officer stops a driver in the field there are no quick
391 means of checking the validity of their license or the drivers’ past traffic infractions. The
392 participants also suggested that lifesaving first aid training should be provided for traffic police
393 staffs, as they are almost always the first to arrive at the scene of an RTC.

394 The discussants also indicated that the insurance claim process is another problem that is
395 contributing to increasing RTCs. the current system requires vehicles and wreckage to stay in
396 their position after a collision until insurance company representatives arrive and get their
397 required documentation. This is very serious when the crash happens in a narrow section of the
398 road or a place with low visibility.

399 Drivers' eyesight and physical fitness may deteriorate over time, but this study has identified that
400 there is no physical examination during the license renewal process. Drivers can simply renew
401 their license by paying a fee and presenting their previous driving license.

402 **Discussion**

403 This mixed-methods study described the characteristics of RTCs occurring over 5-year
404 period on a mountainous, two-lane asphalt highway in Hintalo Wejerat District, Tigray, Ethiopia.
405 Interrupted time series analysis was used to reveal that transverse speed reducers installed in
406 January 2012 did not appear to impact the volume of RTCs. However, the speed reducers may
407 have impacted crash severity according to Chi-squared testing. Local stakeholders' views about
408 the benefits and drawbacks of the speed reducers installed in their community help to elucidate
409 why the intervention was not as effective as hoped, and point towards what can be done
410 differently in the future.

411 According to local police reports, speeding was the primary cause of crashes, both before
412 (17/29, 58.6%) and after (66/101, 65.3%) the speed reducer installation, documented in 63.8%
413 (83/130) of all collisions. This finding was within the range reported in Ghana, where speed was
414 responsible for 50% of crashes¹¹, and Kenya where speed was documented 34-70% of the time.³¹
415 In the study area, speed was also reported to be the major contributor of road crash.^{32,33}
416 Statements from the interview and FGD participants, who attributed the majority of crashes to
417 drivers' negligence and speedy driving, also support the result of this finding. These results
418 confirm that effective speed control remains a crucial factor in improving road safety in rural
419 Ethiopia.

420 The discussion participants in this study specified that speedy driving is particularly common
421 among long vehicles and public transportation, and the local police reports indicated that heavy
422 trucks were responsible for the majority of crashes both before (21/29, 72.4%) and after (76/101,
423 75.2%) speed reducers were installed. In contrast to this finding, a recent study conducted in the
424 European Union reported that heavy trucks were not linked with greater numbers of traffic
425 fatalities or crashes compared with medium or light trucks.³⁴ The stark divergence between the
426 two studies underscores the importance of contextual differences between high- and low-
427 resource settings. For example, low enforcement capacity could exacerbate issues such as
428 overloading trucks beyond the recommended weight capacity or operation of trucks with

429 mechanical problems that do not meet safety standards. The considerable role of heavy trucks
430 observed in this study calls for special consideration when implementing future speed reduction
431 interventions.

432 To examine the impact of speed reducers on the risk of a crash, an interrupted time series
433 approach was deemed appropriate for several reasons. First, the speed reducers were a
434 population level intervention introduced at a clearly defined point in time (January 2012), and
435 although no baseline survey was conducted beforehand, the outcome (crashes) was already being
436 captured by the existing traffic police reporting system.^{21,27} Moreover, the literature explains the
437 irrelevance of simply comparing the mean number of crashes before and after speed reducers
438 were implemented, due to the particular characteristics of time series data such as non-
439 stationarity, seasonality, autocorrelation.^{20,28} By relying on multiple observations both before and
440 after the intervention, interrupted time series analysis enables the researcher to more effectively
441 control for these characteristics, as well as any pre-existing trends.^{20,21} In this study, the expected
442 number of crashes per month was found to be decreasing slightly (Slope=0.977, 95%CI: 0.92-
443 1.03) prior to the installation of the speed reducers. This could be due to regression-to-the-mean,
444 however, since the roadway was newly constructed in September 2010 prior data was not
445 available to obtain a more stable estimate of the pre-existing trend. Different types of effects,
446 both immediate and gradual, can also be identified through time series analysis.^{20,21,29} In this
447 study, there was a non-significant 17% level increase (IRR 1.17, 95% CI:0.60-2.30), or a jump in
448 the expected number of crashes immediately following the intervention. There was also a non-
449 significant 3.6% slope increase (IRR 1.036, 95% CI: 0.98 - 1.10), which indicates a gradual
450 increase over time compared with the pre-existing trend in the absence of the intervention. The
451 immediate level increase could have been due to the lack of signage to warn drivers of the new
452 road feature, as mentioned by the discussion and interview participants. The slope increase could
453 be explained by drivers' risky adaptive behaviors such as lane departure, excessive speeding in
454 between bumps to make up time, or perhaps decreasing the effectiveness of the bumps due to
455 profile erosion.

456 Vehicle speed influences not only the risk of a crash occurring, but also the severity of
457 the resulting injuries.^{3,5} Chi squared test of homogeneity indicated that the distribution of crash
458 severity (property damage only, minor injury, major injury, fatal) was not the same before versus
459 after the speed reducers were installed. Before the installation of speed reducers, all of the

460 collisions resulted in injury (22/29, 75.8%) or fatality (7/29, 24.2%). Afterwards, the majority of
461 crashes resulted in property damage only (59/101, 58.4%), with a smaller proportion of injuries
462 (27/101, 26.8%) and fatalities (15/101, 14.9%). Although the speed reducers may not have
463 reduced the number of crashes per month, this finding implies that they may still have been
464 effective at reducing vehicle speeds thus resulting in less severe crashes.

465 Failure to consider the road characteristics when designing and placing the speed reducers
466 may have decreased their effectiveness. The geometric design (travel length, rise profile, and
467 height) of speed reducers determine the velocity at which motorists travel over the application,
468 and spacing or placement determines the extent to which motorists can accelerate between
469 applications. It follows that the design and spacing should be tailored to obtain the desired
470 behavior from motorists. In general, shortening the travel length and increasing the height forces
471 point deceleration, while closer spacing limits driver speeds along an extended road segment.
472 The literature states that speed humps, which are the least intrusive vertical speed reducer design
473 due to their longer travel length (3.7-4.3m) and shorter height (10cm), are recommended for
474 roads with speed limits of 50 km/hour or less and should be spaced at intervals of 90-150 meters
475 to optimally restrict driver acceleration between humps.^{6-9,35}

476 Low community involvement and poor coordination between the contractor, government
477 offices, and local stakeholders were apparent based on results from the qualitative portion of this
478 study. The inadequate planning process may have contributed to the non-standard design and
479 placement, lax maintenance practices, and overall weak ownership of the speed reducers in
480 Hintalo Wejerat. Similar studies conducted in other African countries, as well as documents and
481 manuals from numerous transportation agencies, have also emphasized the importance of a
482 proper planning process before implementing vertical speed reducers.^{5-7,11-16} Planning should
483 begin with the selection of an appropriate site including a formal requesting procedure and public
484 consultation process. This should be followed by a traffic engineering study to diagnose the road
485 conditions at the site. Next, potential interventions should be identified and prioritized based on
486 the needs of the specific street or neighborhood. The selected intervention should then be
487 constructed, keeping in mind operation and maintenance concerns. Lastly, the effectiveness of
488 the intervention must be monitored and evaluated continuously.^{5-7,11-16}

489 There were contradicting perceptions about drivers' age and experience. Some of the
490 study participants stressed that the risk of road crash is more common among young and novice
491 drivers, which can be explained by deliberate contraventions³⁶ and low motive for compliance
492 with traffic laws.³⁷ This is consistent with other studies conducted elsewhere.^{33,38,39} On the other
493 hand, some of the study participants noted that crashes among older-aged heavy truck drivers are
494 also common in their area, and heavy trucks (presumably operated by older and more
495 experienced drivers) were responsible for 74.6% (97/130) of the crashes as documented by
496 police reports. These reports are in line with some studies, which reported a U-shaped
497 relationship between age and risk of RTC. According to these reports, a higher rate of RTC was
498 observed among drivers younger than 27 or less than one year of driving experience and older
499 than 63-years of age or greater than five years of driving experience, respectively.^{38,40} As
500 suggested by Reason et al., this U-shaped relationship could be due to the fact that young drivers
501 may violate the traffic law more often, whereas older drivers may be more vulnerable to make
502 unintentional driving errors.⁴¹

503 Findings from this study underscore the importance of continued monitoring. FGD participants
504 observed that drivers were swerving recklessly to avoid driving over the speed reducers, and
505 failure to respect the right hand rule (32/130, 24.6%) was also documented by police reports as a
506 common cause of crashes. This indicates that the intervention should be re-evaluated and other
507 types of road modifications such as shoulder and median barriers may be beneficial.

508 **Limitations of the study**

509 The main limitation of the study is the small number of crash events, which may have
510 precluded the statistical significance of the results. Additionally, though the interrupted time
511 series design explicitly models secular trends such as population growth or gradual changes in
512 traffic volume, the statistical adjustments may be inadequate resulting in biased estimates.
513 Outside events such as petrol shortages or other concurrent road safety interventions could also
514 threaten the validity of the study. Regression-to-the-mean bias may also be present since the
515 number of pre-intervention observations was fewer than the number of post-intervention
516 observations. In future studies, a larger number of data points prior to the intervention would
517 help to get a more stable estimate of the underlying trend. Data from an untreated comparison
518 roadway or Full Bayesian estimation could also be used to gain a more valid prediction of the

519 expected number of crashes that would have occurred without the intervention. However, the
520 increased time, monetary, and computational costs were problematic for the scope of this study.
521 Lastly, reliance on routine data can also introduce bias, because it may not always be complete or
522 may be affected by changes in data collection requirements.

523 **Conclusion and recommendations**

524 Ethiopian Roads Authority should establish evidence-based design and placement standards
525 for speed reducing road modifications that are specific to the roadway functional class and
526 empirically measured traffic characteristics such as vehicle speeds, traffic volume, road user mix,
527 and emergency vehicle access. These standards should be followed both by governmental
528 workers and private contractors. An established requesting process, a high level of community
529 involvement, and an intensive needs assessment including baseline measurement of the problem
530 and an expert engineering study should all precede the construction of any speed reducing
531 device, while regular maintenance and evaluation should follow it. On the other hand, increasing
532 the number of traffic police, providing patrol vehicles, and procuring speed radars and
533 breathalyzer machines could improve the capacity of traffic police to enforce existing laws and
534 control driver speeds. Behavioral change campaigns addressing the drivers as well as community
535 members (pedestrians and passengers) could also be effective if tailored to the local society and
536 culture.

537 Overall, better coordination between contractors, local police, and different governmental
538 sectors is needed to attain ownership and sustainability of road design interventions. Finally, the
539 findings of this study demand further investigation on how road modifications and traffic
540 calming technologies can be effectively adopted in low- and middle-income settings to reduce
541 RTC.

542 **Declarations**

543 *Ethical consideration*

544 The Institutional Review Board of Mekelle University College of Health Sciences approved this
545 study. A supporting letter was also obtained from the Tigray Traffic Police Commission. The
546 collision data was received and analyzed in a de-identified format. Informed written consent was
547 obtained from each discussion and interview participant. The investigators explained the study

548 objectives and assured participants that their responses would be confidential and that they could
549 refuse or withdraw from the study at any time.

550 ***Consent for publication***

551 No details, images, or videos relating to an individual person is included.

552 ***Availability of data and materials***

553 Data are presented on tables and figures, however, if additional information is required, the
554 datasets used and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding
555 author on reasonable request.

556 ***Competing interests***

557 No competing interest exist.

558 ***Funding***

559 There is no specific funding for this research, but transportation costs were covered by Tigray
560 Regional Health Bureau.

561 ***Authors' contributions***

562 Conception or design of the work: NA, HY; Data collection: NA, HY; Data analysis and
563 interpretation: NA, HY, but also inputs from TG, ZH, AH; Drafting the article: NA, HY; Critical
564 revision of the article TG, ZH, AH. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

565 ***Acknowledgements***

566 We are thankful to all of the discussion and interview participants who shared their
567 suggestions, views, and experiences. We would also like to extend our gratitude to Mekelle
568 University, Tigray Regional Health Bureau, Hintalo Wejerat District Traffic Police Office,
569 Hintalo Wejerat District Health Office, Tigray Construction, Road, and Transport Bureau, and
570 Tigray Police Commission who supported the implementation of this research.

571 ***List of abbreviations***

572 FGD- Focused Group Discussion

573 IDI- In-Depth Interview

574 IRR- Incident Risk Ratio

575 RTC- Road Traffic Crash

576 WHO- World Health Organization

577 **References**

- 578 1. World Health Organization. *The Global Status Report on Road Safety 2018.*; 2018.
- 579 2. Adeloje D, Thompson JY, Akanbi MA, et al. The burden of road traffic crashes, injuries
580 and deaths in Africa: a systematic review and meta-analysis. *Bull World Health Organ.*
581 2016;94(7):510-521A. doi:10.2471/BLT.15.163121
- 582 3. World Health Organization. *Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015.* Geneva; 2015.
583 http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/2015/en/.
- 584 4. Abegaz T, Berhane Y, Worku A, Assrat A. Effectiveness of an improved road safety
585 policy in Ethiopia: An interrupted time series study. *BMC Public Health.* 2014.
586 doi:10.1186/1471-2458-14-539
- 587 5. Global Road Safety Partnership. *Speed Management: A Road Safety Manual for Decision-*
588 *Makers and Practitioners.* Geneva; 2008.
- 589 6. Ewing R. *Traffic Calming: State of the Practice.* Washington DC, USA; 1999.
- 590 7. Parkhill M, Sooklall R, Bahar G. Updated Guidelines for the Design and Application of
591 Speed Humps. In: *CITE 2007 Conference.* Toronto, Ontario, Canada; 2011.
- 592 8. Johnson L, Nedzesky AJ. *A Comparative Study of Speed Humps, Speed Slots, and Speed*
593 *Cushions.*; 2004.
- 594 9. Rahman F, Takemoto A, Sakamoto K, Kubota H. Comparative study of design and
595 planning process of traffic calming devices. *Proc East Asia Soc Transp Stud.*
596 2005;5:1322-1336.
- 597 10. Hyder AA, Allen KA, Di Pietro G, et al. Addressing the Implementation Gap in Global
598 Road Safety: Exploring Features of an Effective Response and Introducing a 10-Country
599 Program. *Am J Public Health.* 2012;102(6):1061-1067. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2011.300563
- 600 11. Afukaar FK. Speed control in developing countries: issues, challenges and opportunities
601 in reducing road traffic injuries. *Inj Control Saf Promot.* 2003;10(1-2):77-81.
602 doi:10.1076/icsp.10.1.77.14113
- 603 12. Staton C, Vissoci J, Gong E, et al. Road Traffic Injury Prevention Initiatives : A
604 Systematic Review and Metasummary of Effectiveness in Low and Middle Income
605 Countries. *PLoS One.* 2016;11(1):1-15. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144971
- 606 13. Abdel-wahed TA, Hashim IH. Effect of speed hump characteristics on pavement

- 607 condition. *J Traffic Transp Eng (English Ed.* 2017;4(1):103-110.
608 doi:10.1016/j.jtte.2016.09.011
- 609 14. Akanmu A, Alabi F, Agboola O. Towards efficient application of speed-bumps as traffic
610 calming devices in Saki West Local Government Area of Oyo State, Nigeria. *J Environ*
611 *Sci Resour Manag.* 2014;6(2):127-136.
- 612 15. Chukwugozi RP. Is Speed Bumps Installation Panacea For Road Traffic Crash
613 Prevention ? An Evaluation of Selected Major Routes in Ondo , Southwestern Nigeria.
614 *IOSR J Humanit Soc Sci.* 2014;19(5):79-98.
- 615 16. Pardon, N., & Average C. The effectiveness of traffic calming measures in reducing road
616 carnage in Masvingo Urban. *Int J Sci Knowl.* 2013;3(2):1-12.
- 617 17. Tigray Regional Health Bureau. *Tigray Regional Health Bureau Ten Years Health*
618 *Bulletin (EFY 1998-2007).* Mekelle, Tigray, Ethiopia; 2016.
- 619 18. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. *Case Study: Road Safety in Ethiopia,*
620 *ECA/NRID/019.* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 2009.
- 621 19. Bolboacă SD, Jäntschi L, Sestraş AF, Sestraş RE, Pamfil DC. Pearson-Fisher Chi-Square
622 Statistic Revisited. *Information.* 2011;2:528-545. doi:10.3390/info2030528
- 623 20. Lagarde M. How to do (or not to do). Assessing the impact of a policy change with
624 routine longitudinal data. *Health Policy Plan.* 2012;(27):76-83. doi:10.1093/heapol/czr004
- 625 21. Bernal JL, Cummins S, Gasparrini A. Interrupted time series regression for the evaluation
626 of public health interventions : a tutorial. *Int J Epidemiol.* 2016;0(0):1-8.
627 doi:10.1093/ije/dyw098
- 628 22. Bhaskaran K, Gasparrini A, Hajat S, Smeeth L, Armstrong B. Time series regression
629 studies in environmental epidemiology. *Int J Epidemiol.* 2013;42:1187-1195.
630 doi:10.1093/ije/dyt092
- 631 23. Novoa AM, Pérez K, Santamariña-rubio E, Borrell C. Effect on road traffic injuries of
632 criminalizing road traffic offences : a time – series study. *Bull World Heal Organ.*
633 2011;89:422-431. doi:10.2471/BLT.10.082180
- 634 24. Pérez K, Olmo MM, Tobias A, Borrell C. Reducing Road Traffic Injuries : Effectiveness
635 of Speed Cameras in an Urban Setting. *Am J Public Heal.* 2007;97(9):1632-1637.
636 doi:10.2105/AJPH.2006.093195
- 637 25. Stolwijk AM, Straatman H, Zielhuis GA. Studying seasonality by using sine and cosine

- 638 functions in regression analysis. *J Epidemiol Community Heal.* 1999;53:235-238.
- 639 26. Nagata T, Setoguchi S, Hemenway D, Perry MJ. Effectiveness of a law to reduce alcohol-
640 impaired driving in Japan. *Inj Prev.* 2008;14:19-23. doi:10.1136/ip.2007.015719
- 641 27. Biglan A, Ary D, Wagenaar AC. The Value of Interrupted Time-Series Experiments for
642 Community Intervention Research. *Prev Sci.* 2000;1(1):31-49.
- 643 28. Kontopantelis E, Doran T, Springate DA, Buchan I, Reeves D. Regression based quasi-
644 experimental approach when randomisation is not an option : interrupted time series
645 analysis. *BMJ.* 2015;350(h2750):1-4. doi:10.1136/bmj.h2750
- 646 29. Wagner AK, Soumerai SB, Zhang F, Ross-degnan D. Segmented regression analysis of
647 interrupted time series studies in medication use research. *J Clin Pharm Ther.*
648 2002;27:299-309.
- 649 30. Exchange Rates UK. Historical Exchange Rates for USD/ETB currency conversion on 1st
650 February 2013 (2013-02-01).
- 651 31. Bachani A, Koradia P, Herbert H, et al. Road traffic injuries in Kenya: the health burden
652 and risk factors in two districts. *Traffic Inj Prev.* 2012;13(Suppl 1):24-30.
653 doi:10.1080/15389588.2011.633136.
- 654 32. Asefa NG, Ingale L, Shumey A, Yang H. Prevalence and factors associated with road
655 traffic crash among taxi drivers in Mekelle town, northern Ethiopia, 2014: a cross
656 sectional study. Ciccozzi M, ed. *PLoS One.* 2015;10(3):e0118675.
657 doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118675
- 658 33. Hassen A, Godesso A, Abebe L, Girma E. Risky driving behaviors for road traffic
659 accident among drivers in Mekele city, Northern Ethiopia. *BMC Res Notes.*
660 2011;4(1):535. doi:10.1186/1756-0500-4-535
- 661 34. Castillo-Manzano JI, Castro-Nuño M, Fageda X. Exploring the relationship between truck
662 load capacity and traffic accidents in the European Union. *Transp Res.* 2016;88:94-109.
663 doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2016.02.003
- 664 35. US Department of Transportation. Federal Highway Administration University Course on
665 Bicycle and Pedestrian Transportation Lesson 20: Traffic Calming. *FHWA-HRT-05-123.*
666 2006:1-24.
- 667 36. Parker D, Reason JT, Manstead ASR, Stradling SG. Driving errors, driving violations and
668 accident involvement. *Ergonomics.* 1995;38(5):1036-1048.

- 669 doi:10.1080/00140139508925170
- 670 37. Yagil D. Instrumental and normative motives for compliance with traffic laws among
671 young and older drivers. *Accid Anal Prev.* 1998;30(4):417-424. doi:10.1016/S0001-
672 4575(98)00003-7
- 673 38. Duke J, Guest M, Boggess M. Age-related safety in professional heavy vehicle drivers: A
674 literature review. *Accid Anal Prev.* 2010. doi:10.1016/j.aap.2009.09.026
- 675 39. Khorasani-Zavareh D, Mohammadi R, Khankeh HR, Laflamme L, Bikmoradi A, Haglund
676 BJA. The requirements and challenges in preventing of road traffic injury in Iran. A
677 qualitative study. *BMC Public Health.* 2009;9:486. doi:10.1186/1471-2458-9-486
- 678 40. Somasundaraswaran AK, Tay R. Self-reported differences between crash-involved and
679 non-crash-involved three-wheeler drivers in Sri lanka. *IATSS Res.* 2006.
680 doi:10.1016/s0386-1112(14)60157-6
- 681 41. Reason J, Manstead A, Stradling S, Baxter J, Campbell K. Errors and violations on the
682 roads: a real distinction? *Ergonomics.* 1990;33(10-11):1315-1332.
683 doi:10.1080/00140139008925335.
- 684 42. American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials (AAHSTO). An
685 Introduction to the Highway Safety Manual. 2010:1-16.
686

Figures




Figure 1

Map of the study area, Hintalo Wejerat District, Tigray, Ethiopia




Figure 2

Cross-sectional profile of Hintalo Wejerat speed reducers compared with other common transverse vertical speed reducer designs (A) Hintalo Wejerat speed reducer- 2.5 sinusoidal undulations; (B) Speed bump; (C) Speed hump- Sinusoidal; (D) Speed hump- Circular; (E) Speed hump- Parabolic; (F) Speed table



Figure 3

A heavy truck passes across a transverse speed reducer in Hintalo Wejerat District, Tigray, Ethiopia




Figure 4

Crash characteristics on a section of rural road in Hintalo Wejerat District, Tigray, September 2010 - August 2015.




Figure 5

Observed number of collisions, modeled trend, and counterfactual prediction in Hintalo Wejerat District, Tigray, September 2010 - August 2015




Figure 6

Seasonally adjusted Poisson regression model estimating of the impact of speed reducer installation on number of monthly collisions, Hintalo Wejerat, Tigray, September 2010-August 2015. IRR: Incidence rate ratios; 95% CI: 95% Confidence interval




Figure 7

Visual representation of factors related to road traffic crash. The frequency with which each factor was mentioned by study participants is depicted on a 5-point scale, increasing from the center to the corners of the diamond. Speedy driving (SS=4.8/5) and flaws in the licensing system (LL=4.5/5), were the most commonly mentioned factors that contribute to road traffic crashes.